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Executive Summary 
 The Icelandic economic crash in fall 2008 was unprecedented in the nation´s history with the 
Icelandic banks being bailed out only 5 years after having been privatized. All of Iceland´s three 
main banks, Glitnir bank, Landsbanki and Kaupthing bank, went into receivership the within a 
10 day span, with most of the savings banks system following those same footsteps in the 
following months. Iceland´s fiscal costs in terms of Gross domestic product (GDP) reached 
unheard levels within advanced nations in at least 40 years. 
A banking and economic meltdown on such a grand scale raises questions. Among such 
questions is what caused such events to occur and maybe more importantly, especially in light 
of the fact that similar failures are well known in financial history, why were such events 
allowed to occur?  Following such an analysis, a natural question is if lessons could be learned 
from such events.  
Given that the crash was to a large extent global, it is worthwhile paying attention to how similar 
the circumstances were in different societies and what, if any, differed between countries and 
regions. 
The research project focuses on investment behavior and the Icelandic economic bubble and 
crash, emphasizing that investment behavior has to be seen within a historical and cultural 
environment. As such the project is related to financial history and behavioral finance. The 
project’s main goals can be summarized into the following key research question:  
What cultural conditions shaped the appearance and formation of the financial bubble in 
Iceland and in what way did those conditions differ, if any, from other countries and to what 
extent?  
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The main results are that cultural conditions influenced the creation of the Icelandic banking 
miracle that ended so badly. Certain dimensions in the Icelandic culture were more suspect of 
embracing values that (temporarily) opened doors to possibly naïve beliefs. Technological and 
ideological changes on an international level also influenced the Icelandic culture; more than 
most cultural studies anticipate. Some changes in the Icelandic culture were, however, caused 
to a certain extent by design, even an invented cultural one, rather than default. With the use of 
the media some agents convinced the Icelandic country that their best interests were served 
blindly embracing certain values when in fact those agents were reaping the profits with 
speculation and risk taking that the public was eventually left to face the consequences of.  
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 1. Theoretical Background 
The Icelandic economic crash in fall 2008 was unprecedented in the nation´s history with the 
Icelandic banks being bailed out only five years after having been privatized. Seldom, if ever, 
has such a banking crisis occurred in the Western world.1  
All of Iceland´s three main banks, Glitnir bank, Landsbanki and Kaupthing bank, went into 
receivership the within a 10 day span. Most of the banks within the savings banks system shared 
the same fate during the following months (SIC 2010a; SICSB 2014). 2 Total governmental debt 
went from being 22% of Iceland´s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 to 80% in 2010 
(Iceland´s Finance Ministry 2015), with real estate prices, adjusted for inflation, falling about 
a third following the crash (Mixa & Sigurjonsson 2010).  
A recent study by Laeven and Valencia (2013) of systematic banking crises world-wide during 
1970-2011 concludes that Iceland´s fiscal costs in terms of (GDP) were the highest of advanced 
countries during the period, at 44% of GDP. Reinhart and Rogoff´s (2008, 3) comparison of 
banking crises from the post-War period until 2007 defined 18 such crises, with three among 
the five most severe ones being in Norway (1987), Finland (1991) and Sweden (1991), where 
the starting year of each crisis started is in parenthesis. According to Laeven and Valencia (ibid, 
255-259), comparable costs associated with the Nordic crises Reinhart and Rogoff (ibid) 
identified were 3%, 13% and 4% respectively, with Ireland´s crisis in 2008 being the only 
nation suffering anything close to comparable losses of Iceland faced at 41% of GDP. 
                                                          
1 It could be argued that the South Sea Company and Mississippi Company bubbles that both burst in 1720 had a 
larger effect on society, and even to a degree the Tulipomania in the Netherlands that burst in 1637. While bills 
of exchange did exist at that point, a banking system as it is usually defined today was, however, in its infancy.  
2 SIC is an abbreviation of the Special Investigation Commission, which focused in a major report on the causes 
regarding the Icelandic banking system, particularly the three Icelandic banks, which were Glitnir bank, 
Landsbanki and Kaupthing bank. SICSB is an abbreviation of another Special Investigation Commission that 
focused in a major report on the causes regarding the Icelandic savings banks system, which also went mostly 
bankrupt following the financial crash in 2008. 
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The costs to the economy as a whole were also very high in Iceland, although not on the same 
relative scale as the direct fiscal costs transferred to taxpayers. There was a major slowdown in 
the economy, but such comparisons can be problematic since output growth prior to crises tends 
to be higher than normal. By focusing on the increase in unemployment, the percentage increase 
from the starting point of each crises until its highest points within five years later was in 
Norway 4.0%, in Sweden 7.5%, in Finland 13.5% (IMF 2009) and in Iceland it was 6.0%.  
A banking and economic meltdown on such a grand scale raises questions. Among such 
questions is what caused such events to occur and maybe more importantly, especially in light 
of the fact that similar failures are well known in financial history, why were such events 
allowed to occur?  Following such an analysis, a natural question is if lessons could be learned 
from such events.  
A banking and economic meltdown on such a grand scale raises questions. Among such 
questions is what caused such events to occur and maybe more importantly, especially in light 
of the fact that similar failures are well known in financial history, why were such events 
allowed to occur? A lack of historical perspective was clearly evident, allowing imprudent 
business behavior to develop and unsound investment philosophies to become wide spread. The 
financial crash was (initially) due to Iceland´s three main banks’ failure to refinance their short 
term debt following a run on deposits in the UK and Netherlands (Bagus & Howden 2009). 
Debt had swollen during the years prior to the crash, mainly short term debt maturing in three 
to five years (SIC 2010b, 3) that occurred with rapid speed as the three main banks became 
privatized. While the Central Bank of Iceland (CBI) attempted to cool down the expansion by 
raising interest rates, the banks used other measures to raise capital. One was with direct CBI 
assistance, which increased lending to financial institutions via collateralized loans from 30 
billion Icelandic krona to 500 billion Icelandic krona, of which 300 billion were against 
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collateral in securities and letters of credit in the three largest banks from autumn of 2005 to the 
beginning of October 2008 (SIC 2010c, 6). Also, the ever increasing interest rate differential 
fuelled capital inflows with the issuance of Eurobonds that were commonly known in relation 
to Iceland as “glacier bonds.” Such bond issuances did not begin until August of 2005 but had 
by September of 2007 reached 450 billion Icelandic krona, the equivalent to 35% of Iceland´s 
gross domestic product (GDP), which to a large extent filtered into Iceland´s economy with an 
increased inflow of money leading to rising asset prices (SICa, 149-150) and also causing the 
appreciation of the Icelandic krona making imported goods cheaper and thus increasing their 
demand, leading to an increased current net deficit (ibid, 152). This development helped 
creating a vicious cycle that the higher domestic Icelandic interest rates became, the more 
interest rates were raised, the more the exchange rate appreciated leading to further capital 
inflows (Plantin & Shin 2011, 4). When the economic crash occurred, the appreciation of the 
Icelandic krona went into reverse leading to prices of imported goods rising    
Once the status of the banks was properly investigated, it became apparent that it was not mere 
illiquidity that caused the crash but more than anything else it was caused by factors such as 
failures in investments, quality controls in risk management, corruption, unreasonable leverage 
and even ignorance and stupidity (SIC 2010a; SICSB 2014). Not only were Glitnir bank, 
Landsbanki and Kaupthing bank put into receivership but many companies went bankrupt or 
had to be re-structured financially (Statistics Iceland n.d.; Icelandic Competition Authority 
2011). Similar failures are well known in financial history. The stock market crashes in the 
United States in 1907 and 1929 are well known examples in the banking arena and also major 
companies such as the brokerage company Drexel Burnham Lambert in 1990 and energy 
company Enron in 2001 (Bruner & Carr 2007; Sobel 1968; Stewart 1992; McLean & Elkind 
2004). This was thus not the first time a major banking crisis had occurred with devastating 
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effects; history is littered with similar examples that very few, especially in Iceland, seemed to 
have learned any lessons from.   
Following the crash, market participants and also to a large degree the entire population of 
Iceland have been learning, or in some cases re-learning, certain truths regarding financial 
markets, particularly those that pertain to financial bubbles.  Although the key characteristics 
of the Icelandic bubble are well known (Gylfason 2011; Zoega 2011; Halldorsson & Zoega 
2010; SIC 2010a; SICSB 2014; Mixa 2009a), the focus is mainly on financial data and possible 
corruption. The historical specificity led many Icelanders to believe that this time things were 
different, both during the prelude of the crash and also its immediate aftermath. Some writings 
did, however, point out certain similarities to prior crashes. A huge influence was the 
publication of the book This Time is Different (2009) in the aftermath of the crash by Reinhart 
& Rogoff, which showed in a thorough and quantitative way (a first among books focusing on 
financial crashes) the similarities of quantitative financial data during preludes of historic 
financial crashes (the title of the book is intentionally ironic). Yet, the financial landscape in 
Iceland during the years before the crash were virtually without precedence with the financial 
system growing at rates virtually unheard of (Halldorsson & Zoega 2010; Sigurjonsson & Mixa 
2011), with the private credit vs. GDP ratio rising well over fourfold from year end 1998 to 
2007 (Johnsen 2014, 7).  
Given that the crash was to a large extent global, it is worthwhile paying attention to how similar 
the circumstances were in different societies and what, if any, differed between countries and 
regions.  
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1.1. Objectives of the Project and Research Question  
The research project focuses on investment behavior and the Icelandic economic bubble, 
emphasizing that investment behavior has to be seen within a both historical and cultural 
environment. As such the project is related to financial history and behavioral finance. The 
project’s main goals can be summarized into the following research questions:  
What cultural conditions shaped the appearance and formation of the financial bubble in 
Iceland and in what way did those conditions differ, if any, from other countries and to what 
extent?  
This question entails a few issues that are addressed, although in varying proportions, in my 
thesis. Among those issues and related questions are:  
 The difference between Icelandic bankers and the rest of the Icelandic nation when it 
came to finance. In other words, are there large differences between investment cultures 
and national cultures? Did foreign bankers view Icelandic bankers as being different in 
any way? 
 Is the global investment culture more important than national culture in determining 
investment strategies and risk assessments? Have there been rapid cultural 
developments during recent decades? 
 Do representations of past successes in stock investing amplify a feedback loop to a 
greater extent in Iceland than in other nations, which possibly had a more mature 
financial history concerning investments, making Icelanders more susceptible to the 
illusion of prosperity?  
I use financial data to compare various financial macro data between nations to establish 
different proportional progresses in the prelude of the crash in Iceland 2008. Such information 
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is intertwined with cultural comparisons using the most common method in the field of cultural 
finance when seeking clues of differences in cultures between nations. These issues and 
questions show to a degree the historical (horizontal) and cultural/social (vertical) dimension 
of the thesis. The hypothesis is that various cultural and behavioral effects form accepted 
attitudes can lead to circumstances where financial bubbles are more likely to take place. The 
research analyzes the effects formed in Iceland, comparing them to other nations such as the 
Nordic nations and ones with high individualism (as defined by dimensional studies explained 
in more detail later) and placing them in a historical and cultural context, attempting to 
understand similarities and disparities.  
This is addressed in this thesis through a series of papers published in international journals and 
edited book chapters addressing different aspects of these key issues described above. This 
involves basing research on both qualitative and quantitative methods, linking these methods 
together for a generalized overview and a more nuanced understanding of particular aspects. 
This also means that the focus is on painting a picture of circumstances providing a deep 
understanding of Iceland’s financial and cultural landscape, using foreign ones as comparisons. 
Whether one looks at financial indicators or cultural ones, the first step is generally analyzing 
comparison studies in an attempt to gain an understanding from a certain standpoint as opposed 
to defining what normative financial or behavior is. An obvious way of doing such research is 
comparing Iceland’s financial landscape to other nations such as Nordic ones. Last but not least 
importantly, it also involves studying cultural differences between nations in many ways similar 
to Iceland and Iceland’s historical financial history.   
While most research papers about the Icelandic crisis have concentrated on the causes of the 
crises by focusing on internal macro issues (Ólafsson 2008; Matthíasson 2008; Jannari 2009; 
Daníelsson & Zoega 2009; Bagus & Howden 2009; SIC 2010a), my research gives a deeper 
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insight on how Iceland´s interlinked social environment influenced and shaped investment 
strategies and risk assessments preceding the crash as well as emphasizing how these conditions 
contributed to the crash. Iceland is a central point in my research, concentrating on financial 
data within the country, comparing it to other countries, in addition to cultural factors between 
nations and also the global changes occurring during the years preceding the crash in 2008, 
years I refer to as the Manic Millennium (Mixa 2009b). By using this example, the thesis seeks 
to contribute to ongoing scholarly discussions about cultural finance as a discipline, 
methodologies and theoretical orientations.  It stresses the importance to critically investigate 
concepts used and how they can be developed for further research, and providing a greater 
understanding in the field of finance and other related fields. 
I will start the discussion in this introduction by clarifying the use of key concepts in this thesis. 
While a general agreement exists about many conceptual issues, the concepts below that I 
briefly define and explain further have multiple understandings and also how they relate to each 
other. I thus begin defining those concepts and underline my view of how they should be used. 
I thus discuss different ways of looking at finance from behavioral economics to cultural 
finance, demonstrating the need to take the culture concept under closer investigation.  Then I 
discuss the papers themselves and how they link with the overall theoretical framework and 
how they address the research question. Finally, I will address the main findings of the overall 
thesis.   
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1.2 Behavior, Culture, Finance & Finance 
In this section I critically assess how scholars have talked about the interrelationship between 
finance and culture. This involves giving an overview of differences in behavioral and cultural 
approaches towards financial matters and how those concepts differ when looking from a purely 
financial dimension and an economic one. I begin by providing a short overview of behavioral 
finance with the intent to relate it to cultural finance. Consequently, I show why I consider the 
concept cultural economics more applicable in the discussion of this thesis than cultural finance.  
1.2.1. Behavioral Finance 
Behavioral finance (interchangeably imprecisely referred to as behavioral economics), is a field 
that studies the effects on psychological social and cognitive factors affecting people, both on 
an individual level, groups and also institutions, relating to investment behavior. The main focus 
generally involves what may constitute irrational investment behavior of many sorts (Reuter 
2009, 35). The consequences of such (sometimes irrational) behavior can be found in the 
demand of certain types of investments, which not only affects market prices of securities and 
other investment vehicles but also resource allocation, since money is transferred to projects of 
various industries and regions where money flows in accordance with the common view of 
were the highest returns are in tandem with associated risks. If the behavior becomes irrational 
due to some types of trends, certain securities, types of securities or other types of investments 
become either grossly undervalued or overvalued when measured against historical data of real 
returns and thus their future expected values, i.e., the market prices of such investments veer to 
a large degree away from their fundamental values. It is, however, very often difficult to assess 
with a certainty what fundamental values actually are since they to a large extent rely on future 
incomes with a large amount of uncertainty. Often, still, such irrationality becomes obvious, 
especially with the benefit of hindsight. Recent examples include the dot.com bubble that burst 
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2000-2001 and the housing bubble that shocked financial markets in August 2007, reached a 
high point in fall 2008 and still rattles western economies.  
The foundation of behavioral finance is not built upon unknown stock market realities that have 
only recently been discovered. Knowledge of systematic irrationality by investors has been 
known for centuries (Chancellor 2000). A famous example is the Dutch Tulipomania that 
reached its height in 1637, a period that Mackay illustrates as being when “the rage among the 
Dutch to possess them was so great that the ordinary industry of the country was neglected” 
(1841/1980, 94), illustrating vividly how the misplacement of investments affects not only 
investments and securities markets but also economies as a whole, hence rationality (or 
behavior) regarding investments directly affects the economy and can thus be said to be on the 
same side of the coin.  Case in point is the relationship between the Crash in 1929 (relating to 
financial markets) and the Great Depression (relating to the economy) during the following 
years is one of the most debated issue in economic history (Chancellor 2000, 224).   
Many investment classics have described irrational investment behavior of various sorts 
(Gordon 1999; Carret 1930/1997; Fisher 1958/1996; Lefévre 1923/1994). A great deal has 
additionally been written and chronicled regarding financial bubbles (Kindleberger & Aliber 
2011; Galbraith 1955/1997; Chancellor 2000) with further work related to the field of 
behavioral finance often discussing how investment irrationality in various ways leads to the 
creation of financial bubbles (Shiller 2000; Surowiecki 20053; Pompian 2006; Zweig 2007). 
Behavioral finance as a science is, however, a recent field that began emerging as an 
independent one in response to the rational market theory formulated mainly at the University 
                                                          
3 Surowiecki actually contends that the wisdom of crowds is most often close to the best estimate, which may yet 
open doors to financial bubbles since people‘s rule of thumb is that the crowd is correct, as is often in financial 
markets. 
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of Chicago in the 1960s with the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) as its best known element 
(Fox 2011, ix). Fama (1970, 383) defined an efficient market as one where security prices 
always fully reflect all available information, i.e., the market always knows best. From the 
beginning of the 1980s new empirical studies reversed such EMH claims leading to the 
emergence of a new approach – behavioral finance (Szyszka 2008). From that point on, many 
anomalies were discovered, among which are investors’ tendency to overtrade despite 
decreasing returns (Barber & Odean 2000),  investor’s tendency to under-react to news in the 
short run (generally labelled conservatism) (Rendleman et al. 1982) but also to over-react to 
successes in the long run (generally labelled representation) (Poteshman 2001). The element 
of conservatism may be one of the reasons why momentum buyers often buy the best 
performing stocks in the most recent 12-18 month period; many investors are still anchoring 
their value to prices from a recent past, often stocks that had represented bad returns in years 
prior to the turnaround (Ilmanen 2011). Perhaps the greatest known theory related to behavioral 
finance, and could be considered a harbinger of the science, is the Prospect Theory put forward 
by Kahneman & Tversky in 1979, which showed how investors’ risk assumptions were affected 
by reference points and the framing of questions. People are generally willing risk more to 
recoup perceived losses but less willing to endanger gains, something MacKenzie (2008, 267) 
points out contradicts a lore among traders, especially ones Ilmanen (2011) refers to, that one 
should run with ones profits but cut losses. 
Related to such complicated dynamics at play is the price-feedback loop mechanism. Akerlof 
& Shiller (2009) describe this as a tendency of people buying or selling stocks due to past price 
changes, i.e. becoming representative to a certain trend, which may develop into a vicious cycle 
of price-to-price feedbacks that will eventually burst since expectations of further price 
increases cannot support rising prices indefinitely. People become less inclined to save since 
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their savings have increased so much in value through market gains in the stock market, i.e., 
when bull markets are the trend. With a lower savings-ratio, more money is put into spending, 
causing added product demand leading to higher operational returns and yet higher sales that 
increase profits and thus provide a temporary justification of higher equity prices. A vicious 
cycle has developed, one that only ends at some inflection point (Soros 2003) that has proven 
difficult by academics to systematically predict. This investment behavior that is generally 
viewed as part of behavioral finance does yet have an effect on the whole economy that sends 
positive signals (until the inflection point has been reached) to the stock market, and so the 
circular motion continues between signals from society to individual investors, intertwined with 
political agendas that may transform institutions and also structural networks as pointed out by 
Vaiman, Sigurjonsson and Davidsson (2009). 
1.2.2 Cultural Finance 
The field of behavioral finance has, however, given little thought to different aspects between 
cultures, generally assuming that people and thus their societies all over the world act and re-
act in the same manner when it comes to financial and economic issues. One could say that the 
focus is on the individual within the field within a particular historical and cultural environment. 
MacKenzie (2008, 266) states that behavioral finance sometimes focuses too narrowly on 
psychological and individual issues. Shefrin’s (2010, 16-17) literature overview of behavioral 
finance states that behavioral finance mainly draws from individualistic psychology rather than 
a social one. That is not to say that behavioral finance ignores social influences all together. It 
is rather that the focus is on the influences society place upon the individual,4 as opposed to 
                                                          
4 The Asch confirmity experiments done in the 1950s showed how people were willing to change their opinions 
of obvious facts when influenced by groups that in experiments willingly gave false answers. Shiller (1995) 
showed, however, that people‘s opinions is altered to a similar degree by information bias rather than a social 
one, with people assuming that other people must be right. This circles back to behavioral finance, dealing with 
the tendency of people assuming that “the crowd” surely knows better. 
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individuals combining to create a consensus of a certain world-view, and the assumption that 
such influences and views are world-wide the same. Shiller (2014, 2) recently stated about the 
relation of financial bubbles and behavioral effect that “a speculative bubble is a peculiar kind 
of fad or social epidemic that is regularly seen in speculative markets; not a wild orgy of 
delusions but a natural consequence of the principles of social psychology coupled with 
imperfect news media and information channels.” Shiller´s words suggest that social rather than 
merely individual forces are at play in creating financial bubbles that are then influenced by 
media channels, which have in recent years transformed via the increased use of television 
channels on a global scale and more recently and possibly more importantly through Internet 
coverage. It can be contended that if social forces differ between nations due to cultural 
variations, such differences must be scrutinized to apply behavioral aspects properly. 
Since the late 1990s, scholars have increasingly criticized this ‘non-cultural bias’ within 
behavior finance, i.e., the tendency to judge phenomena with standards of a single culture 
(Shiller 1999; Statman 2006; Statman 2008). Different social influences on individuals’ 
financial behavior are the main basis of what is generally referred to as cultural finance (or 
cultural economics). Demonstrating the importance of focusing more closely on ‘culture’ in 
relation to finance and economic issues, Breuer and Quinten (2009) maintain that cultural 
finance5 can be located as an interface between finance and social sciences, contending that the 
consequences of globalization suggests that cultural finance as a research area will expand fast. 
They see cultural finance as a bridge between a neo-classical point of view of finance (where 
market players are purely rational, and obey laws and regulations within parameters that provide 
no place for corruption) and behavioral finance (where market players are considered more 
influenced by cognitive and emotional factors related to financial decision making). As such, 
                                                          
5 In this essay cultural finance is viewed as cultural economics. 
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cultural finance can be defined as a discipline that takes cultural aspects into consideration when 
analyzing financial matters in regards to behavior within society. Stulz’s & Williamson’s 
(2003) analysis begs the question that if culture has been shown to being important regarding 
legal traditions how the same could not be true regarding financial matters. A recent survey by 
Reuter (2009) of culture and finance shows cultural finance emerging as a field within 
publications with explicit culture-interest in financial research, with publications relating to this 
field only consistently starting a decade ago (during the writing), with working papers as a 
majority in recent years. Breuer and Quinten (2009) even proclaim that cultural finance can be 
seen as constituting a new, autonomous discipline within the field of economics. The systematic 
use of culture-concepts in financial research is thus recent and gaining a larger audience with 
an increase of interest in culture among financial scholars, involving as well a more 
interdisciplinary approach in understanding financial phenomena.   
To the best of my knowledge, cultural finance research is limited in scope, with no studies in 
Iceland or internationally having been done in a constant and systematic way. A cultural 
comparison study between Iceland and USA has been published comparing the prelude of the 
crash in Iceland 2008 and the Great Crash in USA 1929 (Mixa 2009b). It was, however, a 
general overview of precipitating factors related to social issues indicating that a financial 
bubble was brewing as Shiller (2000) described regarding the years preceding the dot.com 
bubble and the Icelandic social environment during the years before the 2008 crash. This is 
hence a topic that is recent in the international arena and thus not surprisingly with limited 
research so far in Iceland. 
1.2.3 Culture 
As stated, the study of behavioral finance assumes that what applies to individuals in one culture 
applies the same (or a very similar manner) in other cultures. It can thus be seen as a study of 
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individuals in intra-relationships within a specific cultural and historical environment. This is 
still a complicated task, with the no universally accepted definition of the concept of culture 
existing, not even within the social sciences, as I will soon address. Reuter (2009) states that no 
such consensus exists in cultural finance studies, which even sometimes skip defining the 
concept. This inconsistency ensures that the findings of various studies may be interpreted in 
different manners simply because the ideas researchers have of culture may differ.  The same 
data may thus lead to different conclusions among researchers.  
The most common systematic efforts in implementing concepts or variables in financial 
research related to culture are Hofstede’s cross-national culture indices, generally labeled the 
‘dimensionalist literature’ (Reuter 2009). Hofstede´s methodology in comparing cultures is 
extremely influential among researchers in business and organizational areas, which views 
culture on a relative scale , being a “collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede et al. 2010, 6). Hofstede 
himself graphically asserts that the structure within each culture is built up in layers in what he 
describes as an onion, where values are the core of cultural differences.  
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Figure 1. Onion Layer of Cultures 
 
Source:  Hofstede et al. (2010, 8) 
 
Hofstede’s methods seek to determine (via questionnaires) people’s values first and foremost, 
on a relative scale by comparing various dimensions of cultures, not defining how cultures 
should be in one way or another.  Hofstede’s methods are usually referred to dimensionalist 
studies due to the focus on various dimensions between countries scale.  
Such a relative method fits nicely with psychologist´s views. Ariely (2009, 1-23) points out that 
people generally define what they should be doing in relative terms, e.g. quoting H.L. Mencken, 
Ariely (playfully) states that a man’s satisfaction with his salary depends on whether he makes 
more money than the husband of his wife’s sister.  Social pressures may differ between societies 
in shaping people´s definition of themselves, like people comparing each other during family 
gatherings. Kindleberger (1996, 13) describes this relative notion from the standpoint of stock 
market gains, stating that nothing is as disturbing as seeing one’s neighbor becoming easily rich 
via investments (a relative comparison thus emerges, “I should be that way too”).  This can be 
further related to how people define themselves and their role within a larger society or nations 
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as a whole within larger territories. Germany’s social structure crumbled when the middle class 
was mostly wiped out financially post WWI, calling for a radical altering of their views of how 
they defined themselves and their nation (Ahamed 2009).   
Hofstede (Hofstede et al. 2010, 128) takes Adam Smith’s theory regarding the “invisible hand” 
as an  example of a generally accepted theory within the heart of economics, yet the science of 
economics is based on an individualistic idea that has been mainly explored within countries 
that score highly on individualism, thus not being necessary applicable in all territories. He 
points out that economics has remained an individualistic science with most of its contributors 
coming from highly individualistic nations such as the United States and Britain. The classic 
case of the Tragedy of the Commons may, for example, be more relevant in certain countries 
than others and must take into account contextual factors (McCay & Acheson 1990, 6-10). By 
the same token, individualism is not necessarily a universal phenomenon but culturally specific 
to individualistic countries, with duties and relations between individuals being different in 
different cultures. Territories that may not adhere to the same extent are ones that score highly 
on the other side of the spectrum, i.e., on collectivism.   
Hofstede’s methods are not the only ones used. Recently a culture model by Schwartz has 
gained in popularity (Breuer & Quinten 2009) because many deem it as overcoming some of 
the methodological weaknesses inherent in the Hofstede model, although both models take the 
impact chain of culture as being a given (ibid). What such models have in common is that they 
are attempts in defining cultures in systematic ways. This may be helpful in creating a 
standardized setting of how the concept is defined. When doing a detailed study, however, the 
use of such models can only be viewed as being stepping stones.  As Hofstede et al. themselves 
state (2010, 48-49), dimensional methods involve not merely collecting the data but also 
interpreting it, determining its usefulness and limitations, and comparing and applying it to a 
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specific topic. Increased production in Asia in recent decades has for example been explained 
with the arguments that the general long term orientation among cultures in the region is 
yielding results. It has also been detected that individualism is prevalent in nations that score 
highly regarding individualism usually have economic superiority compared to other nations. 
It is, however, difficult to say whether cultural effects created such effects or whether the 
surroundings created something that constitutes being of a certain cultural nature. It is for 
example interesting that nations with high individualism scores tend to have lower economic 
growth once they have reached higher individualism. This can be explained in a way that such 
nations contain a great number of people that can afford having such individualist views, having 
often a strong social system with thus a less need of collectivism among individuals as some 
sort of insurance of survival among individuals within a society (Hofstede et al. 2010, 132-
133).  
Hofstede’s methods have been criticized by numerous researchers, with for example 
McSweeney (2002) criticizing Hofstede´s generalization of nations and averaging scores within 
nations as being yet representive of the nation and Ailon (2008) further arguing that the studies 
and subject used to gather data are too centered on Western subjects and assumptions, thus not 
taking into account the diversity of other groups within nations. While Hofstede´s methods are 
not flawless and by their own admission (Hofstede et al. 2010) with limitations, they remain 
nevertheless the most popular method in studying cross-national cultures (Breuer & Quinten 
2009) and compare still favorably with other frameworks (Magnusson et al. 2008). 
Quantitative research using the dimensionalist perspective advocated by Hofstede (i.e. cross 
cultural comparison) is immense in an international context, while lacking in relation to Iceland. 
A paper Eyjolfsdottir & Smith wrote in 1997 has been e.g. been often cited, in which they infer 
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Iceland being similar to other Nordic countries using Hofstede’s methods as a base point, 
despite offering no supporting quantitative data.   
Two University of Iceland studies analyze the main characteristics of Icelanders using Hofstede 
dimensional analysis (Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson 2011; Gudmundsdottir, 
Gudlaugsson & Adalsteinsson 2015). Another study I am aware of was conducted by Kaupthing 
prior to the crash. The results of that study have though not been properly analyzed nor publicly 
released. There have been other minor studies using Hofstede’s methods that cannot be 
considered being reliable. The results from those studies combined may still provide indications 
of the general financial/economic mood in Iceland that may, due to Iceland’s smallness, provide 
a glimpse of how those views altered the perception of Icelanders concerning financial matters. 
It is important to underline that cultural analysis in this thesis takes the common current view, 
which will be later explained in further historical detail, that no true or correct cultures exist but 
is rather subject to comparisons of each other.  
1.2.4. Cultural Economics 
When discussing behavioral finance, the commonly interchangeable term behavioral 
economics is often used. The former term focuses on issues relating to the act of investing while 
the latter one additionally entails the effects investment decisions have on the whole economy, 
i.e., both the act of investing (and thus the allocation of capital and resources) and also the 
economic effects. Such effects within the economy create a feedback that both begins 
influencing people’s investment behavior, not only in terms of investing but also consumption 
(that creates yet another feedback loop) and attitudes towards savings, risk and the public’s 
willingness to accept and follow certain ideologies. Galbraith (1955/1997, 169-170) describes 
such an economic and social environment stating that: “People must also have faith in the good 
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intentions and even in the benevolence of others, for it is by the agency of others that they will 
get rich.” It is, in other words, old wisdom that during good times, people change their behavior 
in a way that affects the economy as a whole. I deem that the term cultural economics by that 
token also takes into account the effects of investment decisions on the economy as a whole, 
how the consequences of such decisions affect societies at large in possibly various manners 
between societies while cultural finance generally relates to a more narrow term concerned with 
the act of investments and how it may differ between societies. Cultural economics is thus a 
better term when describing the interplay between sociological aspects and economical ones, 
which are never-the-less closely tied with financial investment behavior, not merely when 
looking at recent events but also from a historical perspective.  
The behavioral finance term is additionally often associated with some sort of irrationality, 
which has a strong association with irrational investment decisions and is additionally often 
associated with financial crisis. This is exemplified by the title of the most famous book in the 
field of behavioral finance, Irrational Exuberance by Robert J. Shiller, which was initially 
published at the peak of the dot.com bubble in March 2000. It should be pointed out that the 
term rationality is difficult to define in finance, because despite its general association to 
psychological effects, with investors not being rational (Statman 2008b), it is well known that 
investors often have invested in securities they believed were overvalued but yet had reasons 
to surf current investing trends (Lynch 2000; Shiller 2002). Reasons include that being wrong 
for a long time and also different than “the crowd,” despite being eventually proven to be right, 
has costs professionals losing their jobs (Bloomberg 2002; Independent 2008). Also, investors 
often pay more attention to momentum trading rather than fundamentals (Mallaby 2010) in a 
fashion Ilmanen (2011) describes momentum traders, which often achieve above average 
returns.    
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Although the term cultural economics could also be deemed being associated with financial 
crisis, having defined in a clear manner the differences between the concepts behavioral 
finance, behavioral economics, cultural finance and finally cultural economics, it should be 
clear that cultural economics focuses on comparing different investment behavior between 
cultures without regard to its rationality (a term that is in itself difficult to define concerning 
investments), but still as a stepping stone in determining the likelihood of financial crisis under 
various circumstances in various cultures. The applicability of cultural economics could, 
however, just as well be to determine the financial institutional setting within different nations. 
Such an application could, still, be relevant when financial institutional settings are being 
transformed. An example of such a transformation is the liberalization of the banking system, 
which, e.g., is generally assumed having had large implications in the Nordic countries and 
Iceland during the prelude of their financial crisis. If one accepts the notion that such 
institutional and economic settings are part of culture, changing the set-up of those institutions 
radically opens the gates to profoundly change people’s views in society to various issues, and 
thus the culture. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 6) find for example that a financial 
crisis occurs more likely in countries where the banking sector is more liberalized, not often 
happening immediately following the aftermath of such liberalization but a few years later. 
They point to the fact that this is especially likely where bureaucracy is inefficient, contract 
mechanism are inefficient, a lack of respect is for the rule of law and corruption is widely 
spread. On a similar note, La Porta et al. (1998) come to the conclusion that laws and their 
enforcement differ between nations, and those nations with less investor protection suffer due 
to less developed equity and debt markets, which tend to enhance economic growth.    
The discussion above indicates that the distinction between behavioral finance and behavioral 
economics is in no way clear-cut. The degree of how much social (and if they differ, thus 
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cultural) issues vs. being individual is often unclear. One of the main concepts in behavioral 
finance is herding, a term relating to people mimicking actions of other people and hence how 
society influences the behavior of people. Sornette (2004, 94) links many economic activities 
to the herding concept such as investment recommendations, price behavior when common 
stocks are initially sold, earnings forecasts and portfolio management, to name a few. Even 
professionals are not immune to such activities. Lynch (2000, 59-63) describes portfolio 
manager’s tendency to mostly buy stocks known by the public so they have little explaining to 
do if stocks within the portfolio fall in value while Shiller (2001, 5&13) states that people are 
more likely to buy assets that have grabbed their attention (via the media or even just word-of-
mouth) and such assets are usually assets whose price has gone up recently; hence to deal with 
the clients’ expectations they portfolio managers have added pressure to invest according to 
certain fads their clients follow. Hence, society influences people’s behavior, with even 
professionals who should know better, feeling themselves forced to possibly amplify irrational 
behavior because of social influences but may also begin rationalizing that they must be wrong 
in their (rational) assumptions since so many others hold other views. This is a commonly 
accepted fact within behavioral finance. It is, however, often difficult to assess to what extent 
it is individualistic biases that causes irrational financial behavior opposed to societal peer 
pressure. Behavioral finance accepts this as a fact and while the field thus embraces sociological 
influences on investment behavior; it has done little research regarding different influences 
between nations or regions. 
1.2.5 History of Culture Related to Economics 
As previously discussed, no consensus of its definition exists in the field of cultural finance. 
What is probably more worrisome is the fact that some papers dealing with the subject have 
used the concept uncritically as if assuming that there was a shared understanding among 
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academics on the concept and as well as that those classified as belonging to a particular culture 
have the same views of what constitutes their culture. I have emphasized the importance of 
contributing from theoretical discussion about the culture concept, which exists in complex 
interrelations with social and historical factors.  
This is involves concepts such as power and hegemony, which strangely are often are absent in 
economic theories when approaching culture.6 While Sigurjónsson and I show in the first paper 
of this thesis that quantitative factors showed clear signs that a financial bubble was brewing in 
Iceland prior to the crash, the fifth paper of this thesis written with Loftsdóttir strongly hints at 
forces within the Icelandic society that had actual interests in creating a new value system 
within it. The degree to which this was by default rather than design cannot be determined but 
it is unquestionable that some agents that had interests of developing a new value system and 
thus culture in Iceland and consciously re-enforced and maintained such views within Iceland 
with the use of media.  
1.2.6 Culture in Tandem with Economics 
The word culture has its roots in the Latin word Cultura that is drawn from the noun to cultivate, 
which explains the relation of the word to agriculture (Jackson 2009, 16). The main thought of 
such use of language during the middle centuries related to the growth of the mind in a spiritual 
sense, with an increased emphasis on meditation, understanding and praying (Beugelsdijk & 
Maseland 2011; Jackson 2009). This began changing with the transformation of European 
societies changing from feudalism to capitalistic ones, with the individual coming more into 
the forefront than before. This was natural since ancient social contracts were being broken and 
                                                          
6 See for example discussion in the fifth paper regarding Keen‘s assertion that historical approaches have been 
removed from economic tool kits. 
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natural resources that once before belonged to society as a whole (not necessary still with the 
same rights or privileges) were transferred in the hands of individuals (Ritzer 2007).  
This period created a society/culture characterized by a great upheaval, unrest and even violent 
actions with the individual in the forefront. The need to frame the development with a coherent 
theory of the transformed society became urgent, explaining how a society could be justified 
where individuals had their own interests in the forefront but yet held together without chaos 
ruling and eventual disintegration within itself. Adam Smith published such a theory in 1776 in 
his book The Wealth of the Nations, in which he maintains that the value of goods within nations 
is not inherent in the wealth of the elite but rather the combined wealth and income of (free) 
individuals (Beugelsdijk & Maseland 2011). Although Smith describes some sort of law of the 
jungle (in a Darwinian vein), with every man for himself, he brought forth arguments that such 
a development would lead to added efficiency for society as a whole (Ritzer 2007), which at 
that point was with added industrialization and urbanization, applying specialization (or 
division of labor as Smith put it) to create and increased amount goods with less effort (Cassidy 
2010, 26-29).  
The conclusions Smith derived were built upon what may be called empirical studies. While 
working on the book he analyzed the operations of a pin (nail) factory and saw that its 
production increased with added specialization, which was in a certain contrast to Britain’s 
society during that period in which bands of hungry laborers at times roamed the country and 
impoverished people filled newly built factories, although Smith’s point was confirmed with 
living standards eventually rising within the free market society (Cassidy 2010, 27-28). Smith 
was describing a development of a pattern within society that was taking a new shape 
(Beugelsdijk & Maseland 2011); he was in other words not simply describing an economical 
concept but also took into account the governing culture within society that was rapidly shaping 
  
 
 
24 
 
itself towards a market economy and industrialization. It is, however, not unlikely that a certain 
justification of the developments within society, which affected the power structure between 
classes in Britain, influenced Smith´s writings, benefitting the interests of the main emerging 
market system and providing the necessary institutional framework for the growth for 
industrialists and merchants (Tsoulfidis 2010, 50); Smith was interested in in explaining how 
capitalistic markets worked, not how they failed (Roubini & Mihm 2010, 40).  
It is worth noting that the famous analogy of the (divine) invisible hand was framed within the 
effects of a different society and added efficiency in manufacturing without leading to chaos, 
but not in relation to financial markets in general. Smith was without doubt influenced by 
memories of one of history´s most famous stock market bubble, The South Sea Bubble, had 
occurred half a century sooner and its dire effects were still engraved in the minds of Britain’s 
public.7 Stock markets were hence still viewed with suspicion and were even illegal in Britain 
during the period of Smith´s writings; Smith himself considered joint-stock companies 
suffering from the separation of management from ownership and hence causing agency 
problems (Chancellor 2000, 90). Although Smith could be described as a free market advocate, 
it was not necessary in the vein that is commonly outlined today regarding financial markets, 
which often are assumed adjusting towards true values of securities like some sort of invisible 
hand guiding equilibrium of demand and supply. Cooper (2009, 93-105) shows, however, that 
while there is plausible arguments of market stability of goods and services, which does not 
apply to credit markets. 
Karl Marx contended that the shaping of the society and thus its culture was in many ways 
explained by how the ownership of machines and tools had formed a sociological pattern. Marx 
                                                          
7 Sir Isaac Newton lost enormous amounts in the bubble. It is said that no one was allowed uttering the words in 
his presence following the debacle. 
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regarded the ideas of the ruling class being in reality the ruling ideology of each culture, 
meaning that the class ruling over the machinery and other necessary resources to create 
valuable products not only had a financial superiority but also a mental/spiritual one (Tucker 
1978). This creates an interwoven relation between the economy and society in creating the 
fabric of the governing culture, where the production of goods becomes not merely an 
economical feature but also creating societal structures and ideologies in maintaining them, like 
human and spiritual relations.  
Since the construction of the economic life, which Marx placed in the center of society, steered 
these structures, it also influenced the legal and political landscape of its environment because 
those social pillars have guided the public towards acting in a manner that maintains such 
structures. Marx maintained that the ruling class thus not only ruled the economy but also 
culture and hence popular core beliefs within it, like what is right and wrong, beautiful and 
ugly, etc. The ideology of the ruling classes was thus the dominant ideology of each society at 
every point. Thus the dominant ideology of the ruling class defines to a great extent the culture 
of a state at any given time. The interpretation of reality of the ruling class is interpreted by 
society as a certain truth at each point in time and mirrors the collaboration of power and those 
who handle it (Marx & Engels1978, 64). 
Gramsci took this concept one step further by maintaining that the ruling class had a certain 
governing power, defined as hegemony rather than ideology, where the masses accept a general 
direction imposed upon the social life by the ruling class (2000). Gramsci made a distinction 
between ruling and hegemony; with ruling expressed as a direct coercion normally used in times 
of crisis but hegemony in more normal situations through political, social and cultural forces 
(Williams 1977, 108). If the general public accepts a certain ideology then the ruling class build 
their power structures not merely upon machines, tools or other types of financial wealth and 
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the structure of society, but also upon the fact that the masses believe that such power of the 
ruling class is built upon an ideology that serves the best interests for the society as a whole 
(Beugelsdijk & Maseland 2011). Hence, by having the population accepting concepts tied to 
the core of what constitutes as cultural issues such as ideology, beliefs, norms and customs that 
maintain the power of the ruling class, an even more and steadier sort of power is attained than 
through sheer ruling. This entails a change from the structural ideas of Marx who viewed power 
of the ruling class being purely economic through the ownership of machines, tools and natural 
resources.  
In 1937 Keynes wrote The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, which 
overthrew the dominant view of economics, mainly due its criticism that some invisible hand 
was at its own devices best suited in directing the economy; a sensible guidance of governments 
was also needed to steer the economy (Roubini & Mihm 2010, 43). It could be said that Keynes 
was taking a step in the direction of feudalism but instead of landlords, now governments were 
granted a larger role in controlling the economy.  Another point of view of Keynes’ writings is 
that individualism by itself as described by Smith did not suffice in maintaining an economic 
balance but a certain amount of collectivism was also needed. 
Although Keynes criticized the writings of Smith, particularly that some invisible hand guided 
the economy, he did not revert towards Marxism but rather combined the individualism Smith 
put forth as a driving force but tempered it with the argument that a government was yet needed 
to guide that invisible hand (Fox 2011, 35). Since Keynes’ arguments did not radically attack 
the dominantly accepted ideologies for the past decades but at the same time gave governments 
a green light in combining individualism to collectivism by piling money into economic activity 
(which provided good results during the following quarter of a century), it is was no surprise 
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that his views regarding the economy and its interaction with Western civilization became as 
accepted as they were.  
In an environment where structure of theories about culture became ever more complicated and 
concentrated increasingly on relationships and power structures, cultural hegemony became 
even more important. It was within such an environment that Polanyi brought forth a new vision 
of the definition of what an economy is, interpreted by Beugelsdijk & Maseland (2011, 98) as 
an economic system as something that entails certain universal governing rules (dealing for 
example with choices of scarcity as a form of science) he defined it as various means in which 
people interact with their social and physical environment for survival and reproduction 
purposes. Such means can take different shapes depending upon the location of each society, 
its climate, and with the advent of increased communication via telephones and the Internet one 
could argue that international ideologies play an increasingly bigger role. This fits with Tang 
& Koveos’ (2008) findings that there is anecdotal data showing that despite institutional factors 
such as geography and religion are important elements of culture, those dynamics in an 
increasingly integrated world (communication) may be declining in certain dimensional ways. 
1.2.6 Cultural Literature Linked with Finance 
Significant works in the domain of cultural finance have only recently started to appear, with 
key works appearing at the turn of the millennium (Breuer & Quinten 2009, 12). Reuter (2010, 
29), furthermore, points out that almost no dimensionalist research effort has been published in 
financial journals in spite of their potential contribution to understanding better workings of 
financial markets. Among the most cited works related to cultural literature in regards to finance 
is La Porta et al. (1998) study, claiming that investor protection between countries differs 
according to their cultures. This observation is important due to investor protection being a 
major issue in economic growth (Acemoglu & Robinson 2012), and thus such differences affect 
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each country’s stock markets. Stulz & Williamson (2003) important contribution to this 
literature was the observation that a county´s dominating religion is a predictor in the variation 
of the rights of creditors, meaning that different dominating religions between counties, which 
is cornerstone in most countries ‘culture, affect the financial landscape within each country in 
varying ways. Kwok & Tadesse (2005) show a correlation between higher mean scores of 
uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) and the types bank-based financial systems in each country, 
papers by Chui et al. (2010) and Dou et al. (2010) showing the correlation between 
individualistic cultures and stock market trading volumes, and Tang & Koveos´ research (2008) 
showing the correlation between individualism, power distance and long-term orientation with 
economic dynamics.  
In my own contribution to the field, I similarly to Kwok & Tadesse, use Hofstede as a base to 
move forward analysis of culture in relation to finance, which also involves a more nuanced 
reading of culture than often is done by those using his approach. The third paper in this thesis, 
“Financial Behavior in Iceland within the Framework of Hofstede´s Cultural Dimensions,” uses 
a dimensionalist approach, indicating a correlation between the level of individualism within 
nations and their propensity to save. By using a diverse set of data consisting on dimensional 
results and financial indicators, the paper shows that while nations may on the surface appear 
similar, their financial behavior may differ radically.  To my best knowledge, this approach has 
not been used before. Looking at historical elements before the Manic Millennium shows how 
the seeds were sown for the formation of classic types of financial bubbles, with a technological 
revolution in the communication industry occurring (Shiller 2001), money inflows into the 
country (Kindleberger & Aliber 2011) and wide spread optimism about the future (Reinhart & 
Rogoff 2009), there were also additional forces involved. As often occurs during such periods 
full of optimism, various sorts of promoters begin raising money for projects, many of which 
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are of a dubious nature, as Mackey (1841/1980) describes regarding the period when the Sea-
South bubble was forming in England in 1719, for example a company creating a wheel of 
perpetual motion and another one carrying on an undertaking of great advantage but no one 
knowing what it is. The fifth paper of this thesis, “Banks Glowing in Nationalism,” shows that 
the idea of Icelanders as in some way special regarding banking and business despite of their 
obvious lack of experience in such international matters was in spite of its absurdity sold to the 
Icelandic nation, hence enabling the banks to carry on their rapid expansion despite the 
associated risks that the Icelandic nation to a large degree eventually had to handle. Here I 
underline the importance of looking at historical conditions of finance as well as the 
consequences of rapid social changes into people’s perceptions and behavior. While the paper 
also stresses the continuity of cultural identity through different decades, it also shows how 
such cultural elements can be appropriated by different forces in society – to the benefit of rapid 
growth.  
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2. Research – Approach & Methodologies 
This PhD thesis advances further the use of the concept ‘culture’ within cultural economics by 
using an interdisciplinary approach, benefitting from the evolution of the concept within social 
sciences. That means that the focus will not be merely on quantitative variables but also takes 
a critical look at the evolution of Iceland’s culture that, interestingly, evolves remarkably in 
tandem with historical changes of the banking system in Iceland, which both are highly 
influenced by new technologies (cable television and the Internet), which is often a harbinger 
of economic growth but also often financial bubbles,8 and international changes in the financial 
system that had a major impact on cultures.  Numerical features will mainly focus on financial 
macro comparisons between nations and dimensional scores between nations/cultures. My 
research takes into account the critical approach within the social sciences that have criticized 
how the culture concept is often used in a simplistic way, for example as completely controlling 
people’s behavior (Skaptadóttir & Loftsdóttir 2009), in regard to how these insights can 
possibly deepen the concept of cultural economics.   
It is important to lay out the course of how I philosophically approach this study because few 
such studies have been conducted within the field of cultural finance and no systematic research 
has been done in predicting financial crisis and cultural variations as far as the author is aware 
of.9 This ambiguity is relevant to the study of finance in general, which is a field that deals 
mostly with future risk and rewards laden with uncertainty of company profits (affecting returns 
on stocks), interest rate movements (affecting returns of stocks, bonds and cash) and company 
failures and other unforeseeable events (affecting all types of ownership). Shiller (2001, 7) 
                                                          
8 See for example discussion in Shiller (2005, 107-131) regarding New Era thinking and Kindleberger & Aliber 
(2011, 26-38) regarding the anatomy of a typical crisis. 
9 Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache (1998) studies of financial fragility may be viewed as an early comparative 
study that may provide explanations of cultural differences combined with a discussion of different institutional 
settings. 
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gives examples of the difficulty portfolio managers constantly face when making investment 
decisions, that is seldom limited to quantitative number crunching but all types of other matters, 
with Shiller stating that: “No one person can be at once a historian, political scientist, economist, 
and psychologist rolled into one,” further stating that “synthesizing all this knowledge,…., is 
an even more difficult task than trying to add a piece of scholarly evidence.”  
One could easily fall into traps by interpreting results using simple inferences. Hofstede et al. 
(2011, 132) provide examples of such interpretation, showing that their research indicates that 
nations that score highly on individualism and generally enjoy higher wealth subsequently 
enjoy less economic growth than comparison nations despite popular belief of the contrary.  A 
similar example of drawing simplistic conclusions from data is pointed out by Vaiman, 
Sigurjonsson and Davidsson (2010) who show that corruption in Iceland exists despite 
traditional measurements indicating the opposite with results constantly published in the media 
prior to the crash 2008, but measurements did not in a subtle way detect. The myth of nations 
scoring high on individualism reaping comparatively high economic growth remains persistent 
while the assumed low level of corruption is being widely questioned.   
Delving too much into the data can be problematic, especially when the financial and cultural 
data is imprecise. That is not to say that it can provide clues about certain relationships. Kwok 
and Tadesse (2005) used dimensional analysis with the research hypothesis of whether nations 
with higher mean scores of uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), using Hofstede’s methods, were 
likelier to be associated with bank-based financial systems as opposed to market-based financial 
systems. While the authors did find a statistically significant relationship indicating that Anglo-
Saxon countries financial systems are more dominated by stock markets, they also underline 
the limitations of the study stating that they “deal with cultural and socio-political variables, the 
measurement of these variables is not precise” (26), furthermore stating that; “our empirical 
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tests do not provide a precise test of causal relationship. What we find is a significant 
association between national culture and the configuration of financial systems” (26-27). 
Hence, the authors do provide a substance to further findings but emphasize themselves the 
limitations of their findings published in their paper.  
Other studies have shown cultural relationships regarding finance. Chui et al. (2010) and as 
further demonstrated by Dou et al. (2010) show that individualistic cultures tend to have higher 
stock market trading volumes. The findings in a study done by Tang & Koveos (2008) show 
that individualism, power distance and long-term orientation are more prone to economic 
dynamics than uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. They suggest that institutional traditions 
and economic conditions should be reflected in cultural values, meaning that economic changes 
require constant adjustments of cultural dimensions. This resonates with Acemoglu and 
Robinson´s (2012, 7-8) argument in their book Why Nations Fail that social institutions have 
by far the greatest effect on how the economy of nations develop, either positively or negatively. 
This is a point the authors argue is due to the different historical build-up of institutional 
structures in each nation, which relates to power structures within societies. The definition of 
cultures when intertwined with economics is thus merely an approach but not an absolute one. 
In the survey of papers and articles focusing on cultural economics (or cultural finance as it is 
defined in his paper), Reuter (2010, 45) points out that there seems to be much confusion 
between culture and institutions and in cases of dimensionalist papers (using Hofstede’s 
methods) they do not come without additional references to institutions, hence “it seems that 
the emergence of the culture theme in financial research corresponds to a renewed interest to 
try and untangle the sources of national embededdness for financial phenomena: cultural, 
political, institutional, structural (networks)…” This is complicated, as Shiller’s discussion 
points out (2001, 7) addressing the difficulty of synthesizing various different fields of 
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knowledge relating to financial matters, which focus on financial analysis on a relatively 
minimal scale but rather on other aspects (both from an individual level and social one), and 
are yet so important when it comes to financial decision making; i.e., where to invest and hence 
resource allocation that affects the economy as a whole and shapes and transforms societies 
(due to investments or even due to the lack of investments in certain areas).  
2.1 Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches  
Reinhart and Rogoff layed a foundation of quantitative studies in the field of financial crises 
with their research that culminated with the book This Time is Different (2009), which is 
generally accepted as the first quantitative summarization of build-ups of financial bubbles over 
800 years. In another recent paper, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) focus on a quantitative and 
historical comparison approach is used to measure danger signs of bubbles in America. While 
I use to a large extent Reinhart and Rogoff´s general approach of using quantitative figures as 
a base of comparing preludes to financial crises, from a historical perspective, the additional 
aim of my research is combining such quantitative analysis to some sorts of dimensional 
literature. To the best of my knowledge such studies have not been done to date. As Reuter 
stated (2006), no review or consistent cultural framework has yet emerged in cultural 
economics.  
A quantitative approach using economic and financial ratios and dimensionalist comparison 
studies sets a foundation of framing such research. The first paper “Learning from the “Worst 
Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis and Nordic Comparisons” is quantitatively straight 
forward, comparing economic and financial ratios in Iceland during the prelude of the 2008 
financial crisis to such ratios in the Nordic countries during the prelude of the 1990s financial 
crisis. The aim of the paper is to quantitatively assess the extent of the growth of each nation´s 
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financial system and whether it was as much in Iceland as in the other Nordic countries. The 
results clearly show that the Icelandic financial system showed signs of much more expansion 
and thus possible overheating during the prelude to the Icelandic 2008 crisis compared to the 
Nordic 1990s crisis. During both comparison periods the banking system of all nations grew 
immensely, with the general conclusions that such rapid growth was to a large extent the reason 
of the Icelandic 2008 crisis (see for example Englund 1999; Jonung 2008; SIC 201010). This 
clearly shows that the Icelandic nation was much more willing to allow the banking system 
expand to a degree that it should have been obvious that inherent risks were associated with 
such an expansion. The paper thus provides a clear overview of the rapid growth of Iceland´s 
financial system during the years before the 2008 crash, both in absolute and relative terms.  
Qualitative research in the area of cultural economics is also limited. Other scholarly traditions 
such as anthropology have relatively recently given a more nuanced view of the dynamics at 
play between finance and society (Miyazaki 2006; Ho 2009; Graeber 2012). I focus at historical 
issues relating to finance (investments) and society in setting up a fuller picture of how cultural 
issues contributed to the financial crash in Iceland, focusing on how Iceland’s culture changed 
during the prelude and qualitatively use theories from the social sciences. 
In this regard the aim of this thesis is to analyze new cross-disciplinary uses of the concept 
culture, which is in line with Zingales’ (2000) view that new methodologies into finance are 
called for, as well as being informed by recent development of the ‘culture’ concept by social 
scientists that have discussed widely the relationship between culture and individuals as agents. 
                                                          
10 It should be pointed out that while the paper “Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis 
and Nordic Comparisons” was published about a year after the SIC report was published, it was ready for 
publication about a year before the SIC report was released. A main feature of the general results of the SIC 
report was that the Icelandic banking system simply grew too fast and was the first thing mentioned during the 
widely viewed press conference regarding the report. While this was news for most of the nation, the authors of 
“Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis and Nordic Comparisons” had been aware of 
those results for a while. 
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Reuter (2009) states that many financial issues are being institutionally embedded on findings 
from sciences such as economics, sociology, political and management sciences. In order to 
provide a conceptual model of how collective norms influence financial decision making, such 
norms must be analyzed separately from cultural conceptions and, in a sense backwards, applied 
to findings of cultural inclinations. This is a different approach from purely behavioral finance 
where biases are identified and rationalized. This thesis thus has the potential of being an 
important contribution to a more theoretical sophistication of the culture concept within cultural 
economics. 
“A Day in the Life of an Icelandic Banker” (the second paper) is inspired by a social science 
point of view in its analysis of Iceland´s society. Narrating how the financial landscape in 
Iceland changed radically, both domestically and internationally, the paper shows that Iceland 
followed international trends in the financial world. The main difference was, however, that 
Iceland had no financial history outside of the realms of traditional banking within a politically 
restrictive environment. It can be argued that Iceland´s culture changed more than other cultures 
with technological changes that were occurring in the communication boom via cheaper phone 
rates and the internet, since Iceland had been isolated from other countries, both geographically 
but also had been much less interconnected with international media than most other Western 
nations. The paper shows that once banks began showing higher profits due to changes, a 
prevailing bias that profits continue in a similar fashion in the future is formed within society 
(Soros 1997), as happened in Iceland, through sound banking practices as opposed to reckless 
risk-taking. The paper´s approach traces in a nuanced manner how a different international 
banking environment, Iceland´s entrance in the European Economic Area (EEA) with its 
requirement of Iceland adapting to international laws and regulations as well as advances in 
communication technology changed Iceland´s culture in a swift manner. As La Porta et al. 
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(1998) have shown, different law systems affect financial systems and thus economic growth, 
which highligths the importance of taking such institional changes into consideration, 
The Hofstede dimensional studies are introduced in paper three, “Financial Behavior in Iceland 
within the Framework of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions,” where quantitative results from the 
paper “Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis and Nordic 
Comparisons” are used as a basis in addition to Hofstede dimensional scores. It is noted that 
while Icelanders are generally viewed as being culturally similar to other Nordic countries, the 
conclusion from the paper “Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis and 
Nordic Comparisons” is that Icelanders were much more reckless than the Nordic nations from 
a financial perspective. While Kwok and Tadesse´s approach (2005) used the uncertainty 
avoidance index dimension as a base of comparison to the likelihood as certain types of 
financial systems, paper three in the dissertation compares nations with very high scores in the 
individualism index dimension to their propensity to save. While other Nordic nations´ 
individualistic index is rather high, Icelanders, according to the dimensional studies, have the 
strongest sense of individualism in their culture in the world, although very similar to the United 
States, United Kingdom and Australia. Those nations also have a very low propensity to save, 
with an apparent correlation being between high levels of individualism and low savings ratio 
levels. While it may be argued that these results are more of an “eyeball test,” further studies 
done by Mixa & Vaiman (2015) show a definite correlation of low savings ratio within nations 
with high individualism scores using the Hofstede method. This correlation is for first time, to 
the best of my knowledge, been shown in a paper.  
The main features of papers two and three (“A Day in the Life of an Icelandic Banker” and 
“Financial Behavior in Iceland within the Framework of Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions”) are 
drawn together in paper four, “A Nation of Money & Sheep,” showing how Iceland´s financial 
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system quickly changed. It shows how these two aspects of the liberalization process of 
Iceland´s financial system, high level of individualism and low savings ratio may have 
combined in contributing to causing the Icelandic nation being very oblivious to the inherent 
dangers of the rapid growth of the financial system.  
Paper four shows, furthermore, that financial liberalization may have opened the doors to 
reckless financial behavior, as Englund (1999) suggests occurred in the Nordic countries in the 
prelude of the 1990s crisis. This discussion is in line with the conclusion Bandiera et al. (2000) 
reach, namely that financial liberalization, especially where liquidity constraints are relaxed, 
may be associated with a fall in saving.  
The fifth paper, “Banks Glowing in Nationalism,” makes the argument that the growth of 
Iceland´s financial system during the Manic Millennium was not merely a natural process where 
changes in Iceland´s culture and its financial institutions, in addition to the international banking 
arena and the swift increase in global communication possibilities, but there were interests 
involved in such a process occurring. One way to enable such a process to take place in Iceland 
to such extremes; one could say having the Icelandic nation accepting such a process, was the 
constant reference to nationalistic themes demonstrating the superiority of the (small) Icelandic 
nation compared to most other nations, with the Nordic nations being the most common 
comparison nations, the same nations mainly used in the quantitative comparisons in this thesis. 
These references were to a large extent built upon imagined images, invented to a large extent 
as opposed being built upon reality. This paper thus shows that while Iceland´s culture 
transformed during the Manic Millennium due to external consequences, greatly influenced by 
simple global processes, other forces had a vested interest in amplifying such processes. This 
was done to a large extent via the media, mostly owned by bankers and their main associates. 
Despite the financial crash and its horrible effects on the Icelandic nation, with many 
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individuals becoming bankrupt following the whirlwind of the boom-bust cycle, there is a 
certain group of individuals related to Iceland´s pre-2008 banking system that are today 
wealthier than was prior to the Manic Millennium imaginable, having paid themselves 
dividends due to in some cases mark-to-market profits that were mainly derived by risky and 
leveraged investment policies that the Icelandic nation to a large extent bore the losses of. 
Although the extent of the use of nationalistic themes cannot be measured, nor if their frequent 
use was simply due to public relations officers ‘own conviction that Icelanders were indeed 
superior, the paper suggests that while Iceland´s culture was rapidly changing, old and mostly 
invented cultural themes relating to some sort of Viking spirit was used to justify the rapid 
expansion of the banking system.  The paper “Banks Glowing in Nationalism” thus shows that 
a certain group of individuals had a vested interest in changing the perception of Icelanders 
towards risk taking, which was to a great degree financed by foreign money but built upon some 
sort of imagined Icelandic superior characteristics. The paper shows that the growth of the 
Icelandic banking system was at least partially because of certain interests gaining money of 
such growth, not only because of various global processes taking place and Iceland´s culture 
changing in tandem with such changes. 
To sum up, an applied and theoretical perspective will emphasize at looking at cultural aspects 
in investment policies (or if one will, behavior), with Iceland in recent years as the central focus, 
using comparisons of historical information and socio-cultural analysis. The research is based 
on a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, using quantitative comparison studies 
in conjunction with an analysis of semi-structured interviews. The cultural comparison based 
upon these two sets of data gives an overview of social and economic indicators and how the 
global development affects societies on a global scale.  
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Bankers are the primary source of interviews in this thesis.  Interviews were conducted in order 
to gain a comparative understanding of concepts often associated with financial crisis.  Not only 
were bankers questioned of how their understanding and perception of key concepts such as 
acceptable risk taking, individual responsibility and relevant financial issues but also how their 
clients perceived such issues during the boom years and how that perception has changed in the 
aftermath of the financial meltdown. Foreign bankers were interviewed that had either worked 
with Icelandic bankers or worked in Icelandic banks on foreign ground.  
2.2 Further description of studies  
In line with approaches of defining culture not from a singular standpoint but a comparative 
one, my research compares financial and cultural concepts between Iceland and other countries. 
Comparison studies are extensive regarding the so-called 1990s Scandinavian Crisis – a term 
often used about the severe banking crisis and consequent recession in Finland, Sweden and 
Norway - with comparisons between the nations involved (Honkapohja 2009; Jonung, Kiander, 
Vartia 2009; Berg 1998; Englund & Vihriala, 2003); studies that some of which include 
possible lessons one can derive from such comparisons (Jonung 2009; Jonung 2008).  Such 
comparison studies view the qualitative background mostly in relation to financial matters that 
is explained via quantitative graphs and movements, focusing on financial indicators and typical 
elements of financial bubbles. While they often contextualize these indicators within social and 
historical perspectives, they usually ignore cultural dimensions.   
I use in my research financial comparisons built upon macro data mainly between Iceland and 
Nordic nations. The reason I began focusing on those nations is that they are commonly viewed 
as having similar cultures, institutional set-ups, political landscape, a common historic bond 
and even financial landscape. The cultural comparisons analyzed used Hofstede´s dimensional 
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method. The financial data was compared on a side-by-side basis in the prelude of major 
financial crisis. While the financial crisis in 2008 is commonly viewed as the most serious one 
world-wide since the one that engulfed the global economy 1930-1932, the Nordic (Norway, 
Sweden and Finland and to a smaller extent Denmark) financial crisis at the beginning of the 
1990s was in a study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) identified among the five “Big Ones” 18 
financial crises from WWII until 2007.11  
This research has thus explored the entanglements of various aspects of Iceland’s economy with 
other aspects of Iceland’s society. The outcome of such an approach does provide some 
explanatory power to why Iceland as a nation was as oblivious to the dangers of leverage and 
bad banking practices despite obvious public warning signs apparent in many dimensions (Mixa 
2009b). The behavior of Icelandic bankers is also compared to the international banking 
community, which affected the public´s opinion of “their” bankers, both regarding attitudes and 
also beliefs, via the use of the media and perceived increase in profits. I show in this regard 
how the banks’ public relation teams used certain elements in the Icelandic past historical 
culture to enhance their agenda.   
Iceland was also a part of a financial global environment. This weighs a great deal in the 
analysis that could be valuable in creating a more enhanced understanding of the nature of the 
global financial environment and how vital it is both to understand national/cultural aspects and 
global ones. As such it will create a deeper understanding of not only the development of the 
Icelandic bubble, but of creation of bubbles in both a local and globalized context. The research 
takes into account both ‘national culture’ and also investigates to what extent one could talk 
                                                          
11 The crash in Norway actually occurred in 1987-1989 but is generally scaled towards 1990 in comparison 
studies. External factors, with the aid of 20/20 hindsight vision, merely hastened an inevitable process of a trend 
that occurred there in a similar fashion as in the comparison countries. 
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about a more ‘global behavior in the finance community, i.e., to what extent the concept culture 
can also be useful to draw out certain variances and similarities that are found within different 
financial systems and their relationship towards the development of global ideologies, 
especially those that relate to financial matters.   
3. Papers of the Thesis – Relevance and Relationship 
This thesis consists of five papers. Two papers have been published in recognized journals. 
“Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis and a Nordic Comparison” 
was published in an international one, Thunderbird International Business Review. The other 
one, “Bankar í ljóma þjóðernishyggju” (English translation is: Banks Glowing in Nationalism: 
The Financial Crash, Globalization and Culture) was published in an Icelandic one, Skírnir. I 
include both a translated version of the paper and also the original Icelandic version of the paper 
in this thesis. Two papers have been published as book chapters in edited books. “A Day in the 
Life of an Icelandic Banker” is published in the book, Gambling Debt; edited by E. Paul 
Durrenberger and Gísli Pálsson, which was published in late 2014. The book is a collection of 
articles analyzing the rise and fall of Iceland’s participation in the global economy through the 
banking system. It is analyzed from multiple perspectives, my chapter being the only one 
focusing on financial aspects. “A Nation of Sheep and Money” is the title of my chapter in the 
second book titled The Routledge Companion to Cross-Cultural Management, which is self-
explanatory of its contents. The book was published spring 2015. Finally, a shorter version of 
the paper, “Financial Behavior in Iceland within the Framework of Hofstede’s Cultural 
Dimensions” has been published in the Icelandic Review of Politics & Administration (Mixa 
2015) entitled “Individualistic Vikings: Culture, Economics & Iceland.”  While the different 
version uses much of the same sources, its focus is more on comparisons directly relating to the 
two Hofstede studies done so far in Iceland by researchers at the University of Iceland 
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(Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson 2011; Gudmundsdottir, Gudlaugsson & 
Adalsteinsson 2015). 
These papers show how Iceland´s culture transformed within a remarkably short time. Such 
changes occurred due to many classical developments known within studies relating to financial 
bubbles. There were, however, additional forces playing a major rule. The culture transformed 
much faster than most cultural studies anticipate because in the past cultural structures are built 
upon values. As shown in Hofstede’s et al. (2010, 8), manifestations of culture at different levels 
of values change only little by little while practices normally change more rapidly. That, 
however, can be argued was not the case with Iceland since it was not only within the banking 
system (practices) that a major transformation took place but it was in tandem with other 
developments in Iceland´s society, having a profound effects on the nation’s general ideology. 
This was used and abused by some people with references of national superiority and the need 
to show the world how fantastic Icelandic bankers were, when in reality they were, as for 
example described by some interviewees, somewhat childish and inexperienced. Such 
inexperience hid the risks associated with the growth of the Icelandic banking system that was 
leveraged to degrees that an eventual collapse was obvious to those (few) observers who studied 
the numbers.  
In an attempt to avoid replicating the papers, I summarize the main purpose of each paper and 
show how they relate to each other. Two papers, “Learning from the “Worst Behaved”” and 
“Financial Behavior in Iceland within Hofstede’s Dimensions,” are explained in a somewhat 
detailed manner (especially the latter one) since those papers are backed up by quantitative data 
that should be explained to summarize the connections of the papers. The latter paper also ties 
all the papers together and is thus of vital importance. The papers are included in their entirety 
at the end of this thesis.  
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3.1 Learning from the “Worst Behaved” 
The first paper, “Learning from the “Worst Behaved”: Iceland’s Financial Crisis and Nordic 
Comparisons” is mostly a groundwork of comparative research between developments during 
the prelude of crisis. The main question is whether warning signs were evident of an imminent 
financial crash in Iceland. As the title of the paper indicates, this question is related to learning 
from the worst behaved; those nations having had major banking crisis during the beginning of 
the 1990s. Those nations are Nordic nations, all of which are geographically close to Iceland, 
with similar cultural attributes and have had a long standing relationship with Icelanders for 
centuries. The main analysis is on Sweden and Finland since the financial crisis in those nations 
was largest during the 1990s, although Norway is also used in the study.12  
The paper provides an overview of the history of the Icelandic banking system from 1979 and 
onwards. It shows a slow descent of the liberalization of Iceland’s banking system that rapidly 
increases when Iceland became one of the founding members of the European Economic Area 
(EEA) agreement. Following that short-term and long-term capital movements were fully 
liberalized and also foreign direct investments. Privatization of banks started in 1998 with 
Icelandic banks transforming within a few years from being mostly state owned and under 
governmental control to being not merely liberalized but also doing so within an international 
arena. This created in some sense a better banking system but also opened doors to features that 
ultimately within a very few years caused the Icelandic banking system in almost its entirety to 
collapse. 
                                                          
12 Those are the countries Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) refer to in their discussion of financial crisis when talking 
about the 5 Big Ones from WWII until the crisis in 2008. 
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This process of the liberalization of the Icelandic banking system is remarkably similar to the 
developments in the Nordic nations during the years before its banking system experienced 
massive losses. The Nordic banking system also began a liberalization process around the same 
time that Iceland’s banking system began veering towards liberalization, i.e., around the early 
1980s. The liberalization process main characteristics were liberation of interest rates (as in 
Iceland 1987) and free flow of capital in international markets (as in Iceland 1994 & 1995). The 
liberalization period in the Nordic nations was thus swifter than in Iceland.   
I and my co-author compared quantitative macro figures to compare the growth of the banking 
system in Iceland, Finland, Sweden and Norway. Regarding the banking system we analyzed 
other financial indicators that could show danger signs regarding financial instability. The 
period 1982-1990 for the Nordic nations were compared side-by-side to the period 1999-2007 
for Iceland. It is striking that the lending growth in Iceland was about three times as great as it 
was in the Nordic nations during the comparison period, despite the lending growth in the 
Nordic nations having, with the benefit of hindsight, been viewed as irrational. It is further 
pointed out that the combined balance sheets of banks was just under the size of the nation’s 
1999 GDP  but was estimated having grown to a staggering size of being 10 times larger than 
Iceland’s GDP in 2008.  
Looking at common macro-economic indicators, Iceland had a very low unemployment rate 
before the crash, indicating a red hot economy, and very high GDP growth, which as on average 
1.5%-2.0% higher than the Nordic nations during the comparison period. Inflation figures were 
actually the lowest in Iceland, but the appreciation of the Icelandic krona had a major influence 
on inflation, making it deceptively low for most of the comparison period, only to increase 
suddenly in a dramatic fashion following the crash and concurrent depreciation of the Icelandic 
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krona. Finally, real estate prices in Iceland rose significantly more than in the comparison 
nations. 
In short, the Icelandic banking system showed very similar elements of growth as the Nordic 
banking system less than two decades before. Both banking systems had for decades been 
politically controlled and thus experience within each system in a non-monopolized banking 
environment was limited. The main difference once the liberalization process started was that 
Icelandic banks were much more aggressive in their growth and for some reason more 
questionable business practices were allowed to happen in Iceland.  
Having established the massive lending growth by Icelandic banks, both in relative and absolute 
terms, it is of additional interest that the growth was much greater in lending to holding 
companies than to households. While the main impetus in the Nordic nations’ lending growth 
was real estate loans, Icelandic banks had more opportunities. This was due to international 
developments related to the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall act, which in 1999 separated 
commercial banking from investment banking. Although such practice was generally not 
prohibited prior to the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall act, this set in motion a trend of banks 
not only in the United States but internationally of combining commercial and investment 
banking. This trend happened at almost the same moment as Icelandic banks became privatized. 
The paper quotes Jannari (2009) who said that the new owners of the Icelandic banks had a 
mind-set like investment bankers as opposed to commercial bankers. Their opportunity for 
growth was thus not limited to real estate, as in the case of the Nordic banks during the 1980s, 
but the whole investment banking scene. 
The paper also points out the importance of the free flow of international capital. Even though 
the liberalization started in Iceland about the same time as in the Nordic nations, the free flow 
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of international capital did not begin until 1995. The massive growth of the banking systems in 
Iceland and the Nordic nations was to a large degree financed with foreign lending. It is 
remarkable how similar the period is from such free flows of capital began and serious banking 
crises to occur in the case of both Iceland and the Nordic nations. 
The association with international markets described above becomes important in the whole 
thesis. The paper also addresses why such rapid rise was allowed. It has still often happened, 
as Bandiera et al. (2000) point out, financial liberalization often leads to property prices surging, 
depending strongly on monetary policy and general macro management. 
3.2 A Day in the Life of an Icelandic Banker 
While the first paper laid a certain groundwork of similarities and differences between Iceland’s 
banking system, both from a quantitative point of view and also a historical one, it only delves 
to a limited extent (and then only indirectly) to behavioral issues and not at all into cultural 
issues.  
The next paper, “A Day in the Life of an Icelandic Banker” is a step towards painting a picture 
of the transformation of the Icelandic culture that was quickly being re-defined by the financial 
community of what an Icelander was. Such descriptions are, however, more in vein with 
classical behavioral issues but lay additional ground work for a discussion of cultural 
economics. That includes certain types of behavior like risk-taking, which was built on risk 
taking that can at best be described as naïve and pricing of some securities that diverged from 
their intrinsic values to such an obvious extent that one must go back to historical descriptions 
of the madness before the 1929 market crash to find similar analogies.  
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This paper sets the stage for the changing banking environment in Iceland. It describes the 
alarming risk of the holding company Exista, with a market value at one point of approximately 
1/3 of Iceland’s annual GDP. The price and leverage of Exista veered to ludicrous levels, with 
a price-to-book ratio for most of 2007 at 1.5 and a booked equity ratio of 43% year-end 2006 
and 30% year-end 2007.13  
The savings banks in Iceland had a huge stake in Exista. The paper shows that one savings bank 
had ¾ of its equity base tied in Exista. (The paper does not mention it but there were actually 
worse examples within the savings banks (SICSB 2014)). That was understandable since its 
regular operations were yielding losses. Because of its gains due to its ownership in Exista, few 
people noticed the true development. The public, as is common place during the build-up to 
financial crises, was in awe of the brilliance of its bankers. This was reinforced in the media 
that Icelandic bankers soon mostly owned (bought with loans from the banks). As is common 
among nations engulfed in the developments of financial markets, those who took most risks 
became media heroes. The paper describes in further details how Iceland became part of an 
international landscape during a period when the nation as a whole became connected to the 
outside world through international phone rates rapidly falling, cable television and most 
importantly the advent of the Internet.  
The phenomenon of making big profits from not so very prudent investment decisions was 
though not limited to Iceland. A common thread among bankers working abroad that I 
interviewed was that Icelandic bankers were rather similar to foreign ones, but lacked 
experience and had an even larger appetite for risk.14  
                                                          
13 It was in reality only 20% year-end 2007 but the listed securities of Kaupthing bank and Bakkavor Group were 
no longer marked-to-market, and they had fallen considerably in value. 
14 The description of the top layer of Icelandic bankers was, however, less positive. 
  
 
 
48 
 
Among the apparent success of the banks Icelanders began embracing neo-liberalistic views 
that the banking system was best left alone to its own devices without governmental 
interference. While history is littered with people being generally blinded by financial 
successes, the paper shows that the Icelandic case was unusually extreme not only in its size 
(as the first paper addresses) but also in how obvious the success was built upon sand. This 
leads to the third paper of providing a partial explanation of why a nation could almost in its 
entirety change its value set in such a dramatic fashion. 
3.3 Financial Behavior in Iceland within the Framework of Hofstede’s Cultural 
Dimensions  
This paper assesses whether cultural indicators may have been to some degree responsible for 
the extent of the massive collapse of the Icelandic banking system in 2008. At first a general 
overview is given of the development of the banking industry in Iceland. It shows, e.g., that 
aggressive young bankers were increasingly hired and older ones put aside. Despite the young 
bankers’ ignorance, they followed their bosses’ instructions and during the constant rise of 
stocks within a low interest rate environment maximized financial gains, which little by little 
led to circular re-enforcing pattern where much risk-taking was rewarded. As also described in 
all of the other papers, those bankers became some sort of national heroes, creating stratification 
within nations of who were winners and who were not.  
This is followed with survey of the dimensional research done in Iceland and the results of those 
surveys are compared dimensional results in the Nordic nations. The main conclusions are that 
Icelanders are mostly like Nordic nations. Icelanders are, however, more individualistic and 
more power distant. This is backed up by studies other studies showing that Icelanders share 
many social, political and cultural aspects of Nordic nations but also showing close similarities 
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to American cultural values (Olafsson 2003). Among those characteristics are a strong sense of 
independence, resenting central authority and individualism (Olafsson 2011).  
Of the dimensional studies done in Iceland, two by far have the most scientific merit. The later 
one (Gudmundsdottir, Gudlaugsson & Adalsteinsson) was published in 2015 when the version 
of this paper was finalized. This paper focuses thus merely on the first study done in 2011 by 
Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson (2011) (same team of researchers, the order of 
authors has though been changed), which specifically points out that Icelanders have a very 
high score on the individualism dimension and is in fact the highest score excluding the United 
States since dimensional studies began in 1980. The results were that Iceland had the highest 
score within the individualistic dimension alongside the United States, with the United 
Kingdom and Australia scoring only slightly lower scores and other nations scoring 
significantly lower. 
This becomes a stepping stone in analyzing possible connections between a certain dimension 
within Hofstede’s methods and financial macro data, pointing towards some sort of culture 
determined by economic factors. Hofstede et al. (2010) provide a clue by stating that increasing 
individualism since the early 1990s is one of the forces leading to deregulation, where certain 
monopolies have been replaced for ideological reasons. This fits well with the privatization 
(and thus abolishment of banks monopolization) and liberalization of the Icelandic banking 
system described in the first paper that took place in Iceland during the decade before the 
banking system crashed. Such trends are generally defined as neo-liberalism, which celebrates 
an ideology of individual empowerment and political government minimized (Steger & Roy 
2010).  
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Following this analysis the financial data, some of which presented in the first paper, is 
introduced showing comparative measurements between Iceland and other Nordic nations. 
Since the discussion is not specifically on comparisons of financial crisis the data also includes 
Denmark. Also included is stock market data showing the incredible rise of the Icelandic stock 
market index, which rose almost eight-fold from the beginning of 1999 until the middle of 2007 
(only to lose over 90% of its value within days following the crash in 2008). One important 
feature is, however, added in this paper and that is the savings ratio. The difference between the 
comparison nations is staggering. While all the other nations were at a similar savings rate level, 
with Norway understandably somewhat higher with a correlation to higher oil prices that are 
put in the nation’s oil fund (that is literally kept as a reserve), Iceland’s savings rate is far below. 
Since the figures use gross savings ratio is used, i.e., one that does not take into account the 
estimated consumption of fixed capital (not taking into account thus costs of replacing fixed 
assets on a certain year basis), the net savings ratio of Iceland is actually close to zero during 
most of the period (this is further confirmed by Statistics Iceland (2007) that shows that the net 
savings of Icelandic households was negative every year during 1997 to 2005 despite the 
purchasing power of disposable income per capital having increased by 56% from 1994 until 
2005).15  
Next, Iceland’s savings ratio is compared to other nations that either have been much in the 
press for all the wrong financial reasons (Greece, Italy & Portugal) or are generally considered 
being financially irresponsible and also the United States, the nation with the highest 
individualistic dimensional score alongside Iceland. While Iceland has culturally little in 
common with the south European nations according to dimensional studies the savings ratios 
are much more alike than when compared to Nordic nations. While Iceland still exhibits the 
                                                          
15 I have not found more recent data of this savings ratio. 
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smallest savings ratio, the United States shows similar scores as those other nations and has 
obviously a lower savings ratio than the Nordic nations.  
I and my co-author propose that the cause of this divergence is related to a sudden shift of 
world-views, one could say paradigm shift, with neo-liberalistic ideological forces sweeping 
the globe from the 1980s onwards, gaining steam with the fall of the Berlin Wall, had not only 
wide-spread effects around the globe but also dissimilar ones, with nations with comparatively 
high individualistic inclinations more inclined to embrace them. Icelanders also became during 
the latter part of the 1990s suddenly connected to the world of media and finance with the 
advent of the internet, at the same time as the cost of international phone calls lower plummeted 
and international live broadcasting of television stations, e.g. the financial television network 
CNBC, became part of society, with access to invest 24/7 in international financial markets via 
internet (Mixa & Vaiman 2015), all classical elements when financial bubbles are forming; 
where a sense of the world becoming smaller is occurring, such as the railways during the 
1840s, the automobile and radio during the 1920s, and television during the 1950s, as Shiller 
(2001) and Chancellor (2000) document. This process in Iceland is related to Iceland’s 
“Americanized” culture and high individualistic scores and veers away from Hofstede’s 
assumptions that cultures only gradually change long periods of time. The period from the 
1990s onwards may, however, be an exception to that assumption. To determine better how 
such a proposition harmonizes with historical facts, we looked further into Iceland’s banking 
history and its sudden changes during the 1990s and 2000s, not only in some isolated fashion 
but in tandem with the whole society. 
We show that after years of the Icelandic banking system being subjected to strict regulation 
the privatization and free-market mantra created a sense of added efficiency, which was further 
apparently underlined with their massive profits that was mirrored in the staggering rise of their 
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stock prices (in the case of the banks, the stock prices when applied to general ratios was 
optimistic on the surface but not irrationally so). The nation began a journey of misguided trust. 
We quote Galbraith in his analysis of the 1929 Great Crash (1955/1997, 170) that speculative 
mania begins brewing when people let their guard down regarding speculation. That is most 
likely to happen after a substantial period of prosperity. 
As often during speculative mania periods, success cries out for more success. That can be done 
via leverage, meaning investing more money but using loans to finance them but at the same 
time, in a contradictory fashion, saving less money. This is derived from one of Shiller’s (2001) 
typical anatomies of precipitating factors of a financial bubble; the expansion of defined 
contribution pension plans, which Shiller in 2000 had considered being rampant in the United 
States. I pointed out (Mixa 2009b) that a similar effect had occurred in Iceland, with the 
equivalent of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) in Iceland having started in 1998 (during 
the same time as the banking system was rapidly transforming). This type of savings in addition 
to an increased emphasis on regular pension funds had the aim of increasing net savings among 
Icelandic households. This is may, however, not be the case with recent research indicating that 
the relationship may be reversed, with Danielsson (2012) concluding that such plans may have 
decreased Icelanders’ needs to set money aside for future purposes (this rhymes with the 
findings of Statistics Iceland showing that Iceland’s households net savings began becoming 
negative almost the same year the Icelandic version of IRAs was introduced) (Statistics Iceland 
database n.d.). Using this information, we propose that this may be at least a partial explanation 
why dimensional scores provide different results than financial ones in explaining the savings 
and even possibly the risk appetite among nations. This is further backed up by research done 
by Duménil & Lévy (2011, 141-169) who contend that there is a correlation between neo-liberal 
influences and low savings rates. 
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By putting nations with high individualistic dimensional scores in the same category as being 
also highly neo-liberal as Duménil & Lévy (ibid) contend, we look at the savings ratio of nations 
with the individualistic scores. As before, Iceland remains the “worst behaved” but what is also 
interesting is that the United States and United Kingdom, who score highest (with Australia) 
on the individual dimension list are nations number 2 and 3 with the lowest savings ratio. Only 
nations from current troubled zones have lower savings ratios. This, we believe, shows a strong 
correlation between cultures where individualism is rampant and inclinations to save is low. 
If this relationship between individualism and neo-liberalism is universal then the close 
inspection of that relationship, using Hofstede’s dimensional studies, provides some 
explanatory power to why the general dimensional scores show Icelanders being culturally 
similar to Nordic nations while in fact they are more American in nature.16 By a similar token, 
while the power distance and masculinity dimensions showed little differences between Iceland 
and other Nordic nations, it still highlighted in the most comprehensive study that Icelanders 
had higher scores in those areas than Nordic nations. This gives further explanatory power to 
why Icelandic bankers were more willing to blindly follow instructions by the supervisors and 
also their willingness to participate in risk taking deals, with money being the main 
measurement of success, which Nordic banks managed better to avoid.  
It may be argued that Nordic nations had simply learned lessons from the 1990s banking crash 
that Icelanders had not experienced. There is a grain of truth in this as Denmark suffered more 
hardship than other Nordic nations during the recent 2008 financial crisis, with Rangvid (2013), 
who was head of Denmark’s version of Iceland’s SIC report, supporting the hypothesis that 
Denmark may have not learned lessons well enough from the 1990s crisis since it did not affect 
                                                          
16 It is worth noting that this is not concluded as being an absolute truth. This is first and foremost and 
observation for further interdisciplinary studies. 
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the nation to the same degree as Sweden and Finland, emphasizing that that was though simply 
speculation without formal research. It is pointed out in the paper that Gylfason (2011) shows 
that Iceland’s government had to support the Icelandic banking system to a similar degree when 
measured against the percentage of each nation’s GDP, hence the crisis definitely had a major 
impact on the Icelandic economy from which lessons should have been learned.  
I and my co-author point out that this is not the first time the relationship between cultural 
elements and economical ones have close ties. Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in 1776 
was first and foremost a description of cultural developments within a society that was quickly 
transforming from feudalism into a market economy (Beugelsdijk & Maseland 2011).  
According to these findings, a wide-spread belief in neoclassical theories, and thus 
individualism, appears to be a certain cultural trait. This approach uses, however, a different 
approach in finding cultural traits. Variables that generally have been associated with empirical 
science with the assumption of being universal, such as economics and people’s rationality in 
their sense, meaning that it was not worth investigating such aspects from different cultural 
standpoints, are now the base in comparison research of cultures between nations. The above 
comparison also differs from Hofstede’s methods. Hofstede´s methods are conducted where 
people answer questionnaires according to how they believe they behave themselves and even 
their nation/culture, which can differ significantly from their true economic, and in this case 
cultural, behavior. Gathering data and applying it to Hofstede’s method is in a sense a 
quantitative empirical study method of people’s behavior as opposed to more qualitative 
studies, where the savings ratio mirrors the reality of how people behave as a culture as opposed 
to how people envision themselves being. By looking at economic ratios one can thus more 
objectively see how people behave and compare such behavior between cultures. Such an 
observation provides a more realistic picture than questionnaires.  
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To summarize the train of thought in the paper; the process laid out is that vertical and horizontal 
elements were at work. They were vertical in a sense that there was stratification within Iceland 
and also the banks where risk takers were deemed exemplifying some sort of true Icelandic 
culture. The horizontal elements were that while a general trend world-wide was taking place, 
it did so with varying degrees, with dimensional elements indicating that Icelanders were more 
“vulnerable” toward ideologies that could cause more damaging effects during financial storms 
than in other less “vulnerable” nations. The combined above elements became apparent when 
high individualism may have been more suspect to ideological shifts occurring over a period 
starting in the early 1990s when neo-liberalism began gaining a stronger foothold. 
It is stressed that other forces were taking place that also may have had effects on this process, 
which the research question of this thesis addresses. Some of those forces are addressed in the 
next two papers. 
3.4 A Nation of Money and Sheep 
 The title of this paper is a play of Icelandic word fé, which can mean money and sheep. The 
message, although barely noticeable, is that Icelanders were for the longest time an agricultural 
nation that transformed within a very short time into financial wizards, which turned out to be 
an illusion. The paper uses similar references as the previous paper but concentrates more on 
describing Icelandic bankers, more specifically “bad” Icelandic savings bank bankers. The idea 
emerged through my work at the SICSB where I worked for 15 months from 1/2013 until 
3/2014.  
As discussed in the previous paper, many bankers working in the banking industry in Iceland 
were inexperienced with older and more reliable bankers put aside. One of the main 
assumptions, and is indicated in the previous paper, when it comes to culture regarding the 2008 
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crash is that there were certain types of bankers, mainly those that are young, reckless and 
embracing cultural values often associated with free market mantra, mostly at fault. This may, 
however, be not so simple. When looking at Iceland’s banking history and in particular savings 
banks, a contradiction arises. Savings banks were also deeply invested in maximizing financial 
gains but lacking concerns over how such returns were achieved and certainly not the associated 
risks.   
What I show is that there was a pressure of uniformed thinking within the banks with an aim to 
change the culture, which was hard, so the banks instead concentrated on changing employees. 
The savings banks were though a very different beast. They had hardly any glamorous 
perceptions within the Icelandic society, with most of the directors and even main workers 
could have easily been put into the old fuddy-duddy category.  
The stratification of beliefs of the Icelandic success within an international arena Icelanders had 
just entered was thus not limited to young and irresponsible bankers, with wool pulled over 
their eyes, but also savings banks that, as described in the second paper, gained most, if not all, 
of their profits from their ownership in one holding company, Exista, that was both (very 
obviously) irrationally priced and not as obviously lad with immense risk in its balance sheet. 
It the time of the writing of the paper the exact numbers were confidential17 but the combined 
equity base of the Icelandic savings banks system year-end 2006 consisted of equity in Exista 
worth 42 billion Icelandic krona (ISK) out of a combined equity base of 74 billion ISK.18 This 
                                                          
17 I worked at the SICSB from 1/2013 to 3/2014. My main task concerned the investments of the savings banks 
and the risk associated with those investments. I thus knew of the confidential information and could use that 
knowledge to a certain extent. 
18 This was not clearly visible because the savings banks „sold“ a large portion of their Exista shares to a holding 
company, which only purpose was to buy Exista stock, which it did by accepting half of the shares as payment 
and the other half the holding company financed with loans from other financial companies. The holding 
company was, however, entirely owned by those same savings banks. As was confirmed later, there was no 
option for the holding company to default on those loans since the savings bank owned it 100%, meaning that a 
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means that about 59% of Iceland’s savings banks equity base consisted of stock ownership in a 
holding company that had equity ratio of 43%, which at that point had never had less than 50% 
of its investments in merely two companies (SICSB 2014).19 What struck me during my work 
at the SICSB was how oblivious practically all the old and “wise” saving bankers were to the 
dangers involved in the type of banking practices they recently embraced. Most of the bankers 
had for decades served rural parts of Iceland (hence many farmers) but all of a sudden were 
creating such “easy” wealth while embracing new beliefs that entailed views that fit to a certain 
degree to the Icelandic culture. As discussed in the concluding chapter of this thesis, this 
ignorance aided certain groups of Icelandic society in becoming very rich, at least temporarily. 
3.5 Banks Glowing in Nationalism 
As previously stated in this thesis there were many actors who benefitted from the reckless and 
ignorant banking practices taking place in Iceland before the 2008 financial crisis. As outlined 
in the first paper many bankers were paid bonuses in amounts not known within Icelandic 
society at the beginning the millennium. As further discussed in the last chapter of this thesis 
there were also other forces gaining from the ignorance of risk and rewards associated with the 
apparent rise of the Icelandic banking system. That discussion will, however, only touch upon 
rather basic facts since a properly detailed explanation would require a much more thorough 
investigation. The discussion in this paper uses theoretical insights about globalism and culture 
to gain a deeper understanding of why warning signals were ignored when financial history 
indicated that a recession or even a major financial crash was imminent. This is a similar 
approach as done in the first paper except here the discussion focuses on qualitative features 
                                                          
default of the company would in the banking world equaled a default by the savings banks. The shares of Exista 
were hence all in their books, not only the associated rewards but also the risks.  
19 Exista began the year 2007 by buying added shares in Sampo Group and paid a handsome dividend, thus 
increasing the balance sheet risk considerably. 
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while the focus of the first paper was on quantitative ones regarding warning signs. It also 
provides qualitative answers to why, or maybe more precisely how, Icelanders were so ready 
to embrace new cultural values.  
There is more focus on the definition of culture than in previous papers, something that is 
lacking generally in the field of cultural economics. It is shown that culture is ever more related 
to some sort of marketing within increased globalization. In this context there is a reference to 
Appadurai’s (1996) conception of a warehouse of cultural scenarios, from which certain past 
memories can be framed into the present. We show that historical comparisons may appear 
irrelevant in an environment where nationalistic characteristics are being emphasized and thus 
facilitate the shunning of obvious warning signs that otherwise would be obvious. This 
nationalism was to a large degree invented.  
The banking system of Iceland is given special attention in this context and shows that this 
nationalistic discourse about Icelandic investors and bankers had no obvious connections to the 
historical development of the Icelandic banking system, having only been released from 
political shackles during the 1990s after having been more like institutions serving specific 
groups since 1930. There is a certain paradox that the Icelandic banking system was 
simultaneously shaped ever more in accordance with international financial systems as the same 
system was conceptualized as a part of Iceland’s nationalistic characteristics. Economic 
variables are thus part of a global and local environment, simultaneously entangled in 
nationalistic ideas and social environments. 
At first the history of the Icelandic banking system is detailed but in this paper the emphasis is 
on how the banks were re-defined from nationalistic ideas. Such ideas related to their role within 
society. While Icelandic banks had for centuries served Icelanders in a localized style they – 
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and Icelanders at the same time – had a bigger role to play once they entered the international 
arena that can be argued took place in 1994 within the EEA agreement Iceland participated in. 
The role of the Icelandic banks was thus set up in a way that it was supposed to mirror the role 
of Icelanders as a nation.  
That role had since 1930 been localized and nationalistic. The National Bank of Iceland had the 
slogan “The Bank of All Inhabitants.”20 The transition of the banking system is explained in a 
more detailed fashion than in previous papers in this thesis, showing how very recently the 
Icelandic banking system changed from having close to no international relationships nor free-
market banking to becoming privatized and with the free flow of foreign capital being financed 
to deal in investment banking financed by foreign banks. With increased internationalism the 
banks became in practice international in their business models. They were, simultaneously re-
defined as part of the Icelandic culture, as if they were part of a team but not as institutions 
serving people’s financial needs. This was done with by the discourse in the media, at that point 
mostly owned by the owners of the banks, which began referring to the banks’ success as being 
part of the success of “us” Icelanders. This was incorporated in constant references to Iceland’s 
settlement legacy, but instead of referring to settlers the discussion focused on Vikings 
(Loftsdóttir 2010, 121), an invented feature found in the Appadurai’s (1996) warehouse of 
cultural scenarios, that soon was re-named as Business Vikings. Those bankers went on a 
spending spree in Europe, snapping up businesses and for a while appeared to be very successful 
in doing so. This was generally described in symbolic terms of conquering territories in the 
media, symbolizing Icelandic bankers as invading Vikings, even in some sort of war. 
                                                          
20 A translation of „Banki allra landsmanna“ 
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This discourse became very obvious during the mini-crisis in 2006 when a Danish analyst 
(correctly) predicted the Icelandic financial system crashing at a certain point, showing all 
typical signs of a financial bubble. One newspaper (Helgason 2006, 12) responded by stating 
in its headline: 
Danes are in an attacking mode and no defences can be expected for that 
country:  Must defend the lies ourselves.21 
This headline emphasizes Icelanders as being “us,” one solidary group that is called to arms. 
Those bankers were not just Vikings but ones who were on behalf of the whole nation battling 
on foreign grounds. It could be argued that Iceland received foreign assistance in such a battle 
when the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce commissioned a report written by Frederic S. 
Mishkin and an Icelander, Tryggvi Herbertsson (Mishkin & Herbertsson 2006), entitled 
Financial Stability in Iceland.  As its title suggests, the report was optimistic about the future of 
Icelandic banking but does, however, point out that potential were problems looming, for 
example that “there are concerns that the banks could experience refinancing problems” (9). 
The next sentence was, however, “Although the banks' reliance on external financing poses the 
biggest risk to the financial system right now, the probability of a credit event occurring is low” 
(ibid). Arnason (2015, 53-57) shows that expert opinions in the vein of Mishkin had an impact 
on markets in defending some sort of production of truth about the Icelandic banking system. 
Other examples are listed in the paper showing that this was done on the behalf of agents who 
had interests in re-enforcing such value systems within the nation. The success of Icelanders in 
foreign territories was thus installed within the nation as being part of some sort of patriotic 
undertaking.  
                                                          
21 This is my translation. 
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The apparent success of Icelandic bankers who were conquering assets on foreign ground was 
thus not separated by the experience of individuals but on the contrary, the conquering acts 
became “common knowledge, lived and touched and constantly proven on the pages of the 
media” (Loftsdóttir 2011, 5). The irony was that most of the expansion was financed with 
foreign capital. 
It is interesting looking at the development of the Icelandic banking system that it had no history 
related to investment banking or even free-market banking but yet was full of invented 
traditions. Hobsbawn (1983) points out the importance of invented traditions when great 
changes are taking place in society, when certain ideologies need to gain a hegemonic status, 
increase the solidarity of certain groups and justify the introduction of stratification within 
society. This became apparent when the Danish analyst Carsten Valgreen in 2006 predicted the 
impeding financial crash. Countless commentators criticized the report vehemently with the 
general public mostly following suit. This was reminiscent of the discussion in the United States 
prior to the 1929 crash and subsequent Great Depression when Paul Warburg, one of the main 
architects of the creation of the Federal Reserve 16 years earlier voiced concerns of the 
overexpansion within the financial system, only to be criticized by his own country-men of 
“sandbagging American prosperity” (Sobel 1968, 126).  
  
  
 
 
62 
 
4. Further Thoughts  
The discussion in the papers shows that the Icelandic banking system was transformed within 
a short period from a localized system influenced by party politics into one a more globalized 
and market-oriented one with added efficiency. This was done with a great deal of national 
rhetoric but still ironically mostly financed with foreign money. During the period of the 
expansion of the Icelandic banking system there was constant reference in the media and the 
whole society of a culture that was identified with and juxtaposed to some sort of Viking nature 
of the nation. Although it cannot be determined if and how consciously the nationalistic rhetoric 
was used, it did without doubt benefit the largest owners of the banks, enabling them to further 
expand the balance sheets of the banks without the public and thus the legislation in putting the 
brakes on the rapid expansion. Having basically no history of finance outside of a highly 
restricted and political environment for over 60 years, Icelanders were still easily swayed in 
defining themselves as part of the Business Viking elite, basing on nationalistic discourses 
dating from early 20th century when Iceland was seeking independence from Denmark 
(Loftsdóttir 2010). Compared to other nations, Icelanders thus defined themselves, i.e. who 
“they are,” as not being dull bond buyers (even though bond yields in Iceland were most likely 
the most advantageous in a risk/reward sense in western society)22 like e.g. the Nordic people, 
but risk seeking Business Vikings making loads of money via leveraged buyouts and investing 
in stocks.  This swift change of view relates to how nations imagine themselves with the 
aftermath, including a constant fear of a fincial bubble developing again in media discourses, 
demonstrating further how fragile such beliefs are.  
                                                          
22 The real yields of Iceland‘s Housing bonds, generally perceived as state guaranteed and had during the years 
prior to the financial crash in 2008 very favorable ratings by investment rating companies, were usually between 
4-6%, which was much higher yields than other governmental bonds with similar debt ratings. 
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As shown in the discussion in the sections discussing the history of culture related to economics 
and also in tandem with it, and then further in the papers number 3 and 5, culture is generally 
accepted to being built upon structural features in most societies (to varying degrees) that Marx 
defined as machines and tools but today also involve to a great degree the set-up of the banking 
system. The ruling classes that control such structural features also control to a large extent 
beliefs and thus values within those societies, what is right or wrong etc. Gramsci took this one 
step further by showing that the ruling class gains hegemonic powers simply by having the 
masses believing an ideology that serves the best interest for the society as a whole. A logical 
extension of this is Polanyi’s view that economic factors are more survival techniques rather 
than a system dealing with scarcity in a scientific manner, meaning that the economy is a social 
landscape where people aim at promoting their interests, using for example the media. 
The international media that Icelanders suddenly gained access to was characterized by free-
market values, often neo-liberalistic in nature. Among the main focus points of such an ideology 
was added efficiency, as Smith had argued about capitalism about 220 years earlier. Iceland 
also followed international trends in the banking business by liberalizing the banking system 
and subsequently privatizing it.  
Once the banks had been privatized, huge profits became the norm. On the one hand, this was 
attributed to some sort of special Icelandic “Viking” nature. This was also attributed to the 
embracing of free-market mantra. Such a mantra generally entails the vision that markets are 
efficient, meaning that market prices are generally close enough of adequately weighing risks 
and rewards that one could not reap constantly spectacular gains compared to other competitors 
or other market indices. There was thus a certain contradiction in those arguments, since the 
enormous profits generated by the Icelandic banks were well beyond any normal profits other 
banks world-wide were enjoying. As it turned out, they were taking risks that were beyond 
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belief (SIC 2010a; SICSB 2014). While the Icelandic nation bore great eventual costs of that 
risk-taking, it was not equally distributed since some agents taking those risks gained massive 
amounts of money. This manifested itself for example in the bonus payments high ranking 
bankers earned during the boom period (SIC 2010a). There was also, as demonstrated in paper 
4, a huge amount of ignorance among some bankers. That ignorance is extensively 
demonstrated in relation to how the savings banks directors and boards were oblivious of the 
associated risks of their ownership in the holding company Exista. Despite the company being 
the main source of profits, that were record breaking 2004-2007, few of the savings banks 
boards or directors had an inkling of the risk inherent in the balance sheet of Exista as 
demonstrated in papers number 2, 3 & 4 in this thesis. Those profits swelled up the balance 
sheet of the savings banks, constituting for example of 80-90% of the largest one, The Savings 
Bank of Reykjavík, for a short while. 
There was more, however, at stake. The massive recorded profits due to the ownership of Exista 
within many savings banks did much more than increasing the wages of the bank management 
teams at some of them. In short, the savings banks were owned by their neighboring 
municipalities or towns with a few owners that owned a small stake in them, usually because 
of historical reasons when those owners were defined as being underwriters on behalf of the 
savings banks. That “ownership” was for decades viewed as being of minimal value. By newly 
created laws the profits could be paid out to those “owners,” which they were to the fullest 
extent and were additionally used to a large extent to finance the owners gaining a larger share 
of the savings banks. In a strange twist, those dividends to those “owners” were the most when 
profits were high and thus increased their share in the savings banks, but if there would be a 
loss of the operations, the “owners” would not partake in those losses, hence they were deducted 
from the share the public owned in those savings banks. A merry-go-round developed where 
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the “owners” reaped the most from taking what for most observers were irrational but in their 
case probably was very rational.  
In the case of The Savings Bank of Reykjavík, its value was estimated being just below 8 billion 
ISK year-end 2003, of which the “owners” were entitled to 19% of the amount, or 1.4 billion 
ISK. With the excessive profits that could be argued were entirely due to its ownership in Exista, 
the merry-go-round practice of using dividend payments due to profits with (ir)rational methods 
that increased the share of the “owners” in the savings bank, and finally an updated and 
questionable23 valuation of the savings bank, the savings bank was valued at 59.4 billion ISK 
in the summer of 2007 and was listed at the stock exchange of Iceland only a few months later 
at a valuation of over 80 billion ISK (it was a month later again valued at around 60 billion 
ISK) (SICSB 2014). The “owner” at this point no longer owned 19% of the savings bank but 
owned now 85% of it. The irrational behavior had thus increased the “owners´” wealth in the 
savings bank from 1.4 billion ISK in late 2003 to 50.5 billion ISK in 2007. The other owner’s 
share during the period, Reykjavík City, was estimated being in 2003 6.5 billion ISK but had 
only risen to 8.9 billion ISK in 2007, which at that point was about 10% less worth than the 
savings bank’s book value (ibid).  
This was done behind a veil of markets being efficient and Icelandic bankers being special. For 
this merry-go-round to take place mostly unnoticed, it was essential for the agents involved 
who benefitted from this process that the Icelandic nation believed in the Icelandic banking 
miracle. It was possible by creating beliefs and value systems in the Icelandic nation that was 
                                                          
23 The valuation derived the value of the savings bank by looking at a 10 year average of profits in the past, 
including obviously those because of the savings bank‘s ownership in Exista, although it was obvious that such 
profits were practically impossible, even with huge risk taking, in the future. 
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done via the media and through popular discourse of Icelandic bankers being efficient and 
special.  
  
  
 
 
67 
 
5. Conclusion 
The main research question of this thesis was: 
What cultural conditions shaped the appearance and formation of the financial bubble in 
Iceland and in what way did those conditions differ, if any, from other countries and to what 
extent?  
The papers show that the cultural conditions lay to a combination of a few facts. The starting 
point is the international changes that swept the western world following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, hence some sort of evidence that capitalism had won communism. Such conditions 
swayed the Icelandic nation to a larger degree than other nations such as the Nordic ones. One 
reason is that despite Iceland’s cultural likeness of Nordic nations, certain cultural dimensions 
influenced the Icelandic nation a great deal, especially individualism but also more power 
distance and masculinity that seems to be evident in Icelandic society, which has also similar 
features as the those in the United States. There were also other forces taking place in Iceland. 
Despite the financial system having begun a liberalization process in the 1980s, the effects did 
not become really apparent in an international sense until 1995 when the free flow of capital 
between borders became a reality. In the sensible name of efficiency, the banks were privatized. 
As has been thoroughly documented, many people profited from that process. This thesis shows 
that there was a cultural shift occurring within that process where the nation bought a new 
ideology, changing its culture more swiftly than cultures usually do. This was probably in some 
cases done by design since many agents became very rich during the process, with invented 
images of the Icelandic culture that had no relation to reality.   
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Abstract: 
This article explores how the financial crisis in 2008 could have been partially avoided by 
Iceland through observing the warning signs. Iceland experienced the harshest consequences 
from the financial crisis in the western world such as the total collapse of its banking sector. 
This article compares the prelude of Iceland’s financial crisis to the Scandinavian one, less than 
20 years ago, providing an understanding of the sources of the crisis and its impact. Results 
show that signs of overexpansion in Iceland were clear and numerous. Iceland’s structural 
weaknesses resemble many other badly hit countries, simply more extreme. 
 
Keywords:  Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, Iceland, Policy Making, Scandinavian 
Crisis 
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Introduction  
Iceland is a good illustration when drawing lessons from the errors that resulted in the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis. No other developed country endured a systemic collapse in its banking 
sector on the scale that occurred in Iceland, or indeed, rarely in the history of finance.  Most of 
the variables that could go wrong undeniably went wrong, and the collection of these wrong 
doings systematically assumed mountainous proportions. Whether it was the fiscal policy of 
the government, the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Iceland, or the financial 
supervisory, corporate governance and risk management of the banks that were the causes; the 
situation turned out to be catastrophic. However, individually, these factors are an inadequate 
explanation. It was the interaction of these factors, which played an important role in the 
breakdown of the financial system.  
Consequently, the question of whether or not there were warning signs arises. Comparative 
research to contextualize the experience Iceland went through provides an understanding of the 
dynamics that led to the financial and economic collapse in 2008. Hence, this research compares 
the Scandinavian Crisis of the 1990s to the Icelandic Financial Crisis, focusing on the similarity 
between the two crisis’ and possible contrasts, illuminating the severity of the current crisis in 
Iceland. The Scandinavian countries and Iceland (often referred to as the Nordic countries) all 
bear a resemblance in their economic and societal structure and considering there is less than 
twenty years occurring between the crises, provide a comparable viewpoint. The Scandinavian 
countries had to provide their banking sector a considerable amount of public support and their 
crisis became widespread. However, an underlying question throughout this discussion is what 
went wrong within the banking institutions and how the changes within the public policy arena 
(itself being influenced by general social trends) may have contributed to the crisis.   
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First, this article will examine the main reasons for the sudden and extraordinary growth of the 
Icelandic banks. Resulting from this growth, the increased vulnerability of the banks and the 
following collapse is reviewed in part two. Third, the paper compares the Icelandic Crisis and 
the Scandinavian Crisis, involving the examination of similarities between the two, and the 
identification of factors that are unique to either banking crisis. Finally, there is a short summary 
regarding what lessons may be learned from the recent crisis, and what policy recommendations 
can be derived from the situation.  Of special interest is the fact that the Scandinavian Crisis 
occurred within a banking environment where the separation of investment and commercial 
banking was mostly still intact.  Following the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1999, 
the international banking landscape changed; meaning that banks’ risk appetite increased.  That 
complacency spread to the general public.  After the abolishment of the act, it took less than a 
decade for the international banking system to collapse, the meltdown being worst in Iceland.  
It also appears that the Scandinavian Crisis was limited to abnormal lending growth, mostly 
related to mortgage loans, while Icelandic banks lent a great deal to holding companies, often 
with limited collateral. 
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1. A Sudden Prosperity   
Iceland experienced the worst financial collapse of any western country when its banking 
system fell apart in October 2008. Most of its financial system toppled when its three largest 
banks, Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir, with 182 billion USD in assets, were taken into 
receivership, creating the third largest collapse after Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual 
(Bibler, 2010). They had grown from small local commercial banks into international 
commercial and investment banks with combined balance sheets amounting to ten times 
Iceland‘s GDP. International conditions had been optimal, supplying funding at historically low 
interest rates at a low risk premium (Central Bank of Iceland, 2009). As early as in 1993, when 
Iceland became one of the founding members of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
agreement, Icelandic banks obtained the right to operate within the border of the EU countries. 
At the same time, Iceland instituted the EU regulatory framework for financial institutions and 
markets. Still, it was not until 2003, when the Icelandic banks were privatized in full, that they 
capitalized on money market funding, opened branches abroad and acquired foreign financial 
institutions in large numbers (Sigurjonsson, 2010a).  
The banks capitalized on the rapid growth that much of Icelandic industry enjoyed during the 
first years of the 2000’s. These were industries such as pharmaceutical, retailing, real estate, 
food processing and transportation. The drivers for this growth were similar to the drivers for 
the financial industry. These were favorable international conditions, a mature domestic market 
and an essential diversification strategy to decrease risk. The banks took advantage of this 
development and collaborated with both large and growing firms within these industries. The 
partnership did not only consist of lending but became, in many instances, joint ventures in 
which banks invested their own equity in their customer´s projects. That gave later rise to 
speculation regarding a conflict of interests and dependence on a few large customers, (some 
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of whom were owners of the banks) and all were not necessarily geographically diversified nor 
diversified by industry (Portes and Baldursson, 2007).  
The privatization of Icelandic banking was conducted somewhat differently from the process 
of privatization in many other countries. Most countries privatized their institutions with at least 
some foreign ownership whereas the Icelandic government initially decided to encourage 
foreign ownership, but then backed away from that decision. Instead, individual domestic 
entities gained controlling interests in the banks. These investors had no prior experience in 
commercial banking (Sigurjonsson, 2010b).  
Within three years of privatization, (in 2006), the banks were hit by what was called the 
informational crisis (Portes and Baldursson, 2007). Fitch Ratings and Danske Bank were the 
strongest critics of the banks mostly focusing on how dependent the Icelandic banks were on 
wholesale markets for financing and how “short maturity they had on their borrowing“. The 
criticism was that these conditions would create great vulnerability in the case of financial 
turmoil and a liquidity crisis. Concerns about potential cross-ownership, earning quality and 
lack of transparency in the banks’ operation drew criticism as well (Central Bank of Iceland, 
2006a; Valgreen, 2006).  
When cross-ownership in Iceland was scrutinized, the lack of transparency was evident and 
corporate governance within the banks became a real issue. The root of these issues can be 
traced to the time when the banks began their growth period. In a small and fast growing 
economy, ownership was more entwined than in a larger economy. The young Icelandic 
financial industry promoted executives mostly aged in their late twenties or thirties. The banks 
went from public to private with considerable stock options for executive level managers. A 
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completely new compensation policy was implemented, encompassing an aggressive 
investment banking style incentive system. This led to excessive risk taking.  
The criticism led to a depreciation of 25% in the ISK, and to a similar drop of the ICEX (the 
Icelandic Stock Exchange Index) during the early part of spring 2006. The banks had, until 
then, relied on wholesale market financing with short maturities. Their income stream was 
vulnerable, with 50% of total income as none core income. The banks had no choice but to alter 
their strategies (Sigurjonsson, 2010a). With an already dominant share in the domestic market, 
they sought vast growth through their subsidiaries and branches abroad, where they managed 
to raise customer deposits, especially through Internet accounts. 
The banks were successful in this strategy and managed to raise the total deposit/asset ratio to 
similar levels that other Nordic banks enjoyed. Growth continued at extraordinary levels as 
indicated by asset multiples of 8 to 12 during 2003-2007 (annual reports of the banks 2003-
2007).  Within 18 months, Landsbanki and Kaupthing managed to collect over £4.8 billion in 
the UK and €2.9 billion in the Netherlands through their Icesave and Edge Internet deposit 
accounts. The goal was to create a broader income base and distribute risk, intended to soften 
any setbacks that the Icelandic economy might suffer (Jannari, 2009). On the other hand, large 
shifts in the value of the foreign assets and liabilities of the banks created problems of how to 
insulate the domestic economy, which depended on the regular production flow of goods and 
services. The Icelandic banks, over a period of a few years, had leveraged their capital base to 
buy up banking assets worth several times Iceland‘s GDP (Sigurjonsson, 2010b), and the 
potential depreciation of assets made the leveraged banking sector highly vulnerable. There was 
thus little leeway for declining assets values, mostly purchased during the years of the banking 
and credit boom period of 2003-2007, in preventing the banks’ equity to dry up. Neither the 
National Treasury nor the Central Bank of Iceland had the necessary foreign reserves to support 
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any of the larger banks. A lender of last resort in foreign currency, therefore, did not exist in 
Iceland’s post-privatization era.  
2. The End of Prosperity 
The Icelandic financial industry was gradually de-regulated prior to the privatization of the 
banks. At the time of the privatization, a laissez-faire policy of the Icelandic government 
fostered a period of optimism and risk taking on behalf of the business community. With ample 
credit, business opportunities were there for the taking. Asset prices appreciated in an era of 
easy access to cheap capital. The belief in further appreciation encouraged people to purchase 
assets, regardless of revenue stream. With equity appreciating further and with assets booked 
at market value, continued borrowing was justified, eventually creating asset bubbles. Most of 
the Western world experienced a similar environment of low interest rate policies for some 
years, with the negative effects of such policies only surfacing in 2007 (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
In 2007, liquidity difficulties accumulated with mounting revelations of severe flaws in the US 
housing credit market. Trust within financial markets diminished and the trouble only 
accelerated in 2008. Less liquidity in asset markets made financing through bond markets yet 
more difficult. Central banks had to interfere and provide liquidity, among which was the 
Central Bank of Iceland. The Icelandic banks had been successful with their Internet deposit 
accounts abroad where they decreased their “loan/deposit ratio“ from 3.2 in 2005 to 2.0 in 2007 
(Carey, 2009). At the time the largest bank in Europe, HSBC, had its ratio as 0.84 to 1.00. 
However, this initiative of the Icelandic banks provided merely temporarily relief. The fact that 
Landsbanki gained a larger market share in the UK than the largest Internet deposit bank 
internationally, ING Direct, should have been a clue that the deposit growth was vulnerable; 
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such depositors were probably inclined following whatever Internet bank provided the highest 
interest rates at any given time.  
The Icelandic banks became a gauge of the negative effects to come. Their assets became 
extremely vulnerable and when creditors began believing that other creditors would refuse to 
roll over present loans and extend new credit and the banks lost credibility. This is a classic 
situation that leads to the failure of banks.  
The fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 did not have a great direct influence on the 
Icelandic banks but its indirect influence was catastrophic. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
demonstrated that a large financial firm could go bankrupt without the state rescuing it. 
International money markets froze completely, interbank markets became inactive, liquid 
resources vanished and assets became untradeable. This was the point of no return for the 
Icelandic banks. A bank run began, not on a single Icelandic bank, but the complete Icelandic 
financial system (some international foreign exchange dealers informed their Icelandic 
counterparts that their banks had ceased lending to Iceland). When short run funding 
evaporated, margin calls came from the European Central Bank. Glitnir bank was the first to 
search for a lifeline at the Icelandic Central Bank, which refused to help, and the bank was taken 
over by the government the next day, October 6th. Landsbanki, which could not meet its 
obligations, went into receivership. On October 7th Kaupthing appeared to be still viable and 
had received an 80 billion ISK loan from the government on October 6th. The UK authorities 
had a substantial role in the events that followed. Landsbanki, with its UK branch, collected 
1,200 billion ISK through its Icesave deposit accounts. By operating a branch, but not a 
subsidiary, the bank had transferred the liability to the Icelandic state. Comments from the 
Central Bank of Iceland stating that the Icelandic state would not be able to meet these 
obligations led to an immediate reaction by the UK authorities, applying anti-terrorist laws to 
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seize the UK assets of the Icelandic banks. Kaupthing‘s operation in the UK was ruined as 
covenants on loan agreements were activated, and Kaupthing was put into receivership on 
October 9th.  
Interestingly, all of the Icelandic banks had passed stress tests only a few weeks earlier by the 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) (FSA, 2008), but unfortunately these stress tests did not 
account for vulnerability to a liquidity nor currency crisis24. While the banks’ assets grew ten 
times, the staff of the FSA only grew from 27 to 45 employees (FSA, 2009). Additionally, 
promising lawyers and economists at the FSA were swiftly ‘bought’ by the banks, maintaining 
an imbalance of corporate knowledge and skills in favor of the banks. The FSA became thus 
increasingly weaker, causing limited control of the banks’ growth, with aggressive incentive 
systems that encouraged excessive risk taking. Since there was not a regulatory framework 
preventing Icelandic banks from opening branches (rather than subsidiaries) abroad, the 
ultimate liability was transferred to the Icelandic public.  
3. Comparison of Crises 
A study by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) identified 18 financial crises from WWII until 2007 
when the subprime crash unfolded.  Among the five “Big Ones” are the crises in Norway, 
Sweden and Finland at the beginning of the 1990s.  They conclude that the crises followed a 
similar pattern although the tipping point in each case seems to differ.  The crises usually follow 
a pattern in which regulation changes lead to some sort of increase in lending (Easy Money) 
that develops into an asset bubble.  When such bubbles burst, especially related to real estate, 
asset prices tumble with the consequence of mass bankruptcies.  Losses related to write-offs 
                                                          
24 Kamallakharan & Tómasson (2009) describe why the test proved to be worthless, stating that the test assumed 
no more than a 20% fluctuation in the Icelandic Krona when in reality its worth against the currency basket fell 
more than 50% in a matter of weeks during the fall of 2008. 
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and asset depreciation causes a banking crisis that, along with a currency crisis, exacerbates 
losses, especially in circumstances where loans financed during the bubble were denominated 
in foreign currencies.  The consequence is a contraction in loans to companies that are still in 
business, adding further pressure on a systematic collapse and necessary governmental 
interference to assist the financial system (Englund, 1999). 
This paper focuses on the crises in Sweden and Finland. These crises had similar characteristics 
within the same timeframe, and are often called “twin crises”, while the crisis in Norway was 
somewhat different, regarding both time and external developments (Jonung, 2008). However, 
the figures used here still include Norway, in order to provide a fuller picture.  Adding Iceland 
to that equation, with its uncanny similarities, draws forth the possibility of  ”triplet crises,” the 
main difference being that Iceland experienced its boom and bust just under two decades later.    
Even those who believe that the deregulation process itself did not cause the crisis usually 
attribute the beginning to the Scandinavian Crisis to the deregulation process that occurred at 
the start of the 1980s.  The processes of deregulation differed somewhat between countries, but 
the start and end points were similar (Englund, Vihriala, 2003). The main characteristics of this 
deregulation were the liberation of interest rates and the free flow of capital in international 
markets, importantly including financing (Jonung, Kiander, Vartia, 2008).   
The new financial landscape was mostly unnoticed by regulators in Sweden where the laws 
remained largely unchanged following the rapid development and in addition, changes to the 
tax system resulted in incentives for households and corporations to increase lending 
(Honkapohja, 2009).   
Whilst the deregulation process took less than a decade in Scandinavia from start to finish, with 
the indirect effects in increased lending taking three to four years to materialize, the period in 
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Iceland was much longer, as seen in Table 1.  It can be inferred that the Icelandic period was 
around 25 years, making comparison somewhat difficult.   
Table 1  Financial Evolution in Iceland 
Event Year 
Financial Indexation permitted 1979 
Liberalization of domestic bank rates 1984-1986 
Iceland Stock Exchange established 1985 
Interest Rate Act: Interest rates fully liberalized 1987 
Stepwise liberalization of capital movement begins 1990 
Treasury overdraft facility in the Central Bank closed 1992-1993 
New foreign exchange regulations marks the beginning of the 
liberalization of cross-boarder capital movements  
1992 
Privatization process launched 1992 
Interbank market for foreign exchange established 1993 
Iceland becomes a founding member of the EEA 1994 
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Long term capital movements fully liberalized 1994 
Short term capital movements fully liberalized 1995 
Foreign direct investment liberalized in accordance with EEA 
agreement 
1995 
Privatization process of the Icelandic banks begins 1998 
Interbank money market 1998 
Interbank FX swap market 2001 
Privatization of state owned banks completed 2003 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2006b) and authors. 
The main years of deregulation were 1982 to 1986 for Scandinavia but for Iceland it was 1984 
to 2003.  However, the lending growth period was immediate in Scandinavia from 1986 to 
1990; while in Iceland such growth started during the latter part of the 1990s but the explosive 
growth, leading to the bust, began after 2003.  Nevertheless, the seeds of growth were planted 
once the interbank lending started in 1998, which quickly spread to add fluidity in currency 
market dealings. 
The starting point for the comparison period may appear being subjective.  We look at the start 
of the deregulation process as a starting point in Scandinavia, i.e. in 1982.  In Iceland, the 
deregulation process began during a similar period, but took longer and the effects were for a 
long time barely visible.  Therefore we use 1999 as the starting point in Iceland, which is four 
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years prior to the beginning of the lending boom (which is the same as the Scandinavians 
starting point), but also an approximation of when deregulation began in reality to change the 
Icelandic financial landscape. At that time, the privatization processes in two of the three 
Icelandic state owned banks had just begun and rapid changes were implemented soon after.   
Using the above assumptions, we use the year 1982 as the starting point for Scandinavia in this 
paper and 17 years later for Iceland.  Thus, we define year 1999 as Period 1 or T for Iceland 
and 1982 or T minus 17 for Scandinavia.  The length of periods differs somewhat, mainly 
because some data is no longer available after the Icelandic banks went into default.  
3.1 Lending Growth 
Following the deregulation process, the banks in Scandinavia decreased their emphasis on 
services and cost structure, and instead began to concentrate on pricing and added market share.  
This resulted in additional risk taking (Honkapohja, 2009) and loans to new markets followed.  
However, financial institutions were working in a new environment where their ability to 
measure risk adequately became more difficult (Berg, 1998).  
Initially the lending increase caused no alarm.  After a long period of lending restriction, in 
which real rates were negative and thus there was some sort of privilege associated with 
receiving loans, a higher lending equilibrium was to be expected.  Added demand for money 
caused interest rates to rise, leading to an increased rate difference between domestic rates and 
international rates.  This made borrowing in foreign denominated currency even more tempting 
within the environment of free capital flow, making interest rate policies in Scandinavia 
increasingly toothless (Honkapohja, 2009).  Due to the pegging of domestic currencies to the 
German Mark, domestic loan takers perceived the likelihood of currency losses to be minimal.  
  
 
 
93 
 
Berg (1998) maintains that without the foreign capital inflow the increased lending growth 
would have been impossible.  
The privatization process of the banks began in Iceland 1997 with the aim of establishing a 
widely distributed ownership structure.  The policy change in 2002, with the controlling interest 
in two of the three main banks falling into the hands of investor groups with little banking 
experience, set the stage for the banks’ transformation in which lending growth exploded in 
Iceland.  As in Scandinavia a few years earlier, the Icelandic banks (with savings banks 
following suit) began to concentrate on market share and pricing with added risk associated to 
their business model.  The true explosive lending growth period thus began in 2003 in Iceland, 
17 years after the same development in Scandinavia. 
A comparison of lending growth in Iceland and Scandinavia is shown in Figure 1.  Since two 
different periods are compared, the starting point is defined as being T or Period 1, representing 
1999 for Iceland and T minus 17 (or 1982) for Scandinavia, in line with the assumptions 
previously explained. 
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Figure 1 Lending Growth Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia25. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2009a) 
It is worthwhile pointing out that lending growth remained very high following the 
Informational Crisis in 2006, dipping a little the following year but was still higher than the 
other comparison periods in all comparison countries.  Lending growth was actually in a similar 
range in Iceland in the early part of the comparison period, as it was in the latter one in 
Scandinavia.  The later part of the comparison period shows that lending growth in Iceland was 
approximately double compared to Scandinavia, only with a short period in Finland being the 
exception.   
It was, however, not only the increased lending to households and companies that caused this 
increase.  Icelandic banks evolved quickly from being traditional commercial banks into 
becoming investment banks who took positions in their commercial customers’ projects.  
                                                          
25 Lending growth information is available for the first nine months of 2008.  Nominal growth that year is almost 
60%.  The authors, however, assume that the depreciation of the Icelandic Krona, which during that period was 
approximately the same percentage as the nominal growth, is largely responsible for the increase (by that point ¾ 
of lending was denominated in foreign currency) in additional to inflation. 
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Jannari (2009) explains this by stating that the majority holders who gained control in 2002-
2003 had a mindset more like investment bankers rather than commercial bankers.  Incentive 
systems were enacted in line with common features abroad where short term profits were 
paramount.  This created an atmosphere in which the main objective was getting a deal done, 
as percentages employees received of loans provided could be around 0.3% to 0.4% in the form 
of bonuses.  Those bonuses were given regardless of long-term consequences and inherent risks 
associated with the deals.  In fact, as McLean and Elkind (2003) described the situation with 
Enron a few years earlier, an incentive scheme evolved in which it became advantageous to 
minimize the potential risk associated with deals taking place in order to make sure that they 
were completed and thus commissions paid. 
Once the contraction in lending growth subsided in the comparison periods, about 3 to 4 years 
after the common starting point (T and T-17), lending growth became much higher in Iceland 
compared to Scandinavia.  Another, and maybe a more descriptive, way to look at this is 
viewing the cumulative increase as shown in Figure 2, representing the Icelandic lending 
growth compared to the “irrational” one in Scandinavia during the late 1980s. 
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Figure 2 Cumulative Lending Growth Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2009a) 
The cumulative growth was already much more than it had been in the comparison countries 
when the Informational Crisis hit in 2006.  The enormous continued growth shows how much 
more the expansion of the Icelandic banking system was compared to the Scandinavian 
countries during the 1980s.  This growth corresponds with the growth of Icelandic banks’ 
balance sheets, which combined were just under the size of the country’s 1999 GDP, but are 
estimated at being ten times larger than Iceland´s GDP in 2008 (Central Bank of Iceland, 2009).  
One explanation of why the negative effects of deregulation filtered down so late into the 
Icelandic financial system is that the government retained its controlling stake in the banking 
system whilst the changes were taking effect.  Thus, despite the free flow of capital, there were 
implicit restrictions on lending growth.  That is not to say that lending growth was non-existent 
during those years (as Figure 2 demonstrates); but during that period it was understandable due 
to the easing of lending restrictions leading to a natural higher lending equilibrium. 
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Information surfacing after the crash (for example, the leaked loan book of Kaupthing Bank) 
indicates that the loans were not merely ill considered but were even questionable from legal 
and ethical standpoints. The collateral for loans were in an abnormally low percentage range or 
even simply only the equity bought.  This raises the question why Icelandic banks did not 
simply buy the equity themselves and thus reap all the benefits themselves if they turned out to 
be successful.  In some instances, such loans were used to finance purchases of the bank’s own 
shares, so in effect banks were lending money to buy shares in themselves, with those shares 
being the only collateral. During the writing of this paper investigations are under way 
regarding market manipulation due to such loans, with banks accused of lending money in the 
attempt of keeping their share prices artificially high.   
As with Japan in the late 1980s, where loans were increasingly made to holding companies with 
the main purpose of investing in other companies (Chancellor, 2000), loans by Icelandic banks 
were often related to cross-ownership or other relations between parties in which dubious 
collateral was placed (Jannari, 2009).  This was not a concern in Scandinavia (Jonung, 2008).  
Figure 3 shows the nominal increase in total lending Icelandic holding companies scaled to 
April 2005, compared to the growth in lending to domestic households, many of whose sole 
purpose was investing in equities of other companies (Jannari, 2009).   
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Figure 3 Lending Growth to Icelandic Holding Companies and Households. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2009a) 
Despite the frenzied increase in lending to households, it pales compared to the increase in 
lending to holding companies.   Often with little (if any) collateral on the table, the owners of 
the holding companies stood a chance of striking it rich if they were successful in their 
investments, it appears that stockholders, bondholders and taxpayers may have to pick up a 
sizeable amount of the tab if unsuccessful. 
3.2 Unemployment, GDP and (asset) Inflation 
Unemployment in Scandinavia was generally low during the 1980s (see Figure 4).  In Finland, 
it gradually decreased during the later part of the decade.  In Sweden, unemployment never 
went above 4% and for a period during that period was below 2%.  A common government 
policy in the region was maintaining full employment (Jonung, Kiander, Vartia, 2008).   
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Figure 4 Unemployment % Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Source: IMF (2009) 
As with the Scandinavian countries during the 1980s, Iceland experienced almost non-
unemployment, which is partially explained by major construction projects.  Thus, the 
expansion in loans in both comparison periods created an illusion of a stable and healthy 
economy, only turning out to being an obvious mirage when unemployment skyrocketed 
following the bust. 
Information from the IMF shows that unemployment in Finland reached 17% for a short period 
during the ensuing bust; that figure in Iceland, at the time of writing, hovers around 8% 
(Directorate of Labour in Iceland, 2010). 
All the countries showed a stable increase in GDP during the period, especially Iceland that had 
a mean annual growth of 4%. This is in contrast to the 2-2.5% mean annual growth in the 
comparison countries within the decade actually being 6% annually during the boom years 
2003-2007 (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 Real GDP Growth Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Source:  IMF (2009) 
What is probably most striking is the extraordinary high GDP growth in Iceland once the boom 
period took hold.  Monetary issues were not the only cause.  The government implemented 
enormous power plant projects that totaled 10.5% to 12% of GDP in 2005 and 2006 (Central 
Bank of Iceland, 2009).  During the same period municipalities engaged in various projects 
keeping demand for labor high.   
The comparison of inflation as seen in Figure 6 shows that it remained relatively mild in Iceland 
during the boom years.  That does not mean that it did not exist, the Central Bank’s goal of 
keeping inflation at or below 2.5% was seldom reached.  Inflation was, in a sense, partially 
hidden due to the strength of the ISK, making imports cheaper than otherwise.  Domestic factors 
were thus mostly instrumental in causing added inflation.  
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Figure 6 Inflation % (end of period) Comparison – Iceland vs. Scandinavia. 
 
Source: IMF (2009) 
When the ISK tumbled following the financial meltdown, inflation shot up.  Its strength had 
held back inflation for many years but when that development reversed inflation quickly spiked, 
as seen in Figure 6, since importers had little choice but to hand the added expense partially to 
the customers. 
Adding insult to injury, many Icelandic companies had, on the surface, operated in a stable and 
profitable manner, by merely looking at the net income numbers.  No study has been done yet 
in this particular field, as far as the authors are aware, but by scanning a few annual reports, it 
shows that by comparing EBITDA numbers to net loans and fixed assets, under normal 
circumstances companies were losing money on their operations.  However, by having a huge 
amount of their loans denominated in foreign currencies, interest costs were little, with 
artificially low interest rates and an increasingly strong ISK.  Once the ISK depreciated, the 
strengthening reversed and exposed the ‘hidden’ risk via currency fluctuations in financing, 
leading to many companies’ equity disappearing almost overnight.  
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The monetary policies in Iceland and Scandinavia during the boom periods have been criticized 
for different reasons.  Many academics have questioned the pegging of the currencies to the 
German Mark (Jonung, 2008; Honkapohja & Koskela, 2000; Englund, 1999).  Although those 
thoughts are inconclusive, most argue that a floating currency would have resulted in a 
‘corrective’ currency adjusting to interest rate spreads.  
Judging from Iceland’s recent experience, those arguments appear to be falling flat.  At the 
beginning of the decade, the ISK was floated with the aim of keeping inflation below 2.5%, 
which was the Central Bank’s main interest rate objective. This policy proved to be futile, as 
Figure 6 demonstrates, as was the pegging in Scandinavia during the comparison period, within 
an environment of free flowing capital.  While pegging created an imbalance too great between 
currencies, the floating ISK with the Central Bank policy of increasingly higher interest rates 
led to an inflow of capital that strengthened the ISK.  Like the Scandinavians during the late 
1980s, Icelanders (both households and municipalities) began taking foreign loans in large 
amounts.  The rationale for many people was that historically such loans had provided more 
advantageous interest rates and, maybe more importantly, the ISK showed no signs of 
weakening (this is a case of the short term memory the public has of financial markets, the ISK 
had weakened considerably 2001, and this seemed already to be a distant memory). 
The consequences proved to be dire.  Icelanders not only took foreign loans because of their 
belief in its continued strength but also, paradoxically, used much of that money to buy foreign 
goods, which had become so cheap because of the strong ISK.  Jannari (2009) maintains that 
this eventually resulted in the high interest rate policy of the Central Bank not only being 
toothless, but in reality with the free flow of capital adding to the inflationary pressure.  A lesson 
to be drawn is that monetary policies alone do not suffice within such circumstances, fiscal 
policies with the same aim are necessary. 
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Therefore, measuring asset inflation during this period is difficult.  The underlying factors that 
were taking place did not necessary show up in normal studies.  A simple approach is looking 
at the nominal inflation price of real estate, which takes inflation, underlying inflation to some 
extent, and the level of risk appetite into account.  It also measures the consequences of access 
to money, or M1.  The case in point is Scandinavia during the 1980s.  Englund (1999) points 
out that while deregulation may have opened the door to asset inflation, it was not until the 
Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratio went from 75% to 90% in 1988, and 3 years after deregulation had 
firmly taken place that real estate values went up 35% within a short amount of time.  Until 
that, real estate prices remained stable and even lowered during much of the decade (Berg, 
1998).  Furthermore, Englund asserts that a higher LTV ratio is, in a sense, a measure of risk 
appetite, which plummeted following the bust and the LTV ratio quickly fell again.  The ratio 
thus increased when there was no need for it, but decreased when liquidity problems surfaced.  
The Swedes surely were aware of this, therefore the lesson simply was that a 90% LTV ratio is 
too high, even during bust periods.    
This development was even more extreme in Iceland.  The government decided to raise the 
LTV ratio in a few steps from 65% to 90%.  People began to take advantage of this by taking 
mortgage loans that were partially government sponsored in an indirect way and using the 
money, not only for household purposes, but also to increase spending and paying down 
overdraft loans.  The banks responded by lowering interest rates even more and in the spirit of 
gaining market share one bank began offering 100% LTV loans26.  The fierce competition led 
to a negative interest rate spread.  One of the major savings banks, for example, financed itself 
                                                          
26 http://www.sa.is/files/Sp%E1l%-EDkan%20um%20%EDb%FA%F0afj%E1rfestingar_1723061657.pdf 
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via long-term bonds paying 4.90% to 5.20% interest but lent its customers at the same time 
money to finance real estate at 4.15%. (NASDAQ OMX Nordic (2009).  
Figure 7 Real Estate Nominal Price Inflation Comparison (index set at 100 as starting point) 
 
Sources: Berg (1998) and Icelandic Property Registry (2009) 
Figure 7 shows that the paths of Iceland and Finland, during the comparison period, were for 
many years almost identical.  However, prices kept on increasing in Iceland, and judging from 
the Scandinavian experience will decrease to about half of their value from their peak prices.  
This prediction is not impossible. Various home builders joked during the boom period that 
there was a 20/50 aim on new buildings, i.e. put 20 million in building an apartment and selling 
it for 50 million.  As Englund and Berg point out, prices in Sweden were stable for most of the 
period but as the LTV ratio was raised, prices shot up only to fall again concurrent with the 
lowering of the LTV ratio. 
The above factors demonstrate not only an overheating of the economy, but indicate how the 
general population perceived the economy, i.e. added optimism leads to added consumerism.  
Therefore a vicious cycle forms, in which the main driver of economic growth is consumption 
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(of various forms) financed by loans. In a sense, the current lifestyle is funded by sacrificing 
the future, although that is usually not the general perception at such a given point.  Carey 
(2009) for example points out that the savings ratio of Iceland was negative during the boom 
years, 2003 to 2007.   
As previously mentioned, the high interest rate policy of the Central Bank may have increased 
underlying inflation, being expansionary in a sense. However, the monetary policy regarding 
Easy Money was clearly accommodating; broad based monetary aggregates such as M1 grew 
above 20% or more every year from 2002 until the crash (Bagus & Howden, 2009).  As Woods 
Jr. (2009) explains, prices can only increase simultaneously (apart from decreasing supply of 
all goods) by increasing the amount of money in the economy.  Hence, despite a high interest 
rate climate, the Austrian School of thought maintains that monetary policy in tandem with 
fiscal policy was adding oil to fire as opposed to reigning in inflation.  Money was thus being 
flooded into society that invested it into long-term projects, such as houses, but put the Icelandic 
nation on a short lease, as recent events underline.   
Berg (1998) asserts that the Scandinavian banks would have not been able to increase their 
lending growth without access to foreign capital.  This was the case in Iceland also, where 
people with loans in foreign currencies had enjoyed favorable interest rates for years and even 
had their underlying debts decrease in value due to the strength of the ISK.  This is further 
amplified when people see others making money by speculative trading (not limited to the stock 
market but even to a larger degree housing loans in foreign denominated currencies), adding a 
tendency to follow the crowd.  Kindleberger (1996) described this as “Monkey see, monkey 
do”.  
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Thus, by adding insult to injury, in the expansionary climate Icelanders began increasing their 
appetite for foreign loans considerably as the boom period continued.  Such loans increased a 
great deal in 2006 and at the start of 2008 represented 14% of household debt (Carey, 2009).  
During the fall of 2007, banks were beginning to shut down foreign denominated loans.  The 
increase, measured in ISK, is after that point mainly due to the weakening of the ISK.  
On paper, such loans were as safe for banks as the loans were denominated in the domestic 
currency.  Currency contracts were generally hedged but could only been done so to a certain 
extent, with fluctuations being assumed to stay within certain parameters.  Such hedges proved 
of limited use due to the discrepancy of the length of maturities between financing and loans 
provided. When the ISK plummeted in value, the hedging only provided support for the short 
term. Long-term contracts were ‘naked’ against such fluctuations.  Carey (2009) also points out 
that although banks theoretically had adequate hedges against such fluctuations, their customers 
did not. Implying that while banks appeared to be safe, their customers simply could not pay 
back the loans under such different circumstances, therefore, write-downs became inevitable.    
A recent report by the Institute of Economic Affairs maintains that the root of the collapse for 
many US banks partially lies in the fact that the government encouraged banks to increase 
mortgage loans to income groups with less money (Schwartz, 2009).  In Iceland, where a 
tradition of equality is rooted within society, such a development occurred to a higher degree 
with the increase of the LTV ratio.  Thus governmental policies contributed to this in both 
countries, and even internationally, in creating the real estate asset bubble via the Easy Money 
policy.  A lesson from this experience is that governmental controls must be in place during 
deregulation and Easy Money policy periods.  Such controls are paramount in keeping lending 
growth within reasonable levels and they need not be an infringement on the free market.  If 
banks were to lend recklessly without government guarantees, knowledgeable depositors and 
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financers would take notice and withdraw their money, but lesser educated people might not, 
therefore leaving trust in the system at the mercy of speculators disguised as bankers.  A simple 
restriction of LTV ratios and foreign denominated loans would be the most effective strategy.  
Without such simple measures, another crisis due to the same underlying factors would soon 
occur, only in a different form. 
4. Conclusion 
The similarity of the two comparison periods (T & T-17) is remarkable.  Despite the 
Scandinavian crisis being defined as one of the five “Big Ones” by Rogoff and Reinhart, Iceland 
shows, by a wide margin, more significant signs of over-expansion in practically all aspects.    
An obvious question is how Iceland came to be a victim of such a similar euphoria so shortly 
after a similar crisis by their neighbors.  Monetary issues are not the sole explanation.  Galbraith 
(1997) maintains that credit has on numerous occasions (for instance both before and after the 
“Roaring Twenties”) been easy without causing speculation.  As with deregulation, easy money 
by itself does not cause unsound speculation leading to disaster.  Galbraith states that the mood 
is far more important than the rate of interest, some sort of conviction that ordinary people 
should be rich.  The answer is in short provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).  Icelanders, in 
line with a common syndrome associated with financial crises, thought that they were smarter 
and had learned from past mistakes; such crises only happened to other people during other 
times.  The reality was that not only had Icelanders not learned from past mistakes, but there 
are vast indications that past mistakes were visible both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
Striking similarities are also to be found in recent examples in Argentina a decade ago, Asia 
during the 1990s, and even the “Roaring Twenties” in the US (Mixa, 2009). 
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Iceland imitated all the main features of Scandinavia such as deregulation, a real estate boom, 
huge lending increase and an increased amount of foreign capital flow.  As the increase of 
lending to holding companies shows, lending growth was not only more prevalent in Iceland 
but had an added category where risk taking among insiders took constantly a bigger share of 
the lending pie.  Such added risk appetite was also prevalent in banks’ increased exposure in 
direct ownership of companies. 
4.1 Firm Level 
Business practices in Iceland became questionable and of such a scale that they ultimately 
facilitated the collapse of the Icelandic economy. The close-knit society, partially created by 
managerial relationships, cross-ownership and cross lending, established imbalances in favor 
of business over regulatory authority. This consequence was an extensive collapse, where if 
one link in the chain was to fail a domino effect throughout the entire economy was created. As 
pointed out in this paper, this was not a problem in the other Nordic countries (Jonung, 2008). 
The foreign criticism from financial institutions, rating agencies and foreign media in 2006 did 
not manage to influence the general discussion in the Icelandic media in such a way that the 
international expansion of the Icelandic banks was scaled down. On the contrary, the growth 
only escalated. In a country where nearly all the newspapers and business magazines are in 
ownership indirectly or directly by the banks themselves through their largest shareholders, 
attempts to criticize become negatively addressed and extinguished (Vaiman, Sigurjonsson and 
Davidsson, 2010). 
One possible reason why things got so out of control in Iceland is that the Icelandic banks 
operated as if they were investment banks.  In the shadow of the Great Depression, the Glass-
Steagall Act was enacted in 1933, separating commercial banking and investment banking.  
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During the Scandinavian crisis, those walls still held.  They were, however, abolished 1999 and 
it was within that landscape that the Icelandic banks grew so quickly.  It took the international 
banking system less than a decade to collapse after investment banking became again part of 
the general banking system.  Icelandic banks, expanding partially because they had some sort 
of governmental guarantee, were the worst culprits and, as such, suffered the worst 
consequences.  This questions how systematic the crash was in reality, whether the similarity 
of the buildup created the circumstance in which all of the banks stood a chance of failing within 
parameters of certain negative events, with or without domino effects.  It can thus be argued 
that this experiment of abolishing the Glass-Steagall Act was an expensive one (Mixa, 2009), 
with Iceland suffering the highest cost.  This also raises the question why such separation has 
not been re-enacted. 
4.2 Macro Level 
The recent experience in Iceland and the experience in Scandinavia two decades ago suggest 
that fiscal and monetary policies must involve consistent goals.  Interest rate tools within an 
environment of free flow of capital were used in both instances, in Iceland with the aim of 
keeping inflation at bay with a floating currency whilst the Scandinavian countries aimed at 
stabilizing the economy by pegging their currencies.  History shows that both these courses 
become toothless once speculation within an environment of rising asset inflation.  The real 
rate of interest was disguised with foreign denominated loans freely available.  During the 
prelude to the crash of 1929, the rate of interest of some margin loans for stock purchases went 
to 40-50% with added collateral required (Rappoport & White, 1994) without dampening the 
amount of speculation since the stock market had become a cornerstone in a sociological sense 
(Galbraith, 1997). 
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While the Central Bank of Iceland raised interest rates to keep the economy´s growth under 
control, the government increased to ceiling of LTV for housing purchases, lowered taxes and 
kept an expansionary policy in the tight labor market.  The signals given by the Central Bank 
via higher interest rates and expansionary policy by the government and its subsidiaries raises 
the question what sort of policy was in place and partly answers the question why nobody 
warned against the build up of foreign loans.   
4.3 Policy Level 
Much discussion has revolved around the effects of added deregulation in Scandinavia.  
Englund (1999) maintains that such a view simplifies reality.  Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) find that a financial crisis occurs more likely in an unregulated environment, especially 
where a lack of respect is for the rule of law and corruption is widely spread.  They find, 
however, no correlation between financial crises and changes from a regulated environment to 
a lesser regulated one.  Englund (1999) concludes that what counts is a balanced macro 
environment in keeping the financial system stable within a deregulated environment.   
Claiming that deregulation was the root of the financial collapse in Iceland is a simplification.  
Deregulation in neither Iceland nor Scandinavia was the cause of excessive lending.  However, 
once the monetary and fiscal policy got out of hand, creating a destabilized economy, the doors 
that deregulation had unlocked were opened.  The main impetus at first was real estate loans, 
leading to higher real estate values in tandem with increased risk in lending.  In Iceland the 
privatization of the state-owned banks accelerated, where size was clearly all that mattered, and 
with  risk taking becoming much more via holding companies within a historically low interest 
rate environment. 
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Banking is among the structural factors within societies today, just as schools, electricity and 
transportation to name a few.  Regulation issues within banking are thus of vital importance for 
the public.  Regulations – detailed or general – are not a substitute for proper business practices 
within banks (Gregg, 2009).  Authorities must ensure that not only are such practices within the 
banks in line with general good practices, but also the interaction of banks and regulatory 
institutions and stakeholders.  It may appear clichéd, but prudent banking is needed to create 
trust, and banking is built on that basis.  Trust in the banking system is deservedly lacking in 
the banking system and needs to be re-built.  A lesson from what went wrong in Iceland is a 
good starting point. 
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Már Wolfgang Mixa was one of those reviled Icelandic bankers, but unlike most of his 
colleagues, he worked from the inside trying to warn against the insanity. Now he’s 
finishing his PhD in cultural finance. In the course of writing this chapter, he was 
appointed to the Special Investigative Committee to study the fall of the saving banks. 
Here he offers a unique perspective, from interviews with insiders and from the inside 
himself, on what went wrong and how.  
 
A Day in the Life of an Icelandic Banker 
The Icelandic banking system,27 which had no history in investment banking, engulfed Icelandic 
society during a period I refer to as the Manic Millennium (Mixa 2009). Its seeds were sown 
during the mid-1980s, took root in 1994, and reached full bloom from 2003-2008. In the midst 
of a transformation in ideologies and a revolution in communication technologies, the 
distinction between investment banker and Icelander was sometimes blurred; the qualities of 
investment bankers at times reflected on Icelanders as a whole (Loftsdóttir 2009).  
The financial community thus began defining the behavior and perception of what an Icelander 
was. Conversely, Icelanders increasingly saw themselves as risk takers, a view that was 
reinforced, at least for a few years, by the market. But few Icelanders, including bankers, had 
any idea how high the risk was or how far prices had diverged from their intrinsic value.  
In this chapter, I examine the environment in which Icelandic banks and bankers developed 
their business ideas and practices during the boom years. I also discuss how national and 
international factors concealed what should have been obvious to anyone with a minimum of 
                                                          
27 The combined balance sheets of the banking system was approximately the same as the amount of Iceland’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) in a single year around the millennium, but had grown to around 7-8 times that 
figure in 2007 (Halldorsson & Zoega 2010). 
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financial savvy, namely that Icelandic bankers in general were dangerously inexperienced in 
the rapidly growing international investment market, and how this oversight lead to the demise 
of the Icelandic banking system, one of the biggest financial disasters in history, dwarfing well-
publicized debacles such as Enron and WorldCom. 
A Banker‘s Life 
My Icelandic banking career began in early 1997. My first job was in a new department that 
the bank had recently created and that would become a blend of brokerage and investment 
banking. There were hardly any eoyees, but we had many desks and chairs side by side, and 
twice as many computer screens on the desks, an unusual sight in 1997. There was a real 
difference between the people working there and other bankers I had worked with.28 Our attire 
was international business suits, not the old-fashioned dress code for men or the bank uniforms 
worn by almost all women. The meeting rooms were simple in setting yet private, in stark 
contrast to either the customer service areas people were used to when discussing banking 
services or the formal bank manager offices where people tried to provide loans (bearing 
negative interest rates) within a restrictive and localized banking environment. While most of 
the workers had university business degrees, most had no investment banking experience. 
Financial terms were most often English slang, both because it sounded more modern because 
and Icelandic hadn’t yet developed a special language around financial markets.  
With this limited experience, there was little training. The previous year when working at Dean 
Witter,29 I had to take a three-month course and complete a nation-wide exam before selling 
securities to customers. In Iceland, I received a one-day training limited mostly to how the 
                                                          
28 I had worked at various positions at Landsbanki Íslands fróm 1986 to 1987 and as a summer employee from 
1988 to 1992. 
29 Dean Witter bought Morgan Stanley two years later and became among the biggest investment houses in the 
world. 
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trading system worked before being set up in front of a computer to trade on behalf of customers 
and the bank without any written limits.  
Risky Exista 
During the economic boom of 2003 to 2008, no one in Iceland, neither the general public nor 
most bankers and investment managers, fully realized the risks associated with fast, exponential 
growth. The investment company Exista illustrates how sociological factors blinded even the 
most financially savvy people.  
Exista was formed by Kaupthing Bank in cooperation with the savings Banks of Iceland, which 
owned Kaupthing before its shares were spun off. In 2003, the brothers Ágúst and Lýður 
Guðmundsson (known as the Bakkavör brothers) became Exista’s largest shareholders, and by 
the end of 2007, they owned 45.2 percent of its shares via their holding company (Exista 2007). 
Savings banks were the second largest shareholder, with a combined 16.2 percent ownership 
via direct holdings and its Kista holding company.30 Exista was by no means small, with total 
assets at year end 2007 amounting to 8 billion Euros; about half of Iceland’s annual GDP using 
the currency rate of the time. 
Exista invested the bulk of its capital in very few companies and mostly in its largest 
shareholder’s own company, the food producer Bakkavör, and their main associate, Kaupthing 
Bank. The largest holding was, however, the insurance company Sampo Group, which was 
rumored to be a take-over target of Kaupthing. The combined book value of Kaupthing and 
Sampo was 4.7 billion Euros, nearly 60 percent of Exista’s total assets. Bakkavör accounted for 
                                                          
30 This information was derived from the 2007 Exista Annual Report (Exista 2007) and other annual reports from 
smaller savings banks, which have limited general availability. 
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approximately 7 percent of total assets; hence two-thirds of Exista’s capital was sitting in three 
companies, all listed on public stock exchanges. 
Exista was a big shareholder in those three companies, holding 39.6 percent of Bakkavör’s 
stock, 23.7 percent of Kaupthing’s stock, and 19.98 percent of Sampo’s stock (20 percent was 
the threshold regarding obligations related to the control of the company). Essentially, Exista 
had almost no exit route if markets took a nosedive.31   
The leverage and thus risk of Exista was alarming. Judging by the book value, the equity ratio32 
at year end 2007 was 29.5 percent, down from 43.2 percent the prior year. In a report in 
Viðskiptablaðið (the Icelandic Business Paper)33 regarding Icelandic holding companies, 
Jónsson, S. (2009) points out that those equity ratios may be normal for companies that actually 
produce goods, especially consumer staples yielding relatively constant revenues, but not for 
investment companies that are wiped out in the next downturn in stock markets. For some 
perspective, the lowest equity ratio since the first quarter of 2003 of Sweden’s main investment 
holding company, Investor AB, is 77 percent.34 Warren Buffett’s35 investment holding 
company, Berkshire Hathaway, generally has an equity ratio around 100 percent, meaning that 
it has no net liabilities (Buffett & Clark 1997, Hagstrom 2005).  
                                                          
31 Holding such a large percentage of the outstanding stock meant that attempts to liquidate the assets would 
drive the market price quickly down unless a buyer could be found for a huge share. Such a buyer would likely 
be acutely aware of this and demand a discount unless other interests were also involved. 
32 The equity ratio is a financial ratio indicating the relative proportion of equity used to finance a company's 
assets. The less it is, the more risk is associated with the financing of the company. If total assets are for example 
$100, of which $60 is financed with bonds and loans, then the equity ratio is 40 percent. If merely $30 is 
financed with bonds and loans, the equity ratio has gone up to 70 percent meaning the company is less reliant on 
the “understanding” of lenders if losses begin piling up. 
33 Exista was owned by the Bakkavör brothers a couple of years before the report was written. 
34 Investor web site -http://www.investorab.com/en/Investors_media/InvestorInFigures/KeyFigures. htm, 2009 
3535 Warren Buffett is arguably the world‘s most famous investor, becoming one of the richest people in the 
world through shrewd investments. 
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The report refers to an interview in Viðskiptablaðið in early 2006 in which Lýður Guðmundsson 
(then current owner) said that Exista aimed at investing in companies through leveraged 
buyouts. A research report titled “Exista hf: Right Place, Waiting for the Right Time“ 
(Ögmundsdóttir and Pétursson 2007) confirms this. The report is the only detailed one regarding 
Exista that was publicly distributed and, not surprisingly, since its lead analysts were employed 
by Kaupthing, containing a recommendation to buy. It shows that while Exista’s assets swelled 
in size, growing four-fold in a span of two years, its liabilities multiplied even more; they were 
five-fold during the same period. With an immensely leveraged balance sheet, the meager 
profits of the underlying investments actually appeared as substantial profits, pleasing the 
shareholders who seemed oblivious of the associated risks. However, given the historical 
volatility of stock markets, where valuations fall every now and then more than 40 percent (has 
already happened twice this century), it is difficult to see how this strategy would not have 
ended by crashing and burning.   
Despite the obvious risk associated with Exista, no one in the public or banking sectors at home 
or abroad seemed to notice. More alarming was that its stock was a huge base of equity of many 
savings banks in Iceland and its rise in market value the major source, in most cases the sole 
source, of temporary profits during the peak of the Manic Millennium. Case in point is the 
Savings Bank of Keflavík (2007), which had three-quarters of its shareholders equity directly 
and indirectly in Exista. From year-end 2002 to year-end 2006 it had more than doubled its 
balance sheet.36 Other savings banks had similar stories, recklessly lending money from 
extremely fragile balance sheets.37   
                                                          
36 Its balance sheet was 18.9 billion Icelandic krona year-end 2002 and 48 billion Icelandic krona 4 years later. 
Its growth in real terms was, however, just over doubled- since the combined inflation during that period was 19 
percent. 
37 This was also done via issuances of subordinated debt, which can be used to conceal the fragility of balance 
sheets. 
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Financially the Manic Millennium resembled the Roaring 1920s in the United States in many 
ways (Mixa 2009). During both periods, there was an explosion in the formation of investment 
trusts (Fridson 1998), many of which leveraged themselves, frequently buying shares of the 
issuing companies or their affiliates at prices as much as double their instrinsic market value 
(Galbraith 1997). Kaupthing’s research report, paradoxically, shows that the price-to-book 
ratio38 was 1.5 at the time of writing. Put another way, people were paying at least 1.5 times the 
amount of money for a few stocks generally available on the open market because of the 
company’s representation of success built upon reckless risk. In the end equity investors lost 
everything and bondholders lost a sizable percentage of their lending, since Exista’s crash was 
also the single biggest company bond loss among Icelandic pension funds (Icelandic Pension 
Funds Association 2012). 
Setting the Stage for the Manic Millennium 
So what kind of environment creates and promotes the likes of Exista? It has been said that the 
four most expensive words in the English language are, “This time is different.”39 Those words 
certainly applied to Iceland during the build-up of the bubble that Exista thrived in. Iceland is 
special because it had no real history of commercial banking and absolutely none of investment 
banking. For a long time it was relatively isolated from other Nordic nations and Europe with 
its population spread in rural areas and its banking localized. After the Bank of Iceland 
(Íslandsbanki) went bankrupt during the Great Depression, it became a highly-regulated system 
similar to those of Nordic nations, with political connections and governmental policies 
dictating which industries should receive preferential treatment (Sigurjónsson & Mixa 2011, 
                                                          
38 A ratio that shows the market price of a stock compared to the book value of the owner‘s equity. 
39 Also the title of a book by Reinhart & Rogoff (2009) concentrating on financial data as warning signs of 
financial crashes. 
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Jonung 2008, Englund 1999). Foreign currency restrictions became the norm in Iceland, and 
Icelanders traveling abroad, for example, had to specifically apply for currency for their travel 
expenses. Real interest rates were often negative, meaning that access to money was an asset in 
itself, with demand constantly higher than supply. Specific interest groups thus began creating 
“their” banks during the next decades, their names reflecting the groups they mainly served and 
lent to rather than promoting any specialization in lending (Jóhannesson, S. 2004).  Some of 
these include The Bank of Industry (Iðnaðarbankinn) formed in 1953, The Icelandic Bank of 
Commerce (Verzlunarbanki Íslands) formed in 1963, and The People’s Bank of Iceland formed 
in 1971 by the labor unions (Alþýðubanki Íslands) (Jónsson, Á. 2009).   
This restrictive environment began to change very slowly during the mid-1980s.  Domestic 
bank rates were fully liberalized in 1986 and restriction on capital movements fully abolished 
in 1995. A year later, Iceland joined the European Economic Area (EEA), which also liberalized 
foreign direct investment within parameters of the EEA agreement (Mixa & Sigurjónsson 
2010), breaking down the currency restrictions and connecting the country’s economy globally. 
This development marked two watershed moments: it opened the door to the 
internationalization of financial markets, and it set up the same kind of financial liberalization 
that had befallen the Bank of Iceland in 1930. These innovations were aimed at making efficient 
a banking system that had been bloated and inefficient for years. In Iceland this was further 
amplified with its 1994 EEA membership.  
The trend in international banking was to combine traditional banking and investment banking. 
Traditional banking revolves mainly around basic lending procedures, and banks make money 
from traditional banking services, such as ATM services, checking accounts, and lending. The 
interest rate differential, lending say at an interest rate of 6 percent but paying on average 3 
percent for saving accounts, is usually the prime source of profits of such banking. Investment 
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banking, however, is focused on raising money for companies, an act that often involves 
investing in other companies. For a long time, such companies were owned by owners, who, 
like in law firms, guarded their interests with great care since their own money was on the line 
(Lewis 2010).  
Unlike traditional banks, investment banks do not raise money from the public via deposits but 
instead, almost entirely through what is known as long-term investments.40 The traditional 
banking Icelanders were accustomed to was more like the grease for the economy, with short-
term funding the norm. There is, however, the inherent danger that depositors may demand their 
money back. That’s what deposit insurance is made for. By providing such programs, which 
became universal following the Great Depression, governments placed restrictions on banking 
practices to dampen the kind of speculative behavior that was rampant in during the 1920s 
(Galbraith 1955, Sobel 1968, Bruner & Carr 2007), justified by the fact that taxpayers’ money 
would fund depositors’ losses. While walls between U.S. investment and commercial banking 
had been in place for decades,41 there had never been a need to set them up in Iceland because 
no investment banking existed. Thus, Icelandic banking entered the international arena with 
adrenalized risk-taking and no restrictive shackles in place, with the chance to act like 
investment bankers yet funded with deposit money backed by the government.   
Privatization – A World of Efficiency  
The privatization that had begun in 1992 was going full bore by 2002. Two of Iceland’s main 
banks had been partially privatized in 1998, just a year after my Icelandic banking career began. 
The large number of shareholders made it look like the banks were still owned by the people of 
                                                          
40 Some people argue about the state of investment banking prior to the crash in 2008, which at that point relied 
to a great degree on short term lending funds, but that was not the traditional way of investment bank funding. 
41 The Glass-Steagall Act enacted by the US Congress in 1933 separated investment- and commercial banking 
following the failures of some banks that had invested heavily in the stock market, its repeal occurring in 1999. 
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Iceland. Just four years later, though, individuals and groups that had little if any banking 
experience but excellent political connections were allowed to buy a controlling stake in each 
bank. This new dynamic changed the mission of the banks from service to growth. The banks’ 
new goal was to expand their balance sheets and become big players (Sigurjónsson & Mixa 
2011). One CEO remarked to one of the board members that he wanted to duplicate Merrill 
Lynch, which he had recently visited.42 The main investor of the National Bank of Iceland, who 
also became chairman of the board, declared in a television interview shortly after the 
privatization that he was determined to make his bank the biggest one of the three.  As Icelandic 
bankers went on acquisition sprees across Europe, the media, increasingly owned by the same 
bankers (Áskelsdóttir 2010), began reporting on them as Vikings pillaging on foreign shores, 
dubbing the bankers “Business Vikings.” Despite having banking roots that were localized and 
regulated like Nordic banks, Icelandic bankers (at least the ones deemed successful during the 
boom years) were described in the media as having greater financial expertise and working 
more quickly than bankers in most other nations (Loftsdóttir 2009). The public believed this 
despite the fact that modern banking in Iceland was only a few years old. I was considered one 
of the most experienced investment bankers in the country, yet had been a novice just a few 
years earlier.   
Domestic and Foreign Perception 
Public awe of the “brilliance” of its bankers is a common phenomenon during the build-up to 
financial crashes (Englund 1999, Gleeson 1999, Chancellor 2000). Galbraith (1997) states that 
the mood is far more important than the interest rate during a boom. He adds that the 
prerequisite of a boom is trust in leaders and in the benevolence of others to create some sort of 
                                                          
42 This is from a confidential source. The CEO’s name and company will remain anonymous. 
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conviction that ordinary people should be rich. In Iceland, the media became a central player in 
creating such trust. The Icelandic tabloid Séð og heyrt focused on businessmen and politicians, 
the latter becoming ever less relevant during the Manic Millennium. In an article published 
barely half a year before the collapse, pictures taken at the Business Conference 2008 show 
politicians mingling with businessmen at the conference. The article quotes one CEO saying, 
“It was enjoyable seeing all the politicians there. It is good that such a good relationship exists 
between politicians and the business community” (Séð og heyrt 2008).  
The country was engulfed in the developments of financial markets, and owners of the banks 
promoted their interests via the media they largely owned. A reinforcing cycle developed in 
which those who sought the most risk became media heroes. The perception of Icelandic 
bankers being the best and fastest was promoted inside as well as outside the banks. An internal 
video at Kaupthing, entitled “What Is Kaupthinking, (Kaupþing, n.d.) emphasized the values of 
acting quickly. It starts with images from the U.S., such as Martin Luther King, Jr. 
demonstrating in Washington, Bill Gates, and a launch to the moon and juxtaposes them to 
scenes from Tiananmen Square and the fall of the Berlin Wall, coupled with the written and 
spoken words “we can.” The narrator then says; “We thought we could double in size and we 
did, every year for eight years” and a few seconds later in a reference of winning out over the 
authority of a rigid state, the narrator says, “We think we can grow by outwitting bureaucracy, 
by moving faster, by being flexible….”  The message was clear; growth mattered.   
The Financial Supervisory Authority had big problems catching up with the new environment. 
Simple regulations separating the bank’s proprietary investments from investments on behalf 
of their clients, for example, had just been enacted in 2002 (Fjármálaeftirlitið 2002) with more 
separation between the operation of banks and mutual funds coming in 2003 (Fjármálaeftirlitið 
2003). The staff of the supervisory agency did not grow in nearly the same proportion as the 
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ranks of the financial industry. It was common knowledge in the industry that the best workers 
were snatched up by the banks when they began learning how to question the banks’ operations. 
Thus bankers learned slowly but surely that making deals quickly counted the most. A former 
Icelandic banker who headed one of the big three banks told me that when he first arrived in 
2003 he had lots of ideas about how to improve the bank’s operations and efficiency. By 2007, 
he was amazed at how focused his co-workers had become on simply getting deals together 
with little due diligence. Within a few years he had gone from being considered an aggressive 
banker to being viewed as a “fuddy-duddy.” 
This was not a phenomenon exclusive to Iceland. An international banker I interviewed in 
London gave an example of a prudent banker working the numbers to reach a decision. The 
banker across the street decided to skip the number crunching and focus instead on getting the 
deal done quickly and simply trusting the market. Bankers’ confidence in the market price 
blinded them to research done by ratings agencies, such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and 
Fitch (Lewis 2010). Another international banker told me that finance professionals all over the 
world lost sight of their role in an industry that rewarded short-term personal greed and 
punished long-term value. Worldwide, central figures in the finance industry, such as bankers, 
were able to claim just enough knowledge to keep their power by getting deals done (as opposed 
to putting thought into them) but not enough knowledge to take responsibility (Davies & 
McGoey 2012), something that became apparent after the crash.   
Good and Bad Bankers 
In his 1989 exposé, Liar’s Poker, Michael Lewis describes the person who makes the most 
money as a Big Swinging Dick. No matter what happened, he ruled. One experienced banker I 
interviewed felt the same about what happened in Icelandic banking at the time: Inexperienced 
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bankers powered manic growth while making easy money. Meanwhile prudent, more 
experienced bankers were sent to the sidelines. At Icebank’s trading desk where I worked in 
2008, the combined banking experience of the 12-14 employees there was barely 15 years, with 
no one having worked in banking for more than two years. They were handling interbank loans 
amounting to 20 percent of Iceland´s GDP and lost almost all of it during the 2008 meltdown. 
Without the anchor of experience, it was easy to be convinced that all was well. Most of the 
experienced bankers I interviewed agreed that young people could be easily molded. One 
Icelandic banker quoted another as saying that 25 was old for a bank employee. 
This inexperience may also explain how stratification within the banks developed easily, with 
the top layer keeping information from the rest. Only a very few people knew the dire state of 
the banks for the longest time. When I expressed concerns to an Icebank employee in April 
2008, I had to backpedal quickly when I saw how shocked my coworker was at what I 
considered a casual remark. After that, I made sure that I expressed my concerns only to persons 
who had some knowledge of the precarious state of the bank. Little by little a small group would 
meet regularly in a specific room to make sure that our talks were limited to a small circle. 
These small, highly stratified layers made the deals of the primary owners and bank associates 
a priority over the banks’ normal operations. Many loans were made to holding companies with 
close ties to the owners of the banks and their cronies. As Figure 4.1 demonstrates, between 
2005 and 2008 the robust increase of household loans looks tame compared to the frenzied rise 
in loans to holding companies.43 
Figure 1 Increase in Lending to Icelandic Holding Companies Compared to Households 
                                                          
43 Figures are only available from early 2005.    
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Picture1: Increase in Lending to Icelandic Holding Companies Compared to Households 
 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland (2009) 
In one glaring example, bankers lent the equivalent of well over $100 million to holding 
companies for the sole purpose of buying a controlling stake in a savings bank. The owners of 
the holding companies were business partners of the biggest shareholder (another savings bank) 
of the bank in question and the top management team of the savings bank being bought. With 
the exception of one buyer, the people involved only had to lay out costs connected with the 
creation of the holding companies, an amount estimated to total $100,000. Practically the entire 
purchase price was lent by other savings banks, and shares in the bank were the sole collateral. 
This meant that if the bank remained successful (as it had been in previous years), the buyers 
would become millionaires. Since the bank went bankrupt shortly afterwards, each of the new 
owners (with one exception) lost what amounted to approximately $10,000.44     
                                                          
44 During the time of writing, this information is confidential but will probably become public late in 2013. 
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Suspicions of such cronyism entered my mind when I was asked in early 2008 to write a memo 
about whether it was prudent to lend money to a holding company whose only purpose was 
investing in stocks, which was also their only collateral. I asked why the bank didn’t simply 
buy shares in the companies themselves, reaping the rewards if the stocks rose in value. 
Wouldn’t this be more valuable than getting the loan back with some interest? But of course 
the bank stood to lose money if the stock value decreased, I explained. I was never asked to 
write such a memo again.  
Many people I interviewed, as well as co-workers, expressed bitterness at having fought to keep 
the banks afloat for what they then considered a just cause, only to find out that they were 
actually fighting for the interests of small groups. It was amazing how so many bankers were 
kept in the dark.   
Interviews with other mid-level foreign bankers about their Icelandic counterparts have been 
rather positive. One banker specifically said that the myth of Icelandic bankers moving so 
quickly on deals did have some substance, explaining that the Icelanders were willing to do 
what it took to get business going and were in general “not out to get me.” Another Nordic 
banker said that in his experience, business in Iceland was not materially different from business 
in other Nordic countries with the exception of the relative lack of experience and the strong 
appetite for risk. This view does not, however, apply to the top level of bankers. One foreign 
banker called them crooks while another one talked at length about how they lied to maintain 
business relationships. Tony Shearer, CEO of Singer & Friedlander when Kaupthing bought 
the company, described Icelandic top level bankers with whom he worked as being very 
confident of themselves and their capabilities (personal communication, January 27, 2012). 
Despite Shearer’s decades of international banking experience, the Icelanders who bought his 
company never asked his advice on any matter.  
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“Bad” bankers within a Utopian Economy  
Iceland was like its farmers’ cows freed in the spring after being locked inside the barn all 
winter, full of life but not necessarily managing freedom very well. Icelanders embraced the 
free-market mantra that they believed entailed harmony and stability, something Cassidy (2009) 
argues was built on an illusion. Neoliberalism was initially built upon the concept of freedom, 
the argument that governments could not decide what was best for their citizens, and slowly the 
argument evolved until the efficiency of the market was in the front seat (Davies & McGoey 
2012). Icelanders justified the privatization of banks not only because it increased efficiency 
but also because of the implied declaration of nationalistic freedom. As Cassidy (2009) puts it, 
by privatizing the banks the way they did, neoliberal proponents created free markets that 
contained incentives for individuals and groups to act in ways that were individually rational 
but in the end damaging to themselves and others. It is also no secret that the main owners of 
the new banks had political ties. It became general knowledge that being associated with the 
Independence Party enhanced one’s chances of being hired at the National Bank of Iceland, as 
was the case with a former director of the Independence Party becoming one of the bank’s board 
members.  
Forces in the top levels of Icelandic business and politics thus had great incentives to embrace 
the neoliberal movement, by handing the banking sector and many national treasures over to 
their cronies. It was essential that the public followed suit. By increasing bank profits, 
improving efficiency, and abandoning the shackles of a restrictive past, the public was willing 
to go along.   
These developments opened certain doors to liberating the financial system. The difference in 
the process of the liberalization, judging from the behavior of Icelanders and citizens of other 
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Nordic countries, can be partially explained by the fact that the Nordic countries didn’t throw 
those doors wide open. In addition to having learned their lessons from the financial crisis of 
the early 1990s, the Nordic countries did not have as much to prove to the world as Iceland, 
who desperately wanted to be a player on the international stage (Loftsdóttir 2010 and 2012b). 
The Icelandic banking system was opened to corruption without the necessary accountability. 
Like the general public, most bankers were simply part of a process that enabled those at the 
top with ties to politicians (Vaiman, Sigurjonsson and Davidsson 2010) to concentrate on their 
self-interests while sacrificing the long-term interests of the nation.  
The Moment of Truth 
Chronic nationalism and the feeling of prosperity made Iceland particularly vulnerable to the 
economic boom and bust, but it is not the only country to have suffered this tragedy. Following 
the breakdown of the Iron Curtain in 1990 and the subsequent fall of communism, a belief in 
the superiority of capitalism reigned worldwide (Steger & Roy 2010). Keynesian economics, 
which was crafted after the Great Depression and gave governmental controls their place, gave 
way to free market views, which had been gathering steam since the 1970s (Fox 2011). The 
collapse of communism shifted the ideological balance, giving neoclassical ideologies (free 
markets govern themselves best) a strong foothold.  The new ideology was amplified in Iceland 
in 1994 when it gained EEA membership, making it more globalized and simultaneously 
susceptible to international trends. International phone communications during that time 
became much less expensive and the rise of the Internet transformed Iceland from a country in 
isolation to one in constant touch with the world.45 The domination of capitalism and increased 
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communication potential set the stage for the irrational optimism that Shiller (2001) lists as a 
precipitating factor of a financial bubble. When such a trend persists, a representation of the 
past amplifies the general view of future trends (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). This is 
consistent with the insights of Soros’ (1997); financial markets operate with a prevailing bias, 
which validates the bias by influencing not only market prices but also the assumed 
fundamentals that market prices should reflect (and that may actually transform toward the 
prevailing bias). This is amplified until the moment of truth when people stop believing the 
hype but may still participate in the madness until they swiftly come to their senses. 
Reports after the crash indicate that most politicians were in the dark about the situation until 
early 2008. The light flickered on following an internal conference at The National Bank of 
Iceland in February 2008, when grim warning signs of the impending crisis were announced 
(Special Investigation Commission, 63). The day after the conference, a Central Bank of Iceland 
internal memo was circulated, expressing shock over the negative views foreign senior bankers 
had expressed during a recent visit. The memo states, for example, that the foreigners said 
Glitnir bankers were both desperate and inexperienced, and Kaupthing bankers were not to be 
trusted.46  When Iceland’s Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced a state of emergency at the 
height of the crash on October 6, 2008 and declared “God Bless Iceland,” my fellow Icebank 
employees stared at the television screen in utter disbelief. It was the beginning of the end.   
                                                          
46 Retrieved 8 July, 2014 from http://eyjan.pressan.is/frettir/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/minnisblad-si-feb-
2008.PDF 
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Introduction 
Iceland´s recent financial bubble and economic crash is historical in various aspects. Foreign 
creditors are estimated having lost the equivalent of the market value of every single building 
in Iceland – twofold (Mixa 2011) - due to losses within the Icelandic banking system. As a 
result, most of the entire banking system in Iceland went into receivership during the first two 
weeks of October of 2008. Losses amounted to well over half of the combined balance sheet of 
the Icelandic banks, which was approximately the same as Iceland’s GDP in 2000 but had 
swelled just before the crash to seven- to eightfold the country´s annual GDP (Halldorsson & 
Zoega 2010). Such losses, both in terms of money and even more so in terms of scale, raise 
questions of practices not only within the Icelandic banks and the public’s participation in such 
reckless growth, but also within the foreign banks that lent them such unprecedented amounts 
of money. Many foreign lenders were not immune to the same worldviews47 as Icelanders, 
which had transformed dramatically within a short period of time. While Icelanders, including 
most bankers, were certainly gullible, they were not alone.   
In this paper, we will assess the vision that cultural indicators were manifested strongly in the 
Icelandic economic collapse of 2008. It has been suggested that Iceland’s propensity to risk 
taking and willingness to bend the law was to a large degree responsible for the collapse, 
affecting bankers in Iceland and also in other parts of the world, all of whom had faith in the 
Icelandic success story. We emphasize how insights from cultural finance, combined with 
additional theoretical aspects from the social sciences, can enrich financial analyses of the 
economic crisis in Iceland in 2008, providing useful indicators of detecting the makings of 
financial bubbles. Furthermore, we contend that focusing on particular agents within the 
                                                          
47 The definition of worldview is in this paper very much associated with financial aspects. 
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financial landscape – in this case the bankers – and their interaction with society as a whole is 
a significant avenue of inquiry to explore.   
This interaction becomes relevant when reviewing cultural comparisons between nations. 
Nordic countries appear to share similar cultural traits, yet as we show in the paper, financial 
data paradoxically shows much more risk taking and less long-term orientation in Iceland. We 
use a common method in measuring cultural differences when applying cultural comparison, 
which is mainly built upon research by Geert Hofstede in investigating certain characteristics 
of national culture which are often referred to as dimensional studies. This method has been 
used extensively in the field of management and business by many scholars (Newman & Nollen 
1996, Soares, Farhangmehr & Shoham 2007, Hoffman & Hegarty 1993), Hofstede’s methods 
have still been criticized by numerous researchers.  McSweeney (2002) criticizes Hofstede´s 
generalization of nations and averaging scores within nations as being yet representive of the 
nation and Ailon (2008) further arguing that the studies and subject used to gather data are too 
centered on Western subjects and assumptions, thus not taking into account the diversity of 
other groups within nations. Despite the limitations in Hofstede´s methods and not being 
flawless, by their own admission (Hofstede et al. 2010), they remain, nevertheless, the most 
popular method in studying cross-national cultures within financial analysis (Breuer & Quinten 
2009, Magnusson et al. 2008, Reuter 2010), with no obvious alternatives. We thus find it 
important as well to analyze its application, weaknesses and possibilities. 
As Hofstede himself asserts, dimensional studies should be first and foremost used as some sort 
of stepping stones in applications to other studies. We show that some of the weaknesses within 
the method are paradoxically also its strength. Our analysis seems on the surface to suggest that 
his methods lack explanatory power because of recent raped changes in world-wide financial 
ideologies, which have had enormous effects on economies and thus cultures. We emphasize, 
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however, that when they are applied to financial indicators the results strongly indicate that 
cultural factors influence financial behavior on a relative scale between countries.  
This is evident when viewing the general results of Hofstede’s dimensional studies, which show 
Icelanders being similar to Nordic countries but appear to break down when inspecting 
Icelandic behavior from a purely financial standpoint. Icelanders behaved very differently than 
the Nordic nations during the years following the start of what we refer to as the Manic 
Millennium until the banking crash during fall 2008. The difference in behavior was actually 
already apparent before the millennium but the divergence gathered considerable strength 
during the early 2000s.   
We provide hypotheses of why such general dimensional studies of culture in the vein of 
Hofstede fail on the surface to explain the divergence between these nations during the build-
up of the bubble, but yet are a solid starting point at explaining the difference that rely, perhaps 
contradictorily, to a great extent on certain elements within Hofstede’s research methods. This 
includes a discussion of a traditional local economy embracing globalization, and an ideology 
based upon Neo-liberalism, and the differing effects that such influences had on the Icelandic 
nation compared to other Nordic nations. As such, our discussion can be located within Cultural 
Finance - a research area that is situated as an interface between Finance and Social Sciences 
and is thus more of multidisciplinary perspective than viewing financial behavior from a purely 
psychological perspective.  
We suggest that it is important to contextualize the ‘banking culture’ in Iceland within a 
particular national environment; one that is undergoing a social paradigm shift where the 
worldview of the general public is changing, and those who are in the center of such changes 
begin a circular re-enforcement  one that is undergoing a social paradigm shift. Those who are 
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at the center of such changes have initiated, in tandem with the public, a reification of sorts of 
the wisdom of the markets with those who were daring enough (and had the necessary access 
to capital) to embrace these changes in the local and international arenas. Such a “daring” 
market environment slowly develops into a norm, similar to what Soros (1997) contends 
happens in financial markets that operate with a prevailing bias that validates itself by 
influencing not only market prices but also assumed fundamentals (that transform towards 
prevailing biases) that market prices should reflect. Although not discussed in detail in this 
paper, such imitating behavior is tied to known developments in the making of financial 
bubbles.   
Furthermore the size of the banking system in Iceland (a nation with no prior history in 
investment-banking before the Manic Millennium)48 had engulfed large parts of the Icelandic 
society and thus blurred to a significant degree the distinction between being an investment 
banker and an Icelander. The behavior of the financial community thus began assimilating the 
behavior and the public´s perceived view of what being an Icelander entailed. Icelanders viewed 
themselves as risk takers who were being rewarded as such by the market, but few, even among 
bankers, had an idea how much the risk level was and how far price levels had in a concrete 
manner diverged from their intrinsic value. As expressed by some bankers we interviewed, 
those “old fuddy-duddy” bankers who did not participate soon found themselves outside of the 
center of the action. Icelandic banks thus became full of inexperienced bankers (Mixa 2015a). 
There was thus a deadly combination in the creation of a loop that again was re-affirmed within 
banks, where Icelanders perceived themselves as not only being rational (Neo-liberal) 
individuals, or rational in maximizing their own financial gains, but did so with a prevailing 
                                                          
48 According to Sigurjonsson and Mixa (2011), the size of the Icelandic banking system when it crashed in the fall of 
2008 as viewed from their balance sheets was almost triple the size of the banking system in Nordic countries when 
their banking systems collapsed during the early 1990s. 
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bias fuelled by ignorance in what Davies and McGoey (2012) describe as being useful for some 
agents.  
The developments described above opened certain doors. The apparent cultural differences, 
judging from financial behavior between Icelanders and the other Nordic countries, can at least 
partially be explained by the fact that Nordic countries made sure those doors were not forced 
wide open, as they did not have ‘as much to prove’ as Icelanders who desperately wanted to 
make a point of their status within the international arena (Loftsdottir 2010). Doors were opened 
to corruption, where stratification within the banks was needed, with most bankers simply being 
a part of a reification process in tandem with the general public (Mixa 2015a). This was enabled 
by the top layer of the financial sector with ties to the political arena of Iceland (Vaiman, 
Davidsson & Sigurjonsson 2010) to concentrate on individualistic self-interest while sacrificing 
the long-term interests of the nation as a whole.    
In the first part of this paper we will provide an overview of cultural finance, then show the 
cultural similarities of Iceland and the Nordic nations in general and how they are re-enforced 
by dimensional studies, compared to what the financial data indicates. We link Neo-liberal 
influences into this discussion, which we believe had considerable effects on nations that scored 
high within the individualism dimension. The second part of the paper analyzes economic and 
financial indicators, comparing again Iceland to certain Nordic nations. Thirdly, the differences 
derived from those comparison styles will be drawn forth, with an emphasis on general results 
from national characteristics studies relating to finance compared to the financial indicators 
themselves.  In the fourth part, a proposition will be set forth of possible explanations of why 
general results harmonize so inconsistently with financial indicators, involving a discussion of 
why the culture of Iceland was in a sense ripe for the nation in embracing new sets of values, 
which is to a degree built upon an analysis of Hofstede’s methods.   
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National Cultures Comparison  
The systematic use of cultural concepts in financial research is recent and gaining a larger 
audience with an increase of interest in culture among financial scholars, involving as well a 
more interdisciplinary approach in understanding financial phenomena. Some scholars even 
proclaim that cultural finance can be seen as constituting a new, autonomous discipline within 
the field of economics (Breuer and Quinten 2009). Thus cultural finance is conceptualized as 
being a bridge between a Neo-classical point of view of finance and behavioral finance. It is 
assumed within the Neo-classical ideology that market players are purely rational agents 
towards money and obey laws and regulations within parameters that provide no place for 
corruption (Cassidy 2009). In contrast, behavioral finance, a field that has gained momentum 
since the early 1990s (Shiller 2001), analyzes more cognitive and emotional factors related to 
individual decision making, showing that irrational behavior often occurs among people 
regarding financial matters. Cultural finance takes this one step further by differentiating 
between such irrationalities as dependent upon cultural values, and even questions if there is a 
singular ‘correct’ rationality but simply different core value systems that differ in what 
constitutes prudent uses of money. These various valid approaches demonstrate the importance 
of viewing finance from a multidisciplinary perspective. Cultural finance thus provides clues 
of how relatively apt different countries are towards conservative or less conservative (even 
reckless) financial behavior. 
A case in point is that behavioral finance generally takes individuals raised in particular cultural 
environments as being normative, thus ignoring cultural aspects as important in shaping 
people’s behavior. The study of behavioral finance generally assumes that what applies to 
individuals in one culture applies the same (or a very similar manner) in other cultures. Hofstede 
(2010) takes Adam Smith’s theory regarding the “invisible hand” as an  example of a generally 
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accepted theory within the heart of economics, yet the science of economics is based on an 
individualistic idea that has been mainly explored within countries that score highly on 
individualism, thus not being necessary applicable in all territories. The classic case of the 
Tragedy of the commons may, for example, be more relevant in certain cultures than others 
(McCay & Acheson 1990 [1987]); the notion of individualism as understood in behavioral 
finance is not necessarily a universal phenomenon, but culturally a specific one as well as the 
duties and relations between individuals being different in different cultural contexts.  
Taking a step away from behavioral finance towards cultural finance complicates the study, 
making some simplifications or accepting assumptions like the definition of culture. 
Anthropologists Clyde Kluckhohn and Alfred Kroeber compiled in 1952 a summary of the 
definition, yielding 161 variations of the definition of culture (Skaptadóttir & Loftsdóttir, 2009). 
In a recent survey of culture among financial scholars, Reuter (2010) comes to a similar 
conclusion as Kluckhohn and Kroeber about sixty years earlier, stating that there is an 
overwhelming diversity in how culture is approached; yet within the study of cultural finance 
the concept is sometimes not defined or even explained at all. Reuter’s (2010) conclusion of 
the survey is that systematic efforts in implementing concepts or variables in financial research 
related to culture are few, with the sole exception of Hofstede’s cross-national culture indices, 
generally labeled the ‘dimensionalist literature’ (there are other ones but less widely used). To 
better understand the utility of the concept, it is important to explain how the concept is usually 
used within dimensional studies and in the analysis here. Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner 
define culture as being a shared system of meanings, dictating what we pay attention to, how 
we act and what we value (1998, 13). That definition is useful as a prelude of Hofstede´s (2010) 
definition of culture, being “a mental programming of the mind.” Both parties define culture as 
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existing in layers that comprise the external observable components of culture and cultural 
practices, with aspects such as beliefs and values being a less observable element of culture.  
By clarifying the common use of the culture concept within dimensional studies, the separation 
of behavioral finance and cultural finance becomes clearer. Behavioral finance relates to 
individualistic thoughts and actions with common characteristics generally assumed being the 
same world-wide. Such characteristics do, however, differ between cultures (groups or 
societies) and are thus not universal in nature. Such cultural characteristics are learned, not 
innate, and are derived from one’s social environment (Hofstede et al. 2010), which in turn may 
be influenced by its geographical environment. As Shiller (2001) points out, such differences 
may be attributed to the memory process of human thought related to patterns of communication 
within certain groups, often related to information regarding the local environment such as 
potential hazards and who is and isn’t to be trusted. Shiller (2001) provides an economic 
example of such information variance, stating the striking savings rates differ across countries.   
Cultural finance can thus be seen as bridging the gap between individual behavior and universal 
innate tendencies in relation to how people actually handle money. Figure 1 shows how these 
concepts are tied together.   
Figure 1.  Three Levels of Uniqueness in Mental Programming in Relation to Cultural Finance 
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Source: Hofstede et al. 2010, addition by Mixa 2013 
 
Hofstede’s dimensions in comparing different cultural differences are grouped into 5 
categories.  Those categories are the following indices: 
1. Power Distance (PDI) - It is defined as being the extent to which members with less 
power within institutions and organizations expect and accept an unequal distribution 
of power. 
2. Individualism versus Collectivism (IDV) - Refers to societies where ties between 
individuals are loose as opposed to other ones where people place a more emphasis on 
strong, cohesive in-groups. 
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3. Masculinity versus Femininity (MAS) - A dimension relating to gender roles; masculine 
societies have e.g. clearly distinct gender roles where males generally are supposed to 
be assertive. 
4. Uncertainty – Avoidance (UAI) – Measures the level of members’ inclination to avoid 
or feel threatened by unknown situations and thus attempt to avoid them to a stronger 
degree than in comparison societies. 
5. Long-term versus Short-term Orientation (LTO) – Is an indicator for the emphasis of 
future rewards, especially concerning actions of perseverance and thrift, not expecting 
immediate gratifications.   
Now, we turn our attention to how Hofstede’s dimensional studies indicate Icelanders being 
similar to Nordic countries, which can fruitfully be linked to analysis within social sciences that 
identify  Iceland’s culture as being similar to those countries and possibly also under influences 
from Anglo-Saxon countries. Then we show that by observing financial indicators a very 
different picture emerges that creates a paradox within the existing dimensional studies 
literature. 
Icelandic Behavior from Dimensional Perspectives  
Studies comparing Icelandic culture to other cultures within the field of economics and finance 
are scarce. Only a few studies relying on Hofstede’s research have recently been conducted in 
Iceland. Eyjolfsdottir and Smith (E&S) examined in 1997 the Icelandic pattern of business and 
management relating to Iceland’s culture. Their findings of Icelandic management culture 
suggest similarities to other Nordic countries. Relying mainly upon a questionnaire study they 
developed an analysis using Hofstede’s concepts, and their findings were that Icelandic 
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managers resemble their Nordic counterparts in general with low power distance, low 
uncertainty avoidance and holding feminine values. E&S´s findings of individualism indicated, 
however, that Icelandic managers were more individualistic than their Nordic counterparts and 
actually similar to other nations where the highest scores in the world were recorded, such as 
the United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Although the long-term dimension 
was not set up in conjunction with Hofstede’s research (it had recently been added when that 
study was done and E&S thus probably were not aware of it during the writing of the paper), a 
great deal is spent on inferring such practices, drawing upon Trompeaars and Hampden-
Turner’s dimension of time and emphasis on short versus long term results. Their conclusion is 
that Icelandic managers concentrate on short term results, having a fisherman’s mentality of 
dealing with an unstable environment. 
H.P. Jonsson (HPJ) used the Hofstede questionnaire in 2004 to compare one company and one 
institution in Iceland to other comparable ones in the Nordic countries. HPJ´s general results 
were that Icelanders are culturally similar to Nordic countries. There is though more power 
distance, slightly more individualism, masculinity in the higher range, with Iceland with the 
highest uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation of the Nordic countries (LTO was not 
measured for Denmark and Finland).   
The similar results of these studies become even more descriptive when using Geert Hofstede’s 
own estimates (long-term orientation not included) when interviewed by Vlad Vaiman (VV) in 
2009 (Vaiman, Davidsson & Sigurjonsson 201049), which showed characteristics similar to 
Nordic countries.50 Hofstede’s estimates and the results of the three studies have the following 
results, seen in Table 1, regarding Iceland’s cultural dimensions compared to Nordic countries 
                                                          
49 The estimate was 25-30 for PDI; we use an average of 27.5. 
50 Nordic countries were in the paper defined as being Scandinavian. 
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drawn together, defined here according to the year of study, and categorized by Higher, Similar 
and Lower ranges. 
A comparison study was (2011) conducted by Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir and 
Gudlaugsson (AGG) at the University of Iceland. A questionnaire was distributed among 
students within the university and the results compared to those from a comparable study done 
by Beardon et al. at universities51 in Argentina, Austria, Japan and the United States. Despite 
the limitations regarding the number of countries, the researchers inferred from the results 
derived from the other countries by locating Iceland within dimensions gathered from previous 
studies. According to those results, Icelandic culture entails a low power distance, high feminine 
values52 and average long-term orientation. It is still of interest that this is the only study where 
masculinity is higher than in the Nordic countries and power distance is also higher, a feature 
that the other studies with one exception did not detect.  
Uncertainty avoidance is relatively high within the Icelandic culture. Since the study was done 
literally in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the researchers believe it may have influenced 
attitudes within the culture towards risk temporarily (it can be confidently stated that Icelanders 
viewed risk differently during the euphoric period prior to the crash).  
When compared to findings of dimensional studies of the Nordic nations, it becomes apparent 
in the study that Iceland scores somewhat higher in all of the dimensions, i.e. its culture has 
more power distance, is more masculine, and both long-term orientation and uncertainty 
avoidance are slightly higher.  
                                                          
51 Hofstede compared IBM employees over the world. It could be argued that this type of study provides views 
of university students as opposed to the population, especially the since certain types of people may have 
enrolled in universities in Iceland following the crash. 
52 About 72% of respondents were females, which may have an effect of creating feminine values. 
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Table 1.  Dimensional Comparisons between Iceland and Nordic Nations 
 
  
 
PDI 
 
IDV 
 
MAS 
 
UAI 
 
LTO 
 
1996 E&S 
     
 
2004 HPJ 
     
 
2009 VV 
 
     
 
2011 AGG 
      
  = Higher score for Iceland compared to average Nordic scores 
        = Lower score for Iceland compared to average Nordic scores 
            = Similar score for Iceland compared to average Nordic scores 
         = No score recorded  
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Sources: Eyjolfsdottir & Smith 1997, Jonsson 2004, Vaiman, Davidsson & Sigurjonsson 2010, 
Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson 2011 
Table 1 shows the comparative results of the studies, two conducted prior to the crisis and two 
following it. It is interesting that little correlation exists between studies depending on whether 
they were conducted before or after the crisis.  
Iceland’s results are similar to general results among the Nordic nations, while Iceland tends to 
score either similar or higher in all cases. This in a sense solidifies the perception that Icelanders 
are similar to Nordic countries in cultural aspects, but yet not in absolute terms. One can thus 
conclude from these results that the common perception of Icelandic culture being similar to 
Nordic ones is not incorrect, but at the same time that Icelandic culture exhibits patterns of 
dissimilarity. The scores of the three Dimensional scores in the studies53 can be seen in Figure 
2. 
Figure 2. Scores of Icelandic Culture within Dimensional Studies 
  
                                                          
53 Eyjolfsson and Smith did not include any specific scores and are thus not included in Figure 2. 
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Sources: Jonsson 2004, Vaiman, Davidsson & Sigurjonsson 2010, Adalsteinsson, 
Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson 2011 
It is interesting though that Hofstede’s own estimates, while being similar to the comparison 
studies, are also more in line with the Nordic countries, with estimates in all instances somewhat 
lower than the scores that the Icelandic 2004 and 2011 studies indicate. This generalization 
seems to accord with a perception of American influences with more individualistic values. 
Individualistic Trends and Traditional Culture  
Here we show that individualistic trends drawn from Hofstede’s methods provide valuable 
clues regarding Iceland´s culture. Judging from the results of the most recent and extensive 
study using Hofstede’s methods, Iceland scores not only high on the individualistic dimension 
but the highest one historically since dimensional studies began in 1980 excluding the United 
States (Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson 2011). We use this finding as a stepping 
stone in further analyzing possible connections between typical elements of individualistic 
behavior within cultures using Hofstede’s methods and financial indicators. Hofstede (2010) 
points out that increasing individualism since the 1990s has been one of the forces leading to 
deregulation, further stating that certain public monopolies have in some cases been replaced 
for ideological reasons rather than pragmatic ones. This trend Hofstede relates to is generally 
defined as Neo-liberalism. In defining Neo-liberalism, Steger and Roy (2010) state that the 
ideology celebrates individual empowerment and that central state power should be cut into 
smaller units with political governance at the same time being minimized.  
The results using dimensional studies rhyme with the conclusion Olafsson came to in 2003 that 
Icelanders share many social, political and cultural aspects of the Nordic (Olafsson defines them 
as being Scandinavian) countries while at the same time showing a significant degree of 
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American characteristics. Olafsson maintains that the thesis put forth by American sociologist, 
Richard F. Tomasson is useful in this regard; that is, that Iceland could be defined as a new 
nation (more precisely the first new nation) showing typical characteristics such nations 
exemplify, such as a strong sense of individualism and independence, strong focus on equality 
but yet being tax averse and resenting central authority. Such characteristics resemble what 
generally fits ideas of American cultural values. Olafsson further compares the welfare regimes 
between Iceland, the Nordic nations and America, concluding that the development of Iceland’s 
welfare state could never be as large in Iceland as in other Nordic nations. This description fits 
well with the general description Olafsson (2011) at a later date proposed as being the main 
characteristics of Icelanders, having a strong sense of individualism and independence and 
resenting central authority.  
We propose in this paper that Neo-liberalistic ideological forces sweeping most of the globe 
during the period from the 1980s onwards, gaining full steam following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, had dissimilar effects on nations depending on their perceptions of individualism.54 
Although the authors are not aware of studies having shown a conclusive correlation between 
high individualistic scores among nations and Neo-liberalistic ideologies, does exist, Hofstede 
et al. (2010) suggest that there is a connection and we provide further indications of such a 
connection in this paper. 
Economic and Financial Comparisons  
Hofstede’s research has shown parallels between certain cultural traits and financial behavior 
(Hofstede 2010), indicating that Nordic countries should have similar scores in that area. A high 
                                                          
54 The development of capitalism within has been different in various parts of the world, within for example 
different political landscapes. 
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level of Individualism is for example most common in countries that are wealthy but Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth in countries with such cultural traits normally lags, in contrast 
with a common assumption that individualism creates high economic growth. Another example 
is how thrifty countries are - a cultural trait related to long-term orientation. Thrift, often 
associated with the percentage of savings compared to income (commonly referred to as the 
Savings ratio), has been associated with high long-term growth (Hofstede 2010).55   
It can be argued that one of the drawbacks of Hofstede´s methods is that they are built upon 
surveys (Jones 2007) and thus mirror people´s perception of disparity between themselves and 
others opposed to their true comparative actions in daily life.  Opposed to surveys that provide 
clues about people’s perception of themselves and their actions, finance may provide insights 
into how people act in reality, since financial indicators (often) show in a more concrete manner 
how people behave in practice. Here we use financial data to determine differing behaviors 
between cultures. This is accomplished through a comparison of behavior interpreted through 
the lens of financial data from a standpoint between various nations. Such data, mostly macro, 
has historically been used to determine various financial developments, mostly in regard to 
financial shocks and the explanatory use of financial statistics in determining the causes and 
consequences of financial crises. 
Financial comparison studies for Iceland and other Nordic countries are scarce. A few studies 
compared the Scandinavian countries’ macro financial numbers preluding the banking crisis in 
the early 1990s, with Jonung (2008) pointing out similar characteristics among the countries; 
Honkapohja (2009) demonstrated how changes to the tax system added incentives for 
households and corporations to increase their loans; Englund (1999) provided arguments that 
                                                          
55 This should not be surprising. Companies that have a higher re-investment rate of their profits usually have 
higher growth rates depending on their return on equity. 
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posited that the deregulation process was not necessary as the driving force in setting in motion 
increased lending among banks to unsustainable levels, but it certainly opened doors to such 
actions.  Berg (1998) showed that deregulation meant that a certain monopoly among banks 
was removed, forcing more competition among banks resulting in loans being handed out 
without enough experience among bankers and the regulatory system to measure appropriate 
risk.   
Sigurjonsson and Mixa (2011) compared financial figures of Sweden, Norway, Finland and 
Denmark during preludes of major financial crises from 1982 to 1991 with the financial figures 
in Iceland 17 years later or between the years 1999 to 2008.  They concluded that Iceland 
imitated all of the main features of the other nations listed above, but simply to a greater extent.  
This is, for example, vividly demonstrated by comparing the cumulative lending growth56 of 
Icelandic banks57 to Nordic banks during the comparison periods as seen in Figure 3. 
  
                                                          
56 This is based upon the size of the balance sheets of banks; Icelandic banks differed in a fundamental way that 
much of the lending was in reality to finance speculative purchases, even of their own stock, while such practices 
were much more weighted towards Real Estate in the Nordic countries. 
57 Banks lent incredible amounts to their own owners to a degree that these numbers are skewed from the reality 
of the public in general. Lending to households never-the-less increased during the same period almost eightfold 
in nominal terms and more than fivefold in real terms during the same period. 
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Figure 3.  Cumulative Lending Growth Comparisons with 1 as a base at period 0 – Domestic 
Credit Provided by Banking Sector % of GDP – Iceland vs. Nordic Countries 
 
Source: World Bank via Datamarket (2013) 
Despite the lending being mostly weighted towards real estate in the Nordic countries and less 
so in Iceland, the effects of the “printing of money” and easy access to it were considerably 
more significant in Iceland as Figure 4 demonstrates. 
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Figure 4.  Real Estate Price Comparison with Index Starting at 100 – Iceland vs. Nordic 
Countries. 
 
Source: Berg (1998) and Registers of Iceland (2012) 
The authors compare the same countries but in a synchronized time frame from 1999, the year 
the Glass-Steagall Act was abolished, which meant that the separation between commercial and 
investment banking that had been in place for 66 years (set up following the Great Depression) 
and thus changing the international banking landscape towards investment banking and setting 
in motion added risk appetite (Mixa & Sigurjonsson 2013). This added risk appetite remained 
rather constant until a decade later when the banking industry collapsed. The difference between 
countries is similarly striking. 
Stock Market Indicators 
Among the most common indicators of optimism in society is measured with stock market 
indices. It may appear to be simplistic to estimate when stock markets have reached extreme 
level of optimism or pessimism by simply gleaning insights from a few commonly known ratios 
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and financial indicators. This is, however, much easier said than done, even for the most 
experienced investor sages. Stocks may be by most indicators under- or overvalued for long 
periods and suddenly move towards their true intrinsic value for no obvious reason (Graham 
1973), the signal of a price “correction” often being that the most ardent non-believers of then 
current market valuations finally caving in to “the market” (Kindleberger 1996).   
Common indicators within society of too much optimism is increased risk appetite, added 
leverage (Galbraith 1997), an expansion in media reporting business news (Shiller 2001) and 
stock market speculation becoming central to the culture (Galbraith 1997), where the perception 
is that “we” are better, smarter and have learned from past mistakes (Reinhart & Rogoff 2009).  
Few Icelandic bankers took note of the enormous risk associated with the holding company 
Exista that invested in very few listed companies but yet had an equity ratio constantly below 
50% (Mixa 2015a, Mixa 2015b). 
The growth of the Icelandic stock market and multiplication of real estate value during the 
period starting 2002 until the crash was historically unheard of. Stocks multiplied in value more 
than sevenfold (OMX 2012) while real estate prices increased threefold (Registers Iceland 
2012). Stocks rose the same or more each year in Iceland over the years 2003 (54%), 2004 
(57%) and 2005 (60%) (OMX 2012) than the best year of US stocks during the 20th century 
which was in 1933 (54%), but then only after the Dow Jones stock index had fallen almost 90% 
the prior 3 years (Fridson 1998). Even compared to the rise of other stock markets in the 
international arena, Iceland clearly stood out as seen in Figure 5 that compares the rise of stock 
markets in Iceland compared to Nordic stock indices.    
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Figure 5.  Stock Indices in Nordic Countries with the base set at 1 at the beginning of 1999 – 
Iceland vs. Nordic Countries. 
 
Source: Eurostat via Datamarket (2012) 
As can be seen in Figure 5, Nordic stock markets had a favorable run from 2003 until the fall 
of 2008. Since the phenomenal rise in Iceland and Norway, the rise is somewhat concealed in 
Figure 5 for Denmark, Sweden and Finland where stock indices approximately doubled in value 
because the rise was much more extreme in Norway and Iceland. Denmark, Sweden and Finland 
all enjoyed healthy economic growth during those years. Its stock indices fell considerably 
following the bust in 2008 but still at or slightly above their 2003 levels. Norway received a 
major boost from higher oil prices, making its oil production yield far more profits. Although 
its stock market crashed in 2008, its stock index still remained about twice its average worth in 
2003.   
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It can happen that stock markets rise in value due to interest rates falling due to the inverse 
relationship between stock prices and interest rates.58 Iceland´s stock market, however, 
multiplied almost eightfold during this period despite interest rates remaining high; the major 
drivers being increased market valuation in banking stocks (as opposed to some risky tech 
stocks rising in value). Such a rise is almost unheard of world-wide in the annals of stock market 
history.   
Although the boom occurred on an international level, Iceland seemed to be more inclined in 
its participation, whilst Nordic financial companies became increasingly hesitant in lending 
Icelandic banks money. Some Danish banks decided not to lend Icelandic banks money59 after 
a report by a Danish analyst at Danske Bank (Valgreen, 2006) was published, which compared 
Iceland to Thailand’s situation shortly before its 1997 financial meltdown. The assumption that 
Nordic financial institutions had simply learned from their early 1990s banking crisis is a weak 
argument since the Icelandic government had to inject a similar percentage of the country’s 
GDP into the banking system during the same period (Gylfason, 2011). 
Whatever reasons for this divergence between Iceland and the Nordic countries (that were still 
by no means pessimistic on whole), the difference in the euphoria in the stock market is 
staggering and does not harmonize with the results of the general and dimensional studies 
comparing Iceland to Nordic nations. 
                                                          
58 A famous historical example was in the US in 1965 until 1981 when stock prices remained unchanged despite 
profits increasing during the period threefold. Interest rates had, however, risen proportionately the same and 
thus cancelled out the increase in profits. 
59 There is no public available source about this information to the best of my knowledge, but this information 
was known within a small circle at Icebank, which was the main source of foreign financing for the Icelandic 
savings banks, where I worked at the interbank desk in 2008.   
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Savings Ratio 
The savings ratio is an indicator of how thrifty nations are; the savings ratio measures the 
percentage of income that is set aside for the future as opposed to spending all income for more 
immediate gratification.  The ratio is measured by comparing the gross national savings to the 
percentage of GDP60.  In other words, if a nation produces goods and services valued at 100 
krona per year and consume only 90 krona of it, the remaining 10 krona are saved for the future 
and comprise 10% of the GDP61. Figure 6 compares the ratio between Nordic nations from 1990 
until 2010. 
Figure 6 Savings ratio in Nordic countries 1990-2012  
  
                                                          
60 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2012) defines it more precisely as being in a current local currency, 
defining gross national saving as gross disposable income less final consumption expenditure after taking 
account of an adjustment for pension funds.  Note that the gross savings ratio does not take into account an 
estimated consumption of fixed capital, which is similar to not taking depreciation into account when estimating 
true net income of a firm. 
61 Being compromised from two variables, i.e., both GDP and the amount of savings, the ratio may change due 
to GDP fluctuation even if the level of savings (in real terms) remains unchanged.  The fluctuation of GDP has in 
recent decades, however, been much less than it used to be (Bookstaber 2007) and can be considered to be a 
fairly stable variable for the purposes of this paper.  The amount of savings has, however, varied a great deal 
more. 
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Source: IMF (2013) 
This graph shows that Norway has during this period saved between 20-40% of its GDP during 
most of the comparison period, increasing to 30-40% during the 2000s. This high figure is 
distorted though by the fact that its direct proceeds from oil profits are set into a specific 
investment fund and with the rise in oil prices the figure has been very high during the most 
recent decade. The other Scandinavian countries show similar savings ratios, most hovering 
during the period in the region of the mid-20s percentile, although all decreased significantly 
towards the low-20s percentile when the financial crisis occurred in 2008. It is interesting that 
all of the countries bar Norway have a ratio below 20% during the early 1990s when the banking 
crisis hit those countries hardest; Norway’s business cycle peaked a few years before the 
banking crisis hit the country (Steigum 2009), meaning that its higher savings ratio during that 
specific period may be explained merely due to a different timing of the public’s perception of 
financial conditions. 
The Nordic countries began, however, to increase their savings ratio again up to or above 20% 
following the unwinding of the banking crisis with the exception of Iceland, which shows by 
far the least inclination of saving money.62  During the boom years the percentage never went 
higher than 20% and became negative following the bust. Although it has reached positive 
levels again, it is still very low compared to its Nordic counterparts.   
Iceland actually looks in this sense much more alike other nations that have been frequent in 
the financial press in recent years, mostly for all the wrong reasons. As seen in Figure 7, 
                                                          
62 The years 2008 and 2009 are abnormal for reasons that have not been fully investigated. Since so much money 
was lost during those years, the savings ratio is probably unreliable during those years. 
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Iceland’s propensity to save is more similar to countries in southern Europe and the United 
States. 
Figure 7. Savings ratio in Iceland, USA & Southern Countries 1990-2012  
 
Source: IMF (2013) 
With the exception of USA, the Icelandic culture has little in common with the comparison 
nations in Figure 7 according to dimensionalist comparison studies. Yet behavior that is 
commonly considered being highly correlated to culture indicates weak similarities between 
Iceland and Nordic countries.  
What is the cause of this divergence? We propose that a sudden change of values, a paradigm 
shift in worldviews, has occurred in Iceland to a much larger degree than in other Nordic 
nations, one that may or may not be permanent. That shift relates to a great extent to Iceland’s 
more Americanized culture and high individualistic scores that we propose are related to Neo-
liberal values. 
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How Results Harmonize 
Sir John Templeton once said that the four most expensive words in the English language are 
“This Time Is Different” (Reinhart & Rogoff 2009). They certainly applied to Iceland during 
the build-up of the bubble. Usually though, a referral is being made of the past. What made 
Iceland special in a way was that it had no real past history of commercial banking outside of a 
politically controlled environment and absolutely no tradition of investment banking. It could 
thus be concluded that Icelanders did not precisely think that ´this time it was different,’ since 
they had no internal point of reference but rather that they were smarter and better than other 
nations as described by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). How could that happen?   
One of Hofstede’s assumptions in his cultural comparisons is that despite cultures gradually 
changing, they usually do so only during a long period of time (Hofstede et al. 2010). The 
period since the early 1990s may, however, be an exception to such an assumption, especially 
relating to neo-liberal influences. Hofstede himself asserts that the Neo-liberal influences show 
the power of cultural values (ibid).   
To provide an answer to how that transformed Icelandic society on a certain dimensional level, 
while other dimensions did not necessary change, it is worthwhile taking a quick look Iceland´s 
banking history in relation to its society and how it quickly transformed, changing not only the 
financial landscape alone but  in tandem with the societal structure. 
Illusion of Harmony & Stability within a Utopian Economy 
As the rise in stock market prices indicates (as seen in Figure 5), there was a perceived sense 
of phenomenal success due to the massive growth in the banking and financial sector. Despite 
having banking roots that were very localized, regulated in a similar manner as Nordic banks 
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but with a virtually no international history, Icelandic bankers (at least the ones generally 
deemed successful during the boom years) were described positively in the media (Loftsdottir 
2010, Askelsdottir 2009).  The public believed this, despite the fact that modernized banking in 
Iceland was in reality only a few years old. This happened despite the banks being filled with 
inexperienced bankers but with a higher inclination due to a comparatively higher power 
distance and masculinity than in the Nordic countries (according to the last and most 
comprehensive dimensional study) to follow their bosses’ lead and also viewing money and 
material things being more important than issues such as social welfare. 
How could a nation “buy” such illusions and why were they being sold? How could such 
misguided trust build up? Galbraith (1997, p.170) points out that when people are cautious, 
questioning, and suspicious or mean, they are immune to speculative enthusiasms. Until then, 
it is as if the crowd lets its guard down and the potential of speculative mania begins brewing.  
Iceland, having been subjected to strict regulation for so many years, may be compared to its 
farmers’ cows that are being freed in the open during spring after being locked inside during 
the winter time, full of life but not necessary handling the freedom very well. This involved 
embracing the free-market mantra that they entailed harmony and stability, something Cassidy 
(2009) argues was built on an illusion. Neo-liberalism was initially built upon the concept of 
freedom, that governments were in no position deciding what was best for their citizens; this 
changed little by little by putting the efficiency of the market in the driver’s seat (Davies & 
McGoey 2012). The privatization of the banks was justified with good reason that it increased 
efficiency, but an underlying concept surely was that it signified some sort of declaration of 
(nationalistic) freedom. For a while, this strategy appeared to be successful. 
As often, added success demanded more success. That can be done via leverage, which in itself 
is the opposite of saving for the future. Mixa (2009) points out that one of the typical anatomies 
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Shiller (2001) suggests being among the precipitating factors of a financial bubble63, one that 
Iceland and the United States had in common during the recent financial bubble build-up, is the 
expansion of defined contribution pension plans. Danielsson (2012) concludes that the increase 
of such plans in Iceland may have contributed to Icelanders’ lesser needs in setting aside money 
for the future, but in a contradictory way people seem to save even less on the whole (or put 
another way, spend more than they set aside in savings) than before. This may explain why 
dimensional indicators diverge from financial ones in explaining the behavior of savings and 
risk appetite among nations. Duménil and Lévy (2011) contend that where Neo-liberal 
influences are rampant, more leverage is prevalent with the savings ratio falling ever more. By 
looking at savings ratios of nations with the highest individualistic scores from Hofstede’s 
dimensional studies, it becomes apparent that such nations do have in common very low savings 
ratios that tend to have decreased further concomitantly as Neo-liberal influences have grown 
(there is no known study of such influences, but are assumed having had grown, e.g. via 
increased inequality in income).  This trend can be seen below in Figure 8. 
  
                                                          
63 Shiller is in his discussion mainly considers what today is commonly known as the dot.com bubble. 
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Figure 8. Savings ratio in highest scoring individualistic countries 1990-2012 
 
Source: IMF (2013) 
While Iceland remains the worst culprit, it is interesting that the USA & UK, nations 
represented by the major two faces of Neo-liberalism, Margret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, 
have a much lower savings ratio than nations number 3, 4 and 5 in Hofstede’s 
individual/collective dimensional index. Actually, by looking at the major 35 nations the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) defined as major economic nations,64 only a few score 
lower on the savings ratio scale, all from the same region around the current troubled zones of 
Greece and Spain with the addition of Ireland (a country often spoken of in the same breath as 
Iceland regarding current financial matters). It is also worth noting that nations having the 
                                                          
64 35 countries are defined but only 28 have sufficient financial data for Savings ratio analyses. 
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highest score on the Uncertainty dimension, Greece and Portugal, had among the lowest savings 
ratios. 
It is also interesting that Canada, a nation that compared to other Western nations, fared 
relatively well during the financial crisis that started in 2008, has diverged from the savings 
ratios experienced amongst the “worst” culprits towards more sustainable levels. It actually 
hovers close to the average of countries65 defined as being advanced economies within the 
International Monetary Fund with sufficient data for the time period investigated. 
This clearly shows a strong correlation between cultures having less inclination to save where 
individualism is extremely highly prevalent within society. 
If this relationship of individualism and Neo-liberalism is a universal66 phenomenon, then it 
may explain why Iceland´s value system has swayed more in line with what it is the USA, 
meaning that dimensional studies are in this case off the mark, at least temporarily, yet 
providing clues to why Icelanders were willing to take added risks during the rise of Neo-liberal 
influences.  As has been documented, more risk entails higher bonuses for bankers, meaning 
that while the going was good (Sigurjonsson & Mixa 2011), the measurement of Individualism 
versus Collectivism were useless within certain stratifications of the Icelandic society. 
Summary 
Sectorial features (bankers and their risky behavior) were in Iceland (and generally world-wide) 
more or less in line with pre-dominant cultural values in conjunction with Neo-liberalism, 
which we show in this paper has links and even re-enforcing effects on increased individualism. 
                                                          
65 22 countries were used in finding the average. 
66 This may appear to be a contradictory way of defining Universal, since cultural finance views behavior of 
groups having the possibility to differ towards financial issues while behavioral finance concentrates on 
individualistic actions within a sphere where actions are universal. 
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Although the sense of individualism world-wide is difficult to measure since it is relative 
between nations rather than an absolute number, financial indicators such as the savings ratio 
appears to provide clues of cultural behavior on both a relative scale between nations and 
absolute scale regarding general cultural trends for certain areas and maybe even on an universal 
scale. With elements such as increased flow of communication (cheaper phone rates and the 
Internet) and the fall of the Berlin Wall implying a victory of Capitalism over Communism, the 
western world was ripe for a sudden transformation often associated with financial bubbles 
(Shiller 2001, Mixa 2009). Icelanders, having lived so isolated for many years due to its 
geographical location, was certainly riper than most other nations to such international trends 
and very likely changed thus much more rapidly than assumed in Hofstede’s work (2010).  
This change, although unusually sudden, is not an anomaly. History shows that the definition 
of culture has often been intertwined with economic developments, such as Adam Smith noted 
when writing The Wealth of Nations, not merely describing economic concepts but more in a 
sense the cultural developments he was witnessing within a society quickly transforming into a 
market economy on the brink of the industrial revolution (Beugelsdijk & Maseland 2011). 
Icelandic society, including its banking culture, transformed in a few years from being almost 
purely domestically focused to becoming highly international oriented (Loftsdóttir & Mixa 
2014).  
Icelanders began defining themselves accordingly, being better and daring than most other 
nations (Grimsson 2006, Vidskiptarad 2006), in a similar manner as Johnson and Kwak (2011) 
contend that many Americans define themselves in relation to their general ideas of their culture 
consisting of capitalism in a country where freedom and individualism is so cherished, and are 
thus generally unwilling to criticize their financial system, despite its 2008 collapse. The 
associated exuberance leading up to the fall of 2008 turned during the crash into a renewed 
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scare of being isolated (Loftsdottir 2013) with a high level of uncertainty avoidance, as the 
Icelandic 2011 dimensional study indicated. 
In our analysis we have used Hofstede’s dimensional method, pointing out its weaknesses but 
more importantly how it can be advanced further by more contextualization within a social and 
historical insight. This was done by combining financial data with insights from social sciences, 
a common way within cultural finance, which can provide new ways of thinking and predicting 
financial behavior of societies. Our analysis furthermore demonstrates how important it is to 
distinguish between people’s actual behavior – not simply how they perceive their own 
behavior. 
Culture by itself certainly does not, however, explain why such a large part of the population 
went along.67 The effects of the relationship between the general culture and sectorial features 
within it, especially in relation to finance, need further studies to show potential links of the 
interplay of culture and financial issues. Such studies must take into account other factors such 
as people’s necessity to prove some sort of point of superiority or conceal some sort of minority 
complex (Loftsdottir 2009), a long history of political and economic isolation (Sigurjonsson, 
Schwartzkopf & Arnardottir 2010) and institutional weaknesses (Landsdomur 2012). 
  
                                                          
67 Dimensional studies usually rely on average scores.  
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Introduction 
I began working at the Savings Bank of Hafnarfjörður in 1998, in a small town carrying the 
same name as the bank at the outskirt of Reykjavík.  It was the main financial institution of the 
town and deeply embedded in the town culture as such, but had recently established a securities 
division. My co-workers and I at the securities division had no interest in adapting to the old 
way of banking which was strong in this institution. This came to a symbolic show-down with 
the CEO, who demanded that we put on (very old-fashioned) name tags. The CEO repeatedly 
said that at meetings it was essential that the customers knew our names; “How can the customer 
address you without seeing your names?” he asked. We prevailed, stating that all of “our” 
customers knew our names and this was thus not necessary.  The CEO caved in but what we 
did not realize at that juncture was that we were in a sense shaped by new way of thinking of 
banks and bankers, putting us in a sense at an elite status. The CEO himself always bore a name 
tag as did all the other bank employees. The CEO had in fact a point although not in the way 
he explicitly said. Name tags had really nothing to do with customers knowing people´s names; 
most of the savings bank employees had worked there for ages and could hardly cope with 
greeting everyone when shopping at the local supermarket. There was, however, an implicit 
message with the name tags; namely that a big family was working there, localizing the 
operations of the business. This meant that everyone had a role in serving the customer in the 
same personal manner. We (new bankers) also had a point. People within the flourishing 
securities business of banking worked in an independent fashion, seldom restricted to 9-5 
working hours. The few times we set up the name tags to please our CEO, we made sure we 
would take them before meeting our colleagues. We were, however, during those moments 
terrified that some colleague would unexpectedly show up.  It would have simply been 
shameful. 
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As expressed in this story, Icelandic banks underwent a radical transformation in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. As I show in this paper, the excitement of a ‘new’ way of doing banking was 
not limited to newly privatized banks that soon acted like investment banks but also to banks 
that were well established in a deeply localized context. I claim here that cultural aspects helped 
to conceal what should have been an obvious fact; namely that Icelanders were very 
inexperienced bankers that still managed to grow in status to a degree that their actions created 
among the biggest financial losses in history, dwarfing well publicized losses such as Enron 
and WorldCom. Those enormous losses were mostly related to Iceland’s main three banks 
going into receivership in autumn 2008. The Savings Banks of Iceland were, however, as a 
whole almost entirely also wiped out during the crash, despite their long history of serving rural 
customers, even clinging to old fashioned customers service. 
Historically, the Icelandic banking system had not changed much and focused on serving the 
local community, as in the example above. The radical changes in the late 1990s involved 
Icelandic banks becoming integrated into global financial markets, which led to an 
unprecedented economic boom and finally to an economic collapse in 2008.  This led to a 
deadly combination, creating a loop that was re-affirmed within banks, where not only the 
bankers but many Icelanders perceived themselves as not only being rational (neoliberal) 
individuals, maximizing their own financial gains, but simultaneously did not seem overly 
concerned with understanding the mechanisms of such high returns. Thus their economic 
behaviour corresponds with Davies and McGoey (2012) critical address of ‘ignorance’ being 
useful to agents in the financial markets at certain times, because it helps them to make 
decisions that can be beneficial financially in the short time but disastrous if looking further 
ahead. During the boom period, the Icelandic nation was mobilized in pulling wool over its own 
eyes for the most part, oblivious to the dangers involved in the type of banking creating such 
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“easy” wealth while embracing new beliefs that entailed views that fit to a certain degree to the 
Icelandic culture, but in a specific manner. 
Geert Hofstede’s model has been widely influential in stressing the importance of taking into 
account cultural variables in explaining economic behaviour.  My argument suggests that while 
Hofstede’s model can be useful to understand economic processes taking places in Iceland prior 
to the crash, it is important to use it in a nuanced and selected ways. The Hofstede model can 
thus help to point towards certain processes and cultural characteristics that should then be 
investigated further and analysed in a more contextual manner.  My argument thus advocates 
approaching his model as a model to guide analysis but not to constrain it. The paper shows that 
Icelanders fit quite well with the other Nordic countries in accordance to Hofstede model but 
closer investigation also reveals that they differ in important respects, then in particular in terms 
of individualism and thus with a much lower savings ratio.  Gleaning into certain aspects of 
culture does thus provide clues of why Iceland became enamoured with the financial arena. 
This relates mainly to the high individualist aspects of the Icelandic nation and financial traits 
such countries have shown in the past.  
My case example focuses on the Icelandic banks, comparing the three big banks’ outward 
characteristics to the savings banks, which is informative in understanding to a wide extent 
what I have called the Manic Millennium mentality that engulfed the Icelandic nation. I show 
in that respect how Iceland’s banking system evolved quickly from some sorts of shackles of 
isolation into becoming an enormous entity. Following its downfall many painted a picture of 
certain personal characteristics, most of which are common within the popular discourse, being 
responsible for the Manic Years. Taking a look at the characteristics of savings banks and their 
operations, however, shows that the matter is not so simple. As opposed to being merely some 
symptoms of personal characteristics within a closely knitt group, Iceland was possibly more 
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suspect to specific characteristics of culture combined with international developments that 
quickly evolved. A combination of such international developments that fit well with 
precipitating factors of financial crises as described by Shiller (2005) and individualism as 
measured by Hofstede’s methods provides clues of how certain cultural elements can easily be 
amplified 
The discussion starts by describing how the Icelandic banking industry transformed within a 
few years from being a localized and highly regulated industry into an international and 
liberated one, embracing neoliberal values but yet inadequately regulated, culminating into the 
economic bubble. Next I show the process of “bad” bankers personifying the apparent success 
of the banking industry in tandem with the Icelandic society at large and the international 
banking community. Following that I discuss how the illusion of easy success also applied to 
old and “wise” saving bankers who seemed on surface to have little in common with the “bad” 
bankers. Finally I explain that certain group elements lack explanatory power of how the 
Icelandic nation got worse caught up in the financial frenzy during the Manic Millennium years. 
That discussion compares for example the Icelandic culture to other cultures using Hofstede’s 
methods. 
From Rural Banking to International Financial Wizards 
What made Iceland special in a way was its lack of any past history of commercial banking 
outside the realms of politics and absolutely none of investment banking. It was for the longest 
time highly localized system with currency restrictions. Its scene was similar to Nordic nations, 
which were mainly dictated by political connections and governmental policies regarding which 
industries should receive preferential treatment (Jonung 2008).  
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The banking environment began a slow liberalization process during the mid-1980s but very 
slowly. It was not until 1995 that Iceland broke down currency restrictions following the 
country joining the European Economic Area (EEA) the prior year, forcing Iceland to liberalize 
foreign direct investment within parameters of the EEA agreement, and thus making Iceland a 
somewhat globalized country for the first time in more than six decades.  
Iceland´s participation within the EEA was a major impetus moving the country towards being 
more international in nature. This related particularly to the banking industry and the first step 
in such a direction since the Great Depression occurred more than 60 years before. Laws and 
regulations regarding finance were in haste updated in accordance to European standards. That 
was only the beginning; Icelandic banks began also financing their operations and following 
that their businesses within European territories, opening branches all over the continent and 
buying other financial entities. This development marked two watershed moments in one stroke 
since this opened the door to internationalization of financial markets in Iceland and was a 
major impetus in a move towards financial liberalization.  
Icelandic banks not only expanded rapidly but did so within another area in which they 
previously had no experience in; namely investment banking. This coincided with international 
trends with many traditional banks and investment banks joining forces.  
This resulted in Icelandic bankers becoming actors in the international banking arena with 
limited laws mainly built around traditional banking in a country that had only recently 
liberalized foreign direct investment. One could say that they were not only influenced by the 
European arena through which door they entered through into the international financial 
landscape, but also to a great degree the changes towards deregulated banking in the USA 
causing banks becoming some sorts of supercentres providing all sorts of services. Icelandic 
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bankers could do this while with the insurance of the deposit money guarantee provided by 
Iceland’s government that had not responded to different circumstances, having once 
guaranteed what one could call dull banks but without substantial risks embedded their 
operations.   
Bad Successful Bankers 
Icelandic banks were privatized little by little, as was common among companies owned by the 
government during the late 1980s and 1990s in the international arena. The new mission of all 
three banks was mainly to expand their balance sheet and become big players (Sigurjonsson & 
Mixa 2011).  
Soon Icelandic bankers were substantial players in investment banking in various territories 
across Europe. Despite having banking roots that were localized and regulated in a similar 
manner as Nordic banks but with a lesser international history, Icelandic bankers (at least the 
ones generally deemed to be successful during the boom years) were at the time described 
positively in the media having greater financial expertise and working quicker than bankers in 
most other nations (Loftsdóttir 2010). The Icelandic public believed this despite the fact that 
modernized banking in Iceland was in reality only a few years old. This was amplified by the 
media; whose ownership was maybe not coincidentally dominated by the main investment 
partners of the banks (Áskelsdóttir 2010). The media began describing these successful bankers 
and investors as 'Business Vikings', pillaging on foreign shores (Loftsdóttir 2012). 
Such growth was mostly powered by limited experience, as exemplified by presentation by a 
public relations specialist at a finance company. She underlined the solidness and experience 
of her company at a presentation in 2009 by saying that one employee even had had gone 
through the dot.com bust in 2001 in addition to the most recent one. The trend of hiring young 
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inexperienced bankers became the norm, since older ones were perceived having a less risk 
appetite. One former savings bank CEO I interviewed stated that all the competitors were hell-
bent on hiring young and aggressive bankers; one even saying that none over 25 years old 
should be hired. Arnason (2012) noted that one foreign compliance officer described the 
atmosphere at banks as “cultish” with pressure of uniformed thinking. That meant, as Arnarson 
stresses, hiring young (mostly) males with investment banking mentality, quoting one former 
bank director at Kaupthing who said that it was hard to change the culture but not the bank’s 
employees. The 14 person unit at an interbank desk of one bank dealing with loans totalling 
20% of Iceland’s annual Gross Domestic Production (GDP) had the average bank work 
experience of approximately one year.  
Imitating other international bankers, Icelandic bankers quickly learned that getting deals done 
meant more than actually doing the homework before deal was decided. An internal video at 
Kaupthing bank even emphasized how much quick actions mattered.68 I interviewed an 
international banker who said that finance professionals all over the world began emphasizing 
short-term rewards and disregarding long-term value. Icelandic bankers in general it seems 
were thus maybe not as special as some people suggest, simply maybe a bit worse behaved. A 
Merrill Lynch report written probably sums up the general attitude towards Icelandic bankers 
in spring 2008 only six months before the banking system collapsed. 
When clients ask us why the Icelandic banks are considered to have a higher 
risk profile than their other European peers, one does not have to search hard 
for answers: rapid expansion, inexperienced yet aggressive management, 
high dependence on external funding, high gearing to equity markets, 
                                                          
68  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=31U54cgf_OQ 
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connected party opacity. In other words: too fast, too young, too much, too 
short, too connected, too volatile. 
The Sheep Bankers 
This development of Iceland’s banking system and Icelandic bankers’ behaviour above has 
been documented substantially since the crash. The Icelandic Parliament had for example a 
thorough investigative report written by a Special Investigative Commission about the causes 
of the crash of the Icelandic banking system by investigating the three main banks in detail, 
released in April 2010.  
Another report, also by the request of the Icelandic government, will be released in 2014 that 
focuses on the fall of the Icelandic savings banks.  
While the three main Icelandic banks were infamous for their rapid growth, savings banks were 
for the most part left behind. The general perception is that young and greedy bankers were 
responsible for the downfall of the Icelandic banking system, swept by new international trends 
but like cows being set free during spring not handling the freedom necessarily well. Such a 
perception was never part of the savings banks, which on surface stayed much closer to the 
traditional rural banking business. Unlike the main three banks, the savings banks never had 
the glamorous perception in their business; they were relatively modest in their foreign 
expansion and did not have the aura of Business Vikings among their main CEOs or owners. 
One of their advertisement campaigns even made fun of one of the Icelandic investment 
companies, emphasizing that they themselves, the savings banks, serviced their customers, thus 
indicating that the others did not. 
A glaring example of the extremely risky investments of the saving banks is the investment 
company Exista. It demonstrates that no one in Iceland, neither the general public nor most 
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bankers and investment managers, fully realized the risks associated with fast, exponential 
growth during the economic boom of 2003 to 2008.  
Exista was formed by Kaupthing Bank in association with the savings banks, which wholly 
owned Kaupthing before its shares were spun off in early 2000. Savings banks were combined 
the second largest shareholder, with a 16% ownership via direct and indirect holdings in Exista, 
which was a huge investment company with total assets at year end 2007 amounting to 8 billion 
Euros; about half of Iceland’s annual GDP using the currency rate of the time and a market 
value of 2.5 billion Euros (Exista, 2007). The market value of Exista was, however, twice the 
amount only six months earlier meaning that its market value was about a third of Iceland’s 
GDP at its highest point. 
Exista invested the bulk of its capital in very few companies and practically all in its largest 
shareholder’s own company, the food producer Bakkavör, and their main associate, Kaupthing 
Bank.69 The largest holding year end was, however, the insurance company Sampo Group, 
which was rumored to be a take-over target of Kaupthing. The combined book value of 
Kaupthing and Sampo was 4.7 billion Euros, nearly 60 percent of Exista’s total assets. 
Bakkavör accounted for approximately 7 percent of total assets; hence two-thirds of Exista’s 
capital was sitting in three companies, all listed on public stock exchanges. Most of the 
remaining assets were either other listed stocks or loans. 
Exista was, furthermore, a leveraged company, meaning that it invested not only money that 
itself owned but also borrowed money to finance its investments. It actually borrowed money 
excessively and increased its leverage in 2007. This meant that Exista made tremendous profits 
when stock markets prices were going up, but also meant that a slight dip in those stock prices 
                                                          
69  The interconnectedness is outside of the scope of this paper. 
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would incur heavy losses. Exista’s assets swelled in size during the Manic Years, increasing in 
size of 80% during 2007, its liabilities yet grew even considerably faster meaning that its 
inherent risk was increasing due to leverage. By looking at the book value, the year end 2007 
equity ratio70 was 29.5 percent, down from 43.2 percent the prior year. It was in reality, 
however, around 20% meaning that if its assets value would drop by the same percentage the 
value of the firm would have gone down to zero. 
The Exista stock was a huge base of equity of many savings banks in Iceland and its rise in 
market value the major, if not sole at some savings banks, source of profits during the peak of 
the Manic Millennium. The Savings Bank of Keflavík is an excellent example. The savings 
bank had three-quarters of its shareholders equity directly and indirectly in Exista. From year-
end 2002 to year-end 2006 it had more than doubled its balance sheet. Many other savings 
banks had similar elements in their balance sheets, recklessly lending money from extremely 
fragile balance sheets. In fact, well over half of the total equity of the combined savings banks 
system in Iceland consisted of stocks directly and indirectly (via a holding company) of 
ownership in Exista stock in 2006 (Special Investigation Commission, 2014).  
This muddles the general perception that Iceland’s financial crash was caused by irresponsible 
young bankers the nation adored as being some sort of Business Vikings. Savings banks were 
just as reckless in their operations and one could even assert that their profit base, and thus 
equity base, was purely built upon one investment company that had risks associated with the 
stock market to such an extent that a relatively common drop in stock prices would deplete its 
equity base and hence its worth. While the representatives of savings banks did not make any 
claims of being international in stature nor involved in much risk taking, their business model 
                                                          
70 The equity ratio shows the proportion a company uses of its own money to finance its assets.  
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and risk in operations were more than even their directors and board members realized, with 
apparently very few of them understanding the risks associated with their main investments. 
This, furthermore, raises the point whether certain aspects of Iceland’s culture had some 
influence on the nation as a whole, including young and old bankers. While the “bad” bankers 
may have had a clue about the risks they were participating in, the older and “wiser” savings 
bankers seemed to be ready to partake in the Manic Millennium while it served their interests 
well. One could say that they were no lesser participants in pulling wool over the nation’s eyes, 
with many of them probably with some over their own eyes. It certainly does not fit that it was 
merely some young bad bankers that caused such economic collapse. The whole nation 
participated. Some common precipitating factors were in place for financial bubbles to occur. 
They include added liberalization of currency flows, a New Era thinking and increased 
communication (in the case of Iceland was the Internet and added access to foreign television 
stations), making people feel as they are part of a larger world (Kindleberger & Aliber 2011, 
Reinhart & Rogoff 2009, Shiller 2005). There may, however, be other common threads 
explaining this development that cross cultural studies may provide a direction to. 
Application of the Hofstede Dimensional Model 
Looking at the Hofstede cross-cultural model from a general point of view provides few clues 
as to the origin of the crisis. Iceland’s culture has often been compared to Nordic ones. Stefan 
Olafsson (2003) maintains that Icelanders share many cultural, political and social aspects of 
Nordic countries but yet showing strong American characteristics such as a strong sense of 
individualism and independence and resentment towards central authority (as put forth by 
American sociologist Richard F. Tomasson in his thesis). Only a few studies about the culture 
of Iceland have been done by researchers using the Hofstede Dimensional (Eyjolfsdottir & 
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Smith 1997, Jonsson 2004 and Adalsteinsson, Gudmundsdottir & Gudlaugsson (AGG) 2011). 
Hofstede’s own personal estimates have also been used as a reference in the matter (Vaiman, 
Davidsson & Sigurjonsson 2010). Although the study in 2011 was the only one that could be 
maintained meeting high academic standards, the results were still similar between Icelandic 
studies and Hofstede’s estimates. The results were also similar to Nordic nations, giving 
strength to the common perception of the Icelandic culture being similar to Nordic ones.  
A study by Sigurjonsson & Mixa (2011) shows, however, that Nordic nations differed 
tremendously from Icelanders during the build-up of the financial crisis. By looking thus at the 
general culture of Iceland and comparing it to nations generally considered being culturally 
alike provides no indication why Icelanders were much worse caught in the banking frenzy 
during the Manic Millennium. 
Instead of focusing on some holistic picture it may be worthwhile focusing on certain elements 
of Hofstede’s dimensions. One might for example think that some sort of risk taking is inherent 
in Iceland’s culture as in Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) dimension, even with a 
propensity to break the law. The few such studies that have been done on the Icelandic culture 
show, however, no glaring indications of Icelanders having a low UAI dimension. According 
to the AGG study in 2011, Icelanders were in one certain sense different from other nations and 
that was the sense of strong individualism, rhyming with Olafsson’s take71 on individualism. 
Not only was the Icelandic nation with the high sense of individualism, it actually had the 
highest score world-wide, tied with the United States. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE 
                                                          
71  Olafsson referring to Tomasson‘s thesis. 
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Hofstede (2010) points out that increasing individualism since the 1990s has been a major force 
of international deregulation, even maintaining that some public monopolies have been 
replaced for ideological reasons rather than pragmatic ones. This rhymes with Olafsson´s 
(2010) general description as being the main characteristic of Icelanders.  
In a work in process Mixa & Vaiman propose that neo-liberalistic ideological forces sweeping 
most of the globe during the period from the 1980s onwards had dissimilar effects on nations 
depending on their perceptions of individualism. Although the authors are not aware of studies 
having shown a conclusive correlation between high individualistic scores among nations and 
Neo-liberalistic ideologies, it can be assumed that a connection does exist, as Hofstede suggests.  
I have earlier pointed out (Mixa 2009) that one of the typical precipitating factors Shiller (2005) 
suggests being of a financial bubble, one that Iceland and the United States had in common 
during the recent financial bubble build-up (Shiller refers to the dot.com bubble in his analysis), 
is the expansion of defined contribution pension plans. Danielsson (2012) concludes that the 
increase of such plans in Iceland may have contributed to Icelanders’ lesser needs in setting 
aside money for the future, but in a contradictory way people seem to save even less on the 
whole (or put another way, spend more than they set aside in savings) than before. This may 
explain why dimensional indicators diverge from financial ones in explaining the behaviour of 
savings and risk appetite among nations. Duménil and Lévy (2011) contend that where Neo-
liberal influences are rampant, more leverage is prevalent with the savings ratio falling ever 
more. This serves little explanatory power of the recklessness of the young Icelandic bankers 
but provides hints of why old and “wise” bankers were willing to engage in such leverage as 
was inherent in the operations of Exista and thus the (almost) whole savings banking system. 
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By looking at savings ratios of nations with the highest individualistic scores from Hofstede’s 
dimensional studies, it becomes apparent that such nations do have in common very low savings 
ratios that tend to have decreased further concomitantly as Neo-liberal influences have grown 
(there is no known study of such influences, but are assumed having had grown, e.g. via 
increased inequality in income).  This trend can be seen in Figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE 
Iceland has obviously been least inclined to save for a rainy day. It is interesting that nations 
like the USA & UK that also live in a rather stable political surrounding have a much lower 
savings ratio than nations number three, four and five in Hofstede’s individual/collective 
dimensional index. This clearly shows a strong correlation between cultures having less 
inclination to save where individualism is extremely highly prevalent within society. 
Summary 
Financial indicators such as the savings ratio appear to provide clues about cultural behaviour 
that also importantly measures how people actually behave. Jones (2007) has pointed out that 
the strong emphasis on surveys is a drawback on Hofstede’s methods but it can also be pointed 
out that surveys do not distinguish between people’s perception of themselves and how they 
actually behave contrary to financial indicators which (often) show in a more concrete manner 
how people behave in practice. While Icelanders were in awe of their young bankers’ success, 
as is common during financial euphoria, the actions of the savings banks suggests that no such 
extravaganza was needed, simply a cocktail of ignorance while the going was good and great 
belief in individuals performing miracles that in hindsight were (way too much) too good to be 
true. 
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The Icelandic nation can also be described as living in total isolation, then, not due to its location 
as is commonly seen but due to the nature of its foreign business ties. The transformation during 
a short span of years very likely changed thus much more rapidly Icelandic cultural identity 
than is assumed in Hofstede’s work (2010). This change, although unusually sudden, is not an 
anomaly. History shows that the definition of culture has often been intertwined with economic 
developments, such as Adam Smith noted when writing The Wealth of Nations, not merely 
describing economic concepts but more in a sense the cultural developments he was witnessing 
within a society quickly transforming into a market economy on the brink of the industrial 
revolution (Beugelsdijk & Maseland 2011).  
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Abstract 
The Icelandic government privatized the three main Icelandic banks in 2003 only to 
take them into receivership 2008 to prevent them from bankruptcy. Comparison studies 
show that certain features are the harbinger of economic meltdowns and Iceland was 
no exception. We use in this article insights from theories about globalism and culture 
to gain a deeper understanding of why warning signals were ignored when financial 
history indicated that a recession or even a major financial crash was imminent. We 
show that the Icelandic economic miracle was interpreted in a very nationalistic manner 
in Iceland despite being built upon an increased participation in global processes. 
Historical comparisons may appear irrelevant in an environment where nationalistic 
characteristics are being emphasized and thus facilitate the shunning of obvious 
warning signs that otherwise would be obvious. The banking system of Iceland is given 
special attention in this context and show that this nationalistic discourse about 
Icelandic investors and bankers had no obvious connections to the historical 
development of the Icelandic banking system. There is a certain paradox that the 
Icelandic banking system was simultaneously shaped ever more in accordance with 
international financial systems as the same system was conceptualized as a part of 
Iceland’s nationalistic characteristics. Economic variables are thus part of a global and 
local environment, simultaneously entangled in nationalistic ideas and social 
environments. 
Keywords: Financial crash, nationalism, finance, globalization, culture 
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Útdráttur 
Árið 2008 tók íslenska ríkið yfir þrjá stærstu banka á Íslandi til að forða þeim frá 
gjaldþroti en þeir höfðu verið einkavæddir aðeins fimm árum áður. Í þessari grein 
bendum við á hvernig íslenskir bankar voru túlkaðir hér á landi með afar 
þjóðernislegum hætti eftir 1995, þrátt fyrir að vera mikilvægur hluti í þátttöku 
Íslendinga í hnattvæddum ferlum. Í umhverfi þar sem áhersla er lögð á sérstöðu 
þjóðarinnar getur sögulegur samanburður við aðra virst vera fráleitur og þannig 
auðveldað að litið sé fram hjá aðvörunarmerkjum sem annars ættu að vera augljós. 
Ákveðin þversögn felst í því að á sama tíma og íslenskt bankakerfi fylgdi því sem var 
að gerast á alþjóðlegum mörkuðum var fjármálaumhverfið á Íslandi í auknum mæli 
túlkað sem hluti af þjóðareinkennum Íslendinga. Hagrænar breytur eru því samhliða 
hluti af hnattrænu og staðbundnu umhverfi jafnframt því sem þær eru tengdar 
samfélagslegum hugmyndum um þjóðerni og samkennd.  
 
Efnisorð: Bankahrun, þjóðernishyggja, fjármál, hnattvæðing, menning 
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Paper 5: Banks Glowing in Nationalism: The Financial Crash, Globalization and 
Culture 
Introduction 
Within the neat stack of promotional materials at the National University Book 
Museum of Iceland is a small brochure from Landsbankinn, which was probably 
released during the height of the economic expansion. The title on cover reads: “We 
Know Our People. “72 Each page contains an illustration on one side and a short text 
on the other side. Remarkably, the text contains no data regarding the bank‘s activities, 
services, or really anything relating to banking operations. The purpose of the booklet, 
according to its own introductory words, was to remind people that "the employees of 
Landbankinn's staff has played a key role in the development progress the Icelandic 
nation has taken for more than 100 years." The brochure does not, however, outline 
this role but rather offers details of the "fascinating peculiarities" of Icelanders that 
make "us unique," as it says in the text. The privatization of the three largest banks in 
Iceland was completed in 2003, but its aim was to "provide banks future opportunities 
and good profitability" as stated in a press release from the Prime Minister 
(Forsætisráðuneytið, 2002). Many promotional booklets were distributed to Icelandic 
homes - as was possibly the case with this brochure - which helped to make the banking 
practices part of the daily reality of people. Only five years after the privatization was 
completed the Icelandic government was forced to bail out the banks to prevent them 
from bankruptcy. Foreign creditors lost the equivalent of double the value of all real 
                                                          
72 In Icelandic the text is „Við þekkjum okkar fólk.“ 
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estate in Iceland (Már Wolfgang Mixa 2011). Banks played in this scenario a key role 
because Icelandic investors were either the banks themselves or companies loyally 
supported by the banks.  
In parallel with the Icelandic banks becoming a part of the global financial system, they 
were re-defined in Iceland from nationalistic ideas. Their re-definition included the 
notion that the banks´main purpose should not merely be serving the local community– 
consisting of Icelanders – but had simultaneously a larger international role. The role 
of the banks was in that sense considered to mirror the role of Icelanders as a whole. 
Increased international relations and global processes have in this sense been a fertile 
ground in raising new questions of nationalistic identities in a changed social 
environment. A few decades ago, when the theoretical debate about globalization was 
growing, some scholars wondered whether the importance of nation states would 
decline (Appadurai 1991). The reality has been different, with the nation continuing to 
be an important platform for identity (Ginsberg, Abu-Lughod and Larkin, 2002). A 
standardized vision of culture and cultural differences has thus been growing in 
contemporary discussion, possibly as a reaction to the increased flow of people and 
ideas (Gupta & Ferguson 1997, Xavier, Rosaldo & Rosaldo 2002). Ideas in focusing 
on culture have also received increased attention because the concept of culture has 
been used by liberal ideologists as some kind of label or brand in global 
marketing. Culture has thus become marketed with increased globalization, which 
contributes to further objectification and its importance to organize diversity in a 
globalized world (Moore 2004, 78). One characteristic of the present, as Andreas 
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Huyssen (2001) points out, is constant reminders of the past where historical events are 
used to create a specific framework to understand the present. Anthropologist Arjun 
Appadurai (1996) describes this as a “warehouse of cultural scenarios“where memories 
are selected to frame the present. In our example here, the nation branding was 
primarily directed at the Icelanders themselves and the creation of their identity as 
Icelanders in a neoliberal world.   
The Icelandic financial system grew in a similar fashion as has happened in the 
precursor of prior banking crisis elsewhere, with clear bubble characteristics 
(Sigurjónsson & Mixa 2011). We suggest that a nationalistic focus emphasizing the 
uniqueness of Icelanders, selected from a warehouse of cultural scenarios, explains to 
some extent why the warning signs were ignored when financial historical signals 
should have clearly shown that an economic crisis and even historical collapse was 
imminent. Our approach is interdisciplinary, underlining that economic variables are 
part of society. There is a long tradition of such an approach within anthropology where 
researchers have studied the economic systems of different societies as integrated to 
other components (Schwegler 2009). Within economics, there has been an increased 
focus on the importance of culture to understand economic issues (Hofstede, Hofstede 
and Minkov 2010) as well as criticism of how economic issues have often been viewed 
primarily as a technical challenges (Hageraud 2003). In a harsh criticism of neoliberal 
theories, Steve Keen (2011, 15) points out that the historical approach has in many 
ways been exiled from the toolbox of economists and is not taught in many universities 
as part of economics. As we show here, one of the ways to connect economics and 
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culture is to highlight how economic variables are a part of the global and local 
environment, as well as related to societal notions of nationalism and community. In 
Iceland, the globalization of the local systems seems to have been interpreted in a very 
nationalistic manner, which had little relation to the previous understanding of Iceland 
and its relationship regarding the role and nature of banks. A certain paradox lies in the 
fact that at the same time as the Icelandic banking system developed in an increasingly 
similar manner as other international markets, the financial environment in Iceland was 
yet interpreted as a part of the unique national characteristics of the Icelandic nation. 
Development of the Icelandic banking system 
In accordance with critical research of scholars regarding nationalism (Anderson 1983) 
and traditions as a political phenomenon (Hobsbawm (1983), research on Icelandic 
nationalism sees Icelandic nationality as shaped by its historical and political context 
instead of consisting of a "natural" phenomenon as social discourses often seem to 
assume (Gudmundur Hálfdánarson 2000). Icelanders views of their history and 
nationality were a long time under a strong influence of the writings of Jon Jonsson 
Aðils, who in the early 20th century connected together the Icelandic national identity 
and progress in the spirit of the ideas the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
(Sigríður Matthíasdóttir 1995, 41). The idea of one nation with the same history and 
future has continued to be important (Gudmundur Hálfdánarson 2000, 7), as well as 
the idea of the superiority of the Icelandic language and nationality (Sigríður 
Matthíasdóttir 2004). The Icelandic authorities have also for a long time 
institutionalized specifically signature symbols of the Icelandic culture and thus 
influenced the public‘s understanding of what is important regarding the Icelandic 
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nationality (Gudmundur Hálfdánarson & Ólafur Rastrick 2006). As Olaf Rastrick‘s 
research on cultural management shows, one can early see an emphasis by authorities 
on culture as important in constructing Iceland as a modern nation (2013, 76-77). 
Although the role of the Icelandic banks in the context of the Icelandic economy and 
what may be described as its shortcomings (SIC 2010, Jon Danielsson & Gylfi Zoega 
2009, Gylfi Zoega 2008), no studies have researched the role of banks in the wider 
community and cultural context nor how their role was re-defined in the expansion 
period.  Gudmundur Jonsson has (1995), however, pointed out that Icelandic economic 
policy has been influenced by nationalism, which aims included ensuring economic 
independence of the country and security of the nation (76), but also as being necessary 
to establish a national economy and build an institutional infrastructure (80). 
Compared to other European countries, the Icelandic banking system developed 
relatively late with Danish traders serving to some extent the same role as financial 
institutions by providing loans when it was necessary for trading activity. Iceland 
gained increased control of their own finances by the granting of a constitution in 1874 
(Gudmundur Jonsson 2004). The National Bank of Iceland or Landsbanki Íslands was 
established by the government in 1885 and began operations a year later. The name 
reflected the bank‘s purpose, to be a bank for the whole population, as it was a mixture 
of being a traditional bank and a central bank; with permission from the government to 
print a limited amount of money insured by the State. Its purpose was to "facilitate 
money transactions in the country and support industrial progress" (“Althingi“1885, 
61). Savings banks came to the scene during this period but they were small and rarely 
  
 
 
213 
 
long-lived. Their names reflected their role as being primarily a service unit for their 
local area. Savings banks began achieving a stronger foothold from 1870, mainly with 
the introduction of the Savings Bank of Reykjavik (Sparisjóður Reykjavikur). In 1904 
Danish investors founded a bank in Iceland. Despite being owned by non-Icelanders 
and being the first financial indicator of an international connection, the Danes decided 
to name the bank The Bank of Iceland or simply Íslandsbanki (Asgeir Jonsson 2009). 
The bank received a license to issue lawful Icelandic currency, which made it indirectly 
some kind of central bank of Iceland. The state had granted to the industries various 
payments in different ways, which led to the establishment of the Agricultural Bank of 
Iceland (Búnaðarbanki Íslands) in 1929 that began operations a year later (Gudmundur 
Jonsson 2004). Íslandsbanki became bankrupt at the beginning of the Great Depression 
in 1930 with the Government of Iceland overtaking the operations of the bank and 
founding a new bank, The Bank of Iceland‘s Fisheries (Útvegsbanki Íslands), which 
became the main commercial bank for the fishing industry (Sveinn Agnarsson 2004, 
Asgeir Jonsson 2009). Despite the general sense that the role of the banks would be to 
service certain groups, the banks were also seen as having a parallel role in establishing 
Iceland as becoming both a modern and independent nation. A good example of this is 
the special issue of Fálkinn issued in 1938 on the occasion of 20 years of Iceland's 
sovereignty, combining a highly targeted promotion of Iceland as a country on a 
journey towards modernization. The magazine, mostly written in Nordic languages, 
introduces various institutions of the country and industries along with some arts. In 
the issue Landsbanki Íslands and the Bank of Iceland‘s Fisheries advertise their 
activities with full-page advertisements, probably aiming to show the modernization 
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and development of Iceland in line with other European countries (William Finsen & 
Skúli Skúlason 1938). As Gudmundur Jonsson (1995) has pointed out, nationalism did 
not have the effect of Icelanders wanting an unchanged economic situation, but there 
was on the contrary great interest in the development and modernization of industries 
(86). 
This specialization of the banks´operations relating to special groups of borrowers 
continued during the next decades. Banks, which lent those who wanted cheap credit,73 
were established during the following decades. Their names reflect that their main 
purpose was lending to certain interest groups rather than focusing on some sort of 
specialization in the types of loans (Sigurdur Johannesson 2004). The Industrial Bank 
of Iceland (Iðnaðarbanki Íslands) was established in 1953, The Icelandic Bank of 
Commerce (Verzlunarbanki Íslands) in 1963 and the People's Bank of Iceland74 
(Alþýðubanki Íslands) in 1971 (Asgeir Jonsson 2009). These above mentioned banks 
bought the Bank of Iceland‘s Fisheries in 1989 (Sveinn Agnarsson 2004) and merged 
into one bank named Íslandsbanki.75 Savings banks kept their specific association to 
local services, identifying themselves through their names that included the names of 
their towns and districts or even trade, as with the Savings Bank for Engineers 
(Sparisjóður vélstjóra), which was founded in 1961, during  the same time as the banks 
associated themselves with certain professions. During the following decades the 
                                                          
73 Real rates were often negative during this period, meaning that by investing in tangible investments, 
such as property, resulted in easy real profits. 
74 The people here refers mainly to union workers. 
75 This is the same name as the bank established in 1904 but there is otherwise no connection between 
those banks. 
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banks’ slogans, e.g. in their marketing, constantly put in the forefront the mutual 
connection of financial institutions and their customers. Landsbanki Íslands referred to 
itself as a "bank for all Icelanders."76 On the 100th anniversary of the bank in 1986 it 
was heavily advertised that the bank had been the bank for all Icelanders in 100 years, 
with very similar overtures being heard during the next decades, even in 2006 when 
the bank was focused on foreign growth. The Agricultural Bank‘s advertisments 
emphasized that it was a "Trustworthy bank." The slogan gained its credibility from 
the fact that the bank had been established to service agriculture, which was the basic 
foundation that the country and thus the nation could thrive. The slogan had a 
tremendous impact, as reflected in the fact that people referred to it when making 
transactions via the bank.77 The savings banks emphasized the symbiotic common 
interests of the savings banks and the interest groups (usually local interests) they 
serviced by hammering in their nationwide ad campaigns that they were operating "for 
you and your people" (fyrir þig og þína), arousing a sense of a close-knitted 
community, based to some extent on the view that Iceland was a small country where 
everyone knew everyone. 
Iceland‘s banking system slowly crept from the highly regulated controls during the 
1980s (Seðlabanki Íslands 2006, 31). Liberalization in terms of capital movements 
occurred at the beginning of the next decade with controls on capital movements being 
                                                          
76 In Icelandic Banki allra landsmanna, which literally means the bank of all inhabitants but we use 
here the implied meaning, i.e. Icelanders. 
77 A personal experience of an employee of the brokerage unit of the bank. This happened especially 
often when older people were investing in the bank‘s mutual funds. 
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removed in full in 1995, a year after Iceland became a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), which also paved aside the removal of restrictions on foreign 
investment (Seðlabanki Íslands 2006, 31). Iceland's membership of the EEA market 
was one of two important junctures occurring at the same time, with major steps taken 
towards internationalization and with the liberalization of the banking system paving 
the way of its development towards a similar one as it was before Íslandsbanki (the 
initial one) went into receivership in 1930 (Seðlabanki Íslands 2006). Iceland's banking 
system was at the turn of the century operating mostly like other international modern 
banking systems, but lacked experience, both in regards to employees of the banks and 
the Financial Supervisory Authority, which was frantically adjusting to the rapidly 
changing banking scene. Simple and customary practices in international banking such 
as the separation of bankers dealing with the bank‘s proprietary investments and 
investments of behalf of their clients had only been enacted in 2002 (Fjármálaeftirlitið 
2002). In 2000, Íslandsbanki merged with an investment vehicle, which had been 
transformed into an investment bank only two years before by the Icelandic 
government on the basis of various governmental loan funds. Íslandsbanki had at that 
point in time recovered after a difficult time during its formation in 1989 and had 
become powerful and solid bank. 
The process of privatization began in 1998 and was completed in 200278 when the state 
sold the rest of its stake in two of the three major banks in the country. Originally, the 
idea was to sell a controlling stake in Landsbanki Íslands and the Agricultural Bank to 
                                                          
78 The final payment was in 2003. 
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foreign banks and thus easily gain strong international connections and knowledge. The 
result was, however, to sell the banks to domestic residents.79 Scholars have shown that 
neoliberal policies, where state owned enterprises have been sold, including banks, 
have often been released from the shackles of the politicization of the surface but sold 
to individual parties related to dominant political forces (Steger & Roy 2010, Duménil 
& Lévy 2011). There is no reason to believe that this does not apply to Iceland when 
state enterprises were privatized. The domestic investors were inherently more 
investment bankers than old-fashioned commercial bankers. Their goal was usually to 
expand the banks’ balance sheets rapidly and become major players in international 
markets. Soon after the privatization was completed, the banks resembled more 
international investment entities than the local domestic service units Icelandic banking 
had been for decades (Ólafur Halldórsson & Gylfi Zoega 2010). 
Iceland‘s entry in the EEA was obviously a big step towards the internationalization of 
the country and had a major impact on the country's financial system, which could now 
operate within such an international region. It was thus straight-forward that the 
Icelandic financial regulatory system was adapted in such a way that it would take 
account of the regulations in the European region. From the beginning of 2003 until 
the end of 2007, Icelandic banks financed themselves in the area in massive amounts, 
opening branches across Europe and buying financial companies (Þröstur Olaf 
Sigurjónsson, 2010). It is ironic that this rise in capital inflows came mostly from 
                                                          
79 It has never been publicly explained why the stake was not sold to foreign entities. It can be argued 
that it was done to insure power on behalf of the controlling authorities during that time, who could 
choose who would be board members of the banks. 
  
 
 
218 
 
financial institutions in Europe providing local financial institutions loans. Icelandic 
parties, meanwhile, believed that they found few promising investment 
domestically80 and thus used the funds to invest in European companies (Aliber 2010). 
German banks lent, for example, much of the money to Icelandic financial institutions, 
which then invested in projects that Germans themselves felt hardly be a sensible 
investment. The loss that the German banks collectively suffered due to lending 
Icelandic banks became, never-the-less, similar to the annual gross national product of 
Iceland (Lewis 2011). The strong belief in the efficiency of markets also had a major 
impact on the financing capacity of the Icelandic banks. There are examples of foreign 
banks having lent Icelandic banks hundreds of million Euros without reliable collateral 
for such loans (short-term loans), with almost no analytical study done by their credit 
departments and instead relying almost entirely on investment grading done by credit 
rating companies such as Moody's and Standard and Poors´ (Héraðsdómur Reykjavíkur 
2010, 2012). 
Growth through such banking practices was much faster than traditional lending to 
households, which underscores the inversion of the alleged role of the Icelandic 
banks. This is clearly shown in Figure 1 that shows the increase in lending to holding 
companies compared with loans to Icelandic households from April 2005. This figure 
does not tell the whole story because such loans were sometimes given with the sole 
                                                          
80 Kindleberger and Aliber (2010) provide an extensive discussion about capital flows between contries 
and the consequences on the economies of a nation when a sudden inflow occurs within the economy. 
Such inflow usually creates an asset bubble, which also happened in Iceland. The capital inflow was, 
however, so much that despite Icelanders increasing their debts, consumption, and the following asset 
bubble, yet a great deal of money had to find its way out (again) of the country. 
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purpose of buying shares in other companies (Jannari 2009) or even shares of the same 
banks that provided such loans (Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis 2010, kafli 12). 
Figure 1. Comparison of the increase in lending to Icelandic holding companies 
compared to households. 
 
Source: Seðlabanki Íslands (2009) 
Figure 1 shows how much the Icelandic banks lent to holding companies, many of 
which were undergoing foreign expansion. The comparison is even more interesting in 
light of the fact that mortgage loans, which had mostly been limited to the Housing 
Loan Fund by the state, exploded in size in 2004 and were exceptionally high during 
this period. Often owners of the holding companies contributed little equity in their 
acquisition spree or investments, which meant that they were highly leveraged.81 
                                                          
81 Leveraged investments take place when investments are financed to a great extent with loans as 
opposed to owner‘s equity. The higher the percentage of loans used to finance investments, the greater 
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Despite the emphasis on international opportunities regarding investments worldwide, 
the Icelandic banks sought surprisingly similar assets, many of them well known 
businesses to Icelanders prior to the expansion. Retailers in Oxford Street in London 
and downtown Copenhagen, places frequently visited by Icelanders on shopping trips 
to Europe, are examples of companies that Icelandic entrepreneurs bought and financed 
largely with foreign capital. These companies included Arcadia in London, which 
owned retailers such as Selfridges, Debenhams and House of Fraser and also clothing 
chains such as Topman, Topshop, Wallis, Burton, Dorothy Perkins, Evans, Miss 
Selfridge and BHS, Illum and Magazine in Copenhagen. A good example of the 
uniformity of the Icelandic economic expansion was the acquisition of the Danish Bank 
FIH Bank by Kaupthing Bank in 2004. Kaupthing Bank's assets nearly tripled that year, 
of which the acquisition amounted to about 80% of the total increase (Rannsóknarnefnd 
Alþingis 2010, kafli 7). The main competitors of Kaupthing Bank in this acquisition 
were the other two Icelandic banks, Landsbanki Íslands and Íslandsbanki.In light of the 
fact that the Icelandic government had little interest in connecting to the global financial 
environment by allowing foreign investors to become dominant investors in the 
Icelandic banking sector, it can be claimed that another type of globalization of 
Icelandic banks took place with the expansion of Icelandic investors, who were either 
the banks themselves or companies supported loyally by them. A CEO of Kaupthing 
                                                          
the risk becomes but also the rewards. If for example an investment is made for $100 and the owner‘s 
equity is only $10, a mere 10% rise in the value of the investment doubles the value of the owner‘s 
equity, making the investor look like an investment genius. If the investment, however, falls in value of 
merely 10%, the investor‘s equity has been wiped out. It is also worth pointing out that a few court 
cases have recently taken place where some Icelandic bankers have been accused of lending holding 
companies money for the sole purpose to invest in the bank‘s shares in order to stem their descent in 
the stock market. 
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Bank said in a private meeting that the company intended to become like the investment 
bank Merrill Lynch,82 recently visited by Kaupthing Bank members, and some of 
Kaupthing‘s employees at a later date said jokingly that they were becoming like 
Goldman Sachs in Iceland (Ásgeir Jónsson 2009). As discussed more closely in the 
next part of the article, the concept of "Vikings" became increasingly used in 
connection with these purchases abroad, with the ownership of the media was 
increasingly moving into the hands of the largest customers and owners of banks (Alda 
Guðrún Áskelsdóttir 2009). Instead of referring to the Icelandic banking system as a 
local system, a concept related to expansion was formed that intertwined with a vague 
idea of the Viking heritage of Iceland (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2009). 
Globalization and nationalism 
It should be emphasized that when the privatization process of the banks was 
completed, the following growth of the banking and securities markets in Iceland was 
historically unknown world-wide. The Icelandic stock index rose by 56% in 2003, 59% 
in 2004 and 64% in 2005, meaning the index rose fourfold during that period (Gylfi 
Magnússon 2006).83 Even compared with other stock markets, which also rose a great 
deal during the same period, the rise in Icelandic shares was noticeably the 
most.  Figure 2 shows how fast the Icelandic stock index rose compared with the other 
Nordic countries since the beginning of 1999. This success was coupled by the 
                                                          
82 This was said in a conversation with a banker who worked closely with Kaupthing Bank during 
those years. 
83 Fridson (1998) shows that the most historical rise of the stock market value in the U.S. during one 
year, measured from the first trading date to the last one each calander year, was in 1933 when the 
stock index rose 54%. That rise occurred, however, after the Dow Jones stock index had fallen almost 
90% from its peak value in the midst of the Great Depression.  
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conception that it was in some way a result of the "nature" of the Icelanders themselves, 
reflected in how the foreign acquisitions among Icelandic businessmen was linked  to 
national characteristics of Icelanders. 
Figure 2. Comparison of the stock markets of the Nordic countries.
                     
Source: Eurostat (2012).                                                                                                            
 The increased emphasis on nationalism was reflected within the banks 
themselves, as can be seen in the names and transformation of the banks´ 
slogans. Landsbanki Íslands kept both its name and slogan that refers obviously to no 
special sectors or groups. It also fitted well to the image of "us" Icelanders being 
Vikings on some sort of conquest, which related still to being the bank of all 
inhabitants/inclusive Icelanders, except now, the term "inhabitants" was probably not 
in the minds of the public associated with the role of banks in Icelanders’ daily life, but 
the Vikings that were expanding in new territories. The advertisments during that 
period were also increasingly utilizing references to the country and nation with images 
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of Icelandic landscapes or unifying symbols of the Icelandic nation, such as works of 
art or artists. By looking at older banking advertisements one can see a the emphasis 
on quality customer service as being the key focus of the banks and additionally 
references to specific sectors or groups. When Kaupthing Bank and the Agricultural 
Bank merged in 2003 (Kaupthing Bank in reality overtook the operations) the name of 
the new bank was first changed to an abbreviation of the two banks, a neutral and non-
localized name KB-Bank. It was then converted again to the name Kaupthing Bank, 
which was Icelandic but had become a well-known name abroad. The bank discarded 
the "Trustworthy Bank" slogan that had been damaged during the turn of the century, 
but the focus was anyway on growth rather than trust. Íslandsbanki changed its name 
to Glitnir Bank in 2006 to provide the bank an international ambience (despite that, 
many foreigners struggled to pronounce it), but held at the same time a connection to 
Iceland. In Iceland, a considerable emphasis was placed on the connection to the Nordic 
mythology in the new name although little effort was put in providing a detailed 
explanation of the concept: Glitnir was the dwelling of the Asa president that was 
maintained to be covered with silver, with the pillars, walls and beams made of 
gold.84 Even savings banks were increasingly using abbreviations in their names and 
advertising campaigns, such as SPH instead of Savings Bank of Hafnarfjarðar and SPV 
instead Savings Bank for Engineers, making their relationship with certain professions 
or towns less clear and even invisible. When the above savings banks merged in 2006 
the merged entity was renamed as Byr Savings Bank, thus leaving no longer any local 
                                                          
84 http://visindavefur.is/svar.php?id=22727 
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or professional connection in its name. Joint promotional campaigns of the savings 
banks continued to focus on services with the use of the "for you and your people" 
slogan, but they were considered to have lost the competition against the banks during 
the years before Iceland's financial system collapsed.85 The name of what may be 
translated as The Savings Bank of Iceland was in 2006 changed to Icebank, a name that 
had been used in relation to its foreign customers since its establishment in 1986 
(Icebank 2006). By doing so, the name of the bank was no longer Icelandic but referred 
still to Iceland. It was changed back to its original name only a few days after the 
collapse of the Icelandic banking system in the autumn of 2008, when it was clear that 
the expansion had failed and the possible future life of the bank would only be based 
upon its former role of servicing domestic savings banks.86 
The re-definition of banks as institutions with no specific relations to certain sectors or 
(local) groups within society fit well to social discourses and main emphasis of many 
leading representatives of the nation on the new role of the banks, with a parallel 
emphasis on the ethnicity of Icelanders as an impact factor in the success of banks and 
Icelandic investors. It is particularly interesting how the media discourse during this 
time, both in terms of what journalists themselves wrote and their interviews with the 
major players in the business community and banks, shows a recurrent reference to 
                                                          
85 It is beyond the scope of this paper but the savings banks began concentrating their profits to an 
alarming degree on one particular investment company that was highly leveraged. In fact, while the 
savings banks recorded record profits 2005-2007, all of them were derived from the ownership in that 
sole investment company. The investment company was was worthless during the beginning of 2008 
when the bad effects of leverage became obvious when stock prices were falling. 
86 Most of the domestic savings banks were merged with other Icelandic banks built from the ashes of 
the older banks, with Icebank being put into receivership in 2009. 
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"our" Iceland; success stories abroad thus becomes a part of "our" success, as well as 
being rooted in "our" specific national characteristics. References to Iceland‘s 
settlement heritage and the Vikings was particularly important when referring to the 
warehouse of memories. Those memories were selected from cultural scenarios, 
something that is worth keeping note of considering that the local textbooks from the 
early 20th century referred mostly to the settlers rather than the Vikings (Kristin 
Loftsdóttir 2009, 121). A speech by Iceland‘s President, Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, at 
the Historian Society of Iceland (Sagnfræðifélag Íslands) in 2006, reflects clearly how 
the success of Icelandic investors abroad was linked to the settlement heritage of 
Icelanders, those investors being in most cases either the banks themselves or 
companies supported by them. According to the President, the Settlement Century was 
in a certain way "the beginning of all this" and "people who came here were part of a 
culture that sought new opportunities in exotic lands, going long distances in search of 
better opportunities, and had thus a similar expansion spirit as the one that has shaped 
our recent success"(Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson 2006). It was not only newspapers that 
evoked Iceland‘s settlement heritage but also public reports, including a report written 
by the Chamber of Commerce, which used terms like "Vikings" and "raid" (Þór 
Sigfússon & Halldór Benjamín Þórbergsson 2005, 21 & 33). A report written by a 
committee on Iceland's image set by the Prime Minister in 2007 reflects similar ideas, 
focusing on the settlement heritage Iceland (Forsætisráðuneytið 2008). A discussion in 
the Icelandic business journal Markaðurinn revolves around an interview that the 
Bloomberg news channel had with Björgólf Thor Björgólfsson  where he talks about 
himself, seeing his role to be "an explorer" (Markaðurinn 2006a, 8). The journalists 
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sometimes use the phrase of Vikings as part of headlines or an explanation of the 
success of individuals, which reflects how normalized such references had become 
(see, for example, Markaðurinn 2006a). This focus on the settlement heritage of 
Icelanders intersected with an emphasis that the success of the expansion was based on 
the specific characteristics of the nation. The report issued by the Iceland's Chamber of 
Commerce regarding Iceland‘s image, as earlier mentioned, reflects this emphasis, 
stating that "Icelandic business is [characterized] by flexibility and rapid decision-
making," and that Icelanders are quick to "adapt innovations," which is different for 
example from the British (Þór Sigfússon & Halldór Benjamín Þorbergsson 2005, 
26). Similarly, the reporter of the journal Markaðurinn talks about icelanders as 
entrepreneurs that "are willing to take great risks" (Markaðurinn 2007a, 14) and in an 
interview with the Executive Chairman of Auður Capital it is stated that some consider 
"us even a bit crazy people, because we get the idea of doing things that others consider 
impossible" (Markaðurinn 2007b, 16). The Icelandic government and interest groups 
supported this image. A vivid example of this is a key business symposium in 2007 
entitled "Iceland is the best in the world? International reputation and image. (Ísland 
best í heimi? Alþjóðlegt orðspor og ímynd)" Iceland‘s Prime Minister and the Minister 
of Educations were key participants with some important people from the business 
community.  The symposium also invited an expert, Simon Arnholt, to introduce to the 
Icelandic government a proposal for long-term policies in shaping the image of Iceland 
(see Viðskiptablaðið 2007, 6). According to a comparative research conducted by 
Arnholt, the strength of Iceland‘s image was in 19th place world-wide. According 
to Viðskiptablaðið, Geir Haarde said on the occasion that he was unhappy with this 
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since "we know better and we need to communicate better that we are in the leading 
group" (Viðskiptablaðið 2007, 6).  His words turn the emphasis from the image as such 
to what Iceland is in "reality." According to his words, "we „are in the top class in a 
vague classification of nations and the goal is to bring others to understand our 
legitimate position. This joint dialogue between Iceland‘s government and the business 
community at the symposium can connect to Guðmundar Hálfdanrson‘s and Olafur 
Rastick‘s discussion, mentioned earlier, on the importance of the government in taking 
up certain nationalistic discourses and legitimate them.     
This does not mean that a perfect agreement was on this image Iceland so freely drawn 
up in the media. Some questioned the vision that something was uniquely Icelandic 
regarding the expansion, even those related to the so-called international 
expansion. This is slightly mentioned in a report by the Export Committee of Icelandic 
companies regarding Icelandic companies in the Nordic region, stating that it does 
"clearly offend various local managers when foreign success is attributed to some ill-
defined Icelandic superiority" (Þorgeir Pálsson, Hákon Gunnarsson & Sveinbjörn 
Hannesson 2006, 15), although this is not covered in an accurate manner. The CEO of 
Össur emphasized in an interview during this period in The Market during this period 
that "Icelanders are not necessarily better than others though we are certainly just as 
good" (Markaðurinn 2006c, 10). The fact that the person finds it necessary to state this 
still provides a strong hint of how such ideas were widely accepted. It is also, however, 
clear that the nationalistic discussion in Iceland reflected itself also in foreign 
discussion about Iceland and in a mutual interaction with it. One chapter of the 
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Chamber of Commerce report is the assessment of British individuals of the Icelandic 
business environment, showing consistent themes from the Icelandic media such as the 
emphasis on flexibility Iceland and quick decision making (Þór Sigfússon and Halldór 
Benjamín Þorbergsson 2005, 28-29). The British media also reported news detailing 
"Icelandic Vikings" with The Market and Viðskiptablaðið constantly and diligently 
outlining in an exact manner the raves of foreign journalists regarding Iceland and its 
expansion on foreign shores. The Market published for example news regarding a 
discussion in The Guardian in the UK where it was stated that the "Icelandic 
expansionists" are "young, horny and hungry" (The Market 2007d, 12). It should be 
reminded, as is reflected in The Market during the 2006-2007 period, the discourse 
regarding foreign criticism of the Icelandic expansion abroad and foreign rating 
agencies being worried of leverage within the Icelandic banks were often reported as 
being something rooted from dubious points of views. This can be seen for example in 
the title of an article in The Market in November 2006: "The Danes are aggressive and 
there is no protection to be expected within that country: We must defend the lie 
ourselves" (Hafliði Helgason 2006, 12). The title focuses on "us" Icelanders as one 
united group as previously mentioned, where Icelanders are called upon to protect.
   
Discussion          
Lehman Brothers collapsed in October 2008 and it was clear from that very moment 
how global processes are interconnected to local conditions (Moore 2004, Haugered 
2003) and the compression of time and space that is often cited as the main features of 
a globalized world (Appadurai 1996). People across the world, including Iceland, 
  
 
 
229 
 
watched closely, knowing that the banks’ collapse would have a major impact on the 
well-being and the future of their own, despite having no means to realize the 
extent. The collapse of the Icelandic financial market set in a similar manner its mark 
on the international situation elsewhere. Icelanders were active in interpreting the 
international context in which the Icelandic banking system progressed into during the 
1990s, and not as part of the increased standardization of the Icelandic system or 
increased uniformity, but a very nationalistic manner. Kristín Loftsdóttir has talked 
about the participation of the Icelandic nation in globalized processes, which had been 
an "integrated discourse on identity and international image" where the "national and 
international are not opposites, but each feature in their own way the importance for a 
national identity" (2007, 160). Symbols of Icelandic nationalism can thus gain a new 
meaning in ever changing contexts, where they become part of marketing of Iceland 
for Icelanders themselves (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2007, 164 & 169). For certain ideas or 
ideologies to receive such custody in the community there needs to be harmony 
between them and the experience of individuals, and they must be in conjunction with 
their desires and expectations (Eagleton 1991, 14-15). The success abroad and the idea 
of the expansion was not separated from the experience of individuals but on the 
contrary, the expansion was "general knowledge, lived and touched and repeatedly 
proven in the pages of media" (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2011, 5).87 In the constant discussion 
about the fascination of foreigners in Iceland and with such self-promotion it can be 
                                                          
87 Such a view was largely due to the easy access to money from abroad that for a short while creates 
added production within society and thus well being. That view turned out scratching only the surface 
and is often the precurser of a financial crisis and massive contraction in the economy. 
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argued that expansion obtained a strong foothold within Icelandic society. This fits with 
Reinhart and Rogoff‘s description (2011) of preludes of previous financial crisis, who 
argue that public opinion during such upswings involves the belief that "(w) e are 
smarter, we have learned from past mistakes ... is built on sound fundamentals, 
structural reforms, technological innovation and good policy" (ibid, xxxiv). The boom 
in Iceland was financed with funds from foreigners, which is remarkable in light of the 
strong national discussion characterizing it. 
If one looks at the history of the banking system in Iceland, as we have done here, it is 
interesting that the discussion that took place regarding the Icelandic investors and 
bankers within the framework of expansion had no visible connection with the 
historical development of the financial system in Iceland or banks. The focus was 
instead placed on a vague Viking nature that was out of step with the financial history 
of the country, which to a certain extent, as one international banker noted, simply did 
not exist in Iceland (interview taken in 2012). Within the history of banks and financial 
institutions there is little emphasis on "quick decision-making", "independence" or 
"flexibility" as important aspects, as was often associated with the vague Viking nature. 
Hobsbawm‘s (1983) concept of "invented traditions" describes this in a certain way, 
when modern times refers to the concept of the Settler or Viking and thus indirectly 
refers to the fight of independence in the early 20th century (Kristín Loftsdóttir 
2009). Hobsbawm (1983) points out the importance of such an ideology at a time of 
immense changes within society, providing certain ideas custody, enhancing solidarity 
among specific groups and justifying the introduction of social layers in the 
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community. Increased hierarchies developed in Iceland‘s society, in parallel with a 
great deal (and positive) discussion in the media about the lifestyle of those who were 
in charge of the banks and the so-called Vikings who created the environment of 
expectations and confidence (Mar Wolfgang Mixa 2010).     
The strong consensus surrounding the expansion was clearly reflected in the responses 
observed within business publications when international rating agencies began 
questioning the business practices of the Icelandic banks. The re-action clearly revealed 
how criticism regarding the expansion of the Icelandic banks was criticism of "us" and 
became, therefore, automatically part of some dubious points of views, as the above 
references reflect. This focus on "us" made criticism particularly difficult for Icelanders 
to swallow as can be seen in the words of one expert working at SPV Bank (formerly 
Savings Bank for Engineers), when he addresses the criticisms of the expansion in the 
wake of negative coverage by a rating agency and adds: "It is sadder, however, that 
parties in this country have chosen to echo the ill-founded statements and unjustified 
criticism of foreign competitors („Skoðun: Enginn er annars bróðir...“2006). This 
echoes the discourse before the Great Depression hit the United States. An excellent 
example is when Paul Warburg, one of the major forces in creating the Federal Reserve 
in 1913, voiced concerns of overheating within the financial system at the beginning 
of 1929; he was criticized harshly and even accused of “sandbagging American 
prosperity” (Sobel 1968, 126).    
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Conclusion          
The Icelandic banking system changed in a relatively short period from being a closed 
system, which was based on political and strategic facilities, to being privatized banks 
that were supposed to promote greater efficiency in operations and reduce political 
interference. The selected way of globalization did not entail the involvement of foreign 
parties but primarily supported certain Icelandic individuals to expand their activities 
abroad. The banks’ focus changed afterwards: Before their activities focused on 
servicing specific groups of Icelandic borrowers but following the privatization the 
banks’ new focus was mainly investment opportunities with the aim to become 
important participants in the international markets. This change of emphasis gained 
permanent foothold after the privatization of banks. The enormous expansion in Iceland 
during the decade before the crash bore obvious signs that can be seen in the precursor 
to other major financial collapses throughout history, both in economic and social terms 
(Reinhart & Rogoff 2008, Shiller 2001). Concerns were being voiced during the 
beginning of the new century about the increase in lending, including lending in foreign 
currencies (Seðlabanki Íslands 2004, „Viðvörun til allra bankanna“2004). This 
criticism was often answered with references to restrictions on loans having restrained 
Icelandic households from borrowing and capital liberalization was thus a factor in 
adapting to the Western world, a tone similar to what it was in the Nordic countries 
during the prelude of the crisis of 20 years ago (Jonung 2008). When material was 
sought in the warehouse of memories a special emphasis was placed on a legacy of 
Icelandic settlers and their unique ability surviving in a difficult country, while 
avoiding obvious but yet important factors such as how much was similar in Iceland 
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during this time compared to historical precursors of financial bubble elsewhere - how 
Icelanders continually ran at a red light as Már Wolfgang Mixa and Throstur Olaf 
Sigurjónsson (2010) termed it. Here we have pointed out that part of the explanation as 
to why the warning signs were ignored can be found in the way globalization was 
interpreted in a nationalistic manner in Iceland, underlining that it is often difficult to 
separate the analysis of culture and finance. 
A strong consensus of the so-called expansion was formed within the Icelandic society, 
which was based among other things on how it was defined as "our" Iceland‘s project 
and criticism of its individual components was easily interpreted as a criticism of 
"us." It is quite difficult to state whether representatives of the expansion Vikings 
deliberately took advantage of such nationalistic themes, but they seem have to some 
extent tried to exaggerate this relationship, like when one major figure named his yacht 
"Viking" and had a three-meter high statue of Leifur Heppni (a figure related to 
Iceland‘s settlement) in the lobby of his company‘s headquarters in London (Guðni 
Eliasson 2009). It is ironic that this nationalistic expansion was largely financed by 
foreign sources, even the Danes, who were at the same time criticized harshly in the 
local media. Ultimately, it was also those foreigners who bore the brunt of the losses, 
having to finance most of the enormous losses associated with the expansion. The 
perception of the uniqueness of the Icelandic banking served the purpose well for the 
owners and key stakeholders associated with the banks. The picture of their role and 
characteristics was, however, not in any way parallel with historical facts and ideas 
concerning the role of the banks. 
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References: See following the original Icelandic version. 
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Icelandic version 
Inngangur 
Innan um snyrtilega bunka af kynningaefni á Landsbókasafni-Háskólabóksafni Íslands 
er að finna lítinn bækling frá Landsbankanum sem líklega var gefinn út á hápunkti 
útrásarinnar svokölluðu. Á forsíðu segir yfirskriftin: „Við þekkjum okkar fólk.“ Á 
hverri opnu er myndskreyting öðru megin og stuttur texti hinum megin. Það merkilega 
er að í bæklingnum eru engar upplýsingar um starfsemi bankans, þjónustu eða í raun 
neitt sem viðkemur bankastarfsemi. Tilgangur bæklingsins, samkvæmt inngangi hans, 
er að minna á „að starfsfólk Landbankans hefur gegnt lykilhlutverki í framfaraskrefum 
íslensku þjóðarinnar í meira en 100 ár“. Bæklingurinn útlistar þó ekki þetta hlutverk 
heldur „heillandi sérkenni“ Íslendinga sem gera „okkur einstök“ eins og það er orðað í 
textanum. Einkavæðing þriggja stærstu bankanna á Íslandi lauk árið 2003 en markmið 
hennar var meðal annars að „veita bönkunum framtíðarsóknarfæri og góða arðsemi“ 
eins og segir í fréttatilkynningu frá forsætisráðuneytinu (Forsætisráðuneytið, 2002). 
Mikið af kynningarefni bankanna var borið inn á hvert heimili landsins – eins og 
mögulega var raunin með þennan bækling – sem átti þátt í að gera banka hluta af 
daglegum veruleika fólks. Aðeins fimm árum eftir einkavæðingu tók íslenska ríkið 
bankana yfir til að forða þeim frá gjaldþroti. Erlendir kröfuhafar töpuðu því sem nemur 
tvöföldu virði allra fasteigna á Íslandi (Már Wolfgang Mixa, 2011). Bankar léku hér 
lykilhlutverk því íslenskir fjárfestar voru annaðhvort bankarnir sjálfir eða félög studd 
dyggilega af bönkunum.   
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Í þessari grein bendum við á að samhliða því sem íslenskir bankar urðu hluti af 
alþjóðlegu fjármálakerfi voru þeir endurskilgreindir á Íslandi út frá þjóðernislegum 
hugmyndum. Endurskilgreiningin á hlutverki bankanna snerist meðal annars um að í 
staðinn fyrir að bankarnir ættu að þjóna staðbundnu samfélagi hefðu þeir – og um leið 
Íslendingar – stærra alþjóðlegu hlutverki að gegna. Hlutverk bankanna var þannig talið 
endurspegla hlutverk Íslendinga sem heild. Aukin alþjóðleg tengsl og hnattræn ferli 
hafa einmitt vakið upp nýjar spurningar fræðimanna hvað varðar hlutverk 
þjóðernislegra sjálfsmynda í breyttu umhverfi. Fyrir nokkrum áratugum síðan, þegar 
fræðileg umræða um hnattvæðingu fór á flug, veltu sumir fræðimenn fyrir sér hvort 
mikilvægi þjóðríkjanna myndi ekki fara minnkandi (Appadurai 1991). Þvert á þessar 
vangaveltur hefur þjóðin haldið áfram að vera mikilvægur vettvangur samsömunar 
(Ginsberg, Abu-Lughod and Larkin, 2002). Stöðluð sýn á menningu og menningarmun 
hefur þannig fengið vaxandi forræði í samtímanum, mögulega sem mótsvar við vaxandi 
uppbroti og auknu flæði fólks og hugmynda (Gupta og Ferguson 1997; Xavier, Rosaldo 
og Rosaldo 2002). Hugmyndir í anda eðlishyggju um þjóðmenningu hafa einnig fengið 
aukið vægi vegna þess að hugtakið menning hefur meðal annars verið tekið upp meðal 
þeirra sem aðhyllast hugmyndafræði frjálshyggju sem einskonar merkimiði eða 
vörumerki í hnattrænu markaðskerfi. Þannig hefur menning orðið markaðsvædd með 
aukinni hnattvæðingu sem stuðlar að frekari hlutgervingu hennar og mikilvægi þess að 
skipuleggja fjölbreytileika í hnattvæddum heimi (Moore 2004, 78). Eitt einkenni 
samtímans, eins og Andreas Huyssen (2001) bendir á, er linnulaus upprifjun á fortíðinni 
þar sem sögulegur atburðir eru notaðir til að skapa ákveðinn ramma til að skilja 
samtímann. Mannfræðingurinn Arjun Appadurai (1996) talar um og vísar til vöruhúss 
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menningarlegra leikmynda (e. warehouse of cultural scenarios) þar sem valið er úr 
minningum til að ramma inn nútíðina. Í því dæmi sem hér er til umfjöllunar snýr 
markaðsvæðing menningar ekki síður að Íslendingum sjálfum og sköpun sjálfsmynda 
þeirra sem Íslendingar. 
Við leggjum áherslu á að íslenska fjármálakerfið óx með afar svipuðum hætti og gerst 
hefur í undanfara bankakreppa annars staðar með augljós bólueinkenni (Sigurjónsson 
og Mixa 2011). Við leggjum til að þjóðernisleg áhersla, þar sem sótt var í smiðju 
ákveðinna menningarlegra leikmynda og því lögð áhersla á sérstöðu Íslands, útskýri að 
einhverju marki af hverju aðvörunarmerki voru hundsuð þegar sagan átti að sýna að 
efnahagsleg kreppa og jafnvel sögulegt hrun væri í aðsigi. Nálgun okkar sem er 
þverfaglegt undirstrikar þannig að efnahagslegar breytur séu hluti af samfélaginu. Löng 
hefð er fyrir slíkri nálgun innan mannfræðinnar þar sem fræðimenn hafa rannsakað 
efnahagskerfi ólíkra þjóðfélaga sem samofna öðrum þáttum þess (Schwegler 2009). 
Innan hagfræðinnar má sjá aukna áherslu á að skilja efnahagsleg málefni út frá 
hugmyndum um menningu (Hofstede, Hofstede og Minkov 2010) sem og gagnrýni á 
hvernig efnahagsleg málefni hafa oft verið skoðuð fyrst og fremst sem tæknileg 
úrlausnarefni (Hageraud 2003). Í harðri gagnrýni á nýfrjálshyggjukenningar (e. 
neoclassical economics) bendir Steve Keen (2011, 15) á að söguleg nálgun hefur að 
mörgu leyti verið gerð útlæg úr verkfærakassa hagfræðinga og er ekki kennd í mörgum 
háskólum sem hluti af hagfræði. Eins og við sýnum fram á hér er ein leið til að tengja 
saman hagfræði og menningu sú að draga fram hvernig hagrænar breytur eru hvort 
tveggja í senn hluti af hnattrænu og staðbundnu umhverfi, sem og tengdar 
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samfélagslegum hugmyndum um þjóðerni og samkennd. Á Íslandi virðist 
alþjóðavæðing staðbundis kerfis hafa verið túlkuð með mjög þjóðernislegum hætti sem 
átti sér litlar stoðir í fyrri skilningi á Íslandi á hlutverki og eðli bankanna. Það er því 
nokkur þversögn fólgin í því að á sama tíma og íslenskt bankakerfi fylgdi í auknum 
mæli því sem var að gerast á alþjóðlegum mörkuðum var fjármálaumhverfið á Íslandi 
túlkað sem hluti af þjóðareinkennum Íslendinga.  
Við byrjum á að tala um þróun bankakerfisins á Íslandi fyrir miðjan tíunda áratuginn 
þar sem áherslan var fyrst og fremst lögð á að þjóna ákveðnum byggðarlögum eða 
starfsstéttum. Þeir meginþættir sem urðu til þess að þetta kerfi breyttist eru svo raktir 
sem og hvernig það var samþætt alþjóðlegu fjármálakerfi. Bent verður á hvernig 
almenningur var virkjaður til að styðja þessar breytingar með tilvísunum til 
þjóðernislegra hugmynda um eiginleika og hlutverk Íslendinga. Íslenskir 
fjármálamarkaðir og þróun þeirra höfðu þó einnig áhrif á alþjóðlegum fjármálamarkaði 
og þannig hnattræn áhrif. Við leggjum áherslu á að lokum að þrátt fyrir að útrásin byggi 
á þjóðernislegum stefum sem lögðu áherslu á eiginleika Íslendingana sjálfra var útrásin 
þó að mestu leyti fjármögnuð af erlendu fé.  
Greinin byggir á útgefnum heimildum og frumgögnum sem voru að mestu leyti fengin 
með eigindlegum aðferðum. Meginfrumgögn eru umræða fjölmiðla um íslensku 
útrásina á tímabilinu 2006–2007, sérstaklega eins og hún birtist árin 2007 og 2006 í 
dagblöðunum Markaðurinn og Viðskiptablaði Fréttablaðsins. Einnig var auglýsingum 
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og kynningaefni bankanna frá 1970 til ársins 2008, sem var að finna á 
Landsbókasafnið-Háskólabókasafnið, safnað saman.88  
Þróun íslenska bankakerfisins 
Í samræmi við gagnrýnar rannsóknir fræðimenna á þjóðernishugtakinu (Anderson 
1983) og hefðir sem pólitískt fyrirbæri (Hobsbawm (1983) hafa rannsóknir á mótun 
íslensks þjóðernis bent á hvernig íslenskt þjóðerni er sprottið úr ákveðnu sögulegu og 
pólitísku samhengi í stað þess að vera „náttúrulegt“ fyrirbæri eins og þjóðfélagleg 
umræða virðist oft gera ráð fyrir (Guðmundur Hálfdánarson 2000). Viðhorf Íslendinga 
til sögu lands og þjóðar voru lengi vel undir áhrifum frá Jóni Jónssyni Aðils en í 
alþýðufyrirlestrum sínum í byrjun 20. aldar tengdi Jón saman íslenska þjóðernisvitund 
og framfarir í landinu í anda hugmynda þýska heimspekingsin Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
(Sigríður Matthíasdóttir 1995, 41). Hugmyndin um eina þjóð með sömu sögu og 
framtíð hefur haldið áfram að vera mikilvæg (Guðmundur Hálfdánarson 2000, 7) sem 
og hugmyndin um yfirburði íslenskrar tungu og þjóðernis (Sigríður Matthísardóttir 
2004). Íslensk stjórnvöld hafa einnig lengi vel stofnanavætt sérvalin tákn íslenskrar 
menningar og þannig haft áhrif á skilning almennings á hvað er mikilvægt í íslensku 
þjóðerni (Guðmundur Hálfdánarson og Ólafur Rastrick 2006). Eins og rannsókn Ólafs 
Rastrick á hugmyndum ráðamanna um menningarstjórnun bendir á má snemma sjá 
áherslu á menningarlega endureisn Ísland sem nútímalega þjóð (2013, 76–77). Þrátt 
                                                          
88 Gögn byggja á tveimur rannsóknarverkefnum: Rannsókn Kristínar Loftsdóttur, Íslensk sjálfsmynd í 
kreppu, sem styrkt hefur verið að af Rannsóknasjóð Háskóla Íslands og RANNÍS - Rannsóknarsjóð 
Íslands. og doktorsverkefni Más Wolfgangs Mixa undir leiðsögn Vlad Vaiman við Háskólann í 
Reykjavík. Már vann um árabil í íslenskum bönkum og fjármálafyrirtækjum. Inga Hrönn Hasler, Ósk 
Sturludóttir og Sigurður Ágústsson aðstoðaðu við söfnun gagna sem nýtt voru við skrifun greinarinnar.  
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fyrir að ýtarlega hafi verið komið inn á hlutverk íslensku bankanna í samhengi við 
íslenskt efnahagslíf og brotalamir þess (Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis 2010, Jón 
Daníelsson og Gylfi Zoega 2009; Gylfi Zoega 2008) hafa rannsóknir ekki fyllilega litið 
á hlutverk banka í víðara samfélaglegu og menningarlegu samhengi né hvernig 
hlutverk þeirra var endurskilgreint á útrásartímabilinu. Þó hefur Guðmundur Jónsson 
(1995) bent á að íslenska efnahagsstjórnun hefur verið undir áhrifum frá 
þjóðernisstefnu þar sem markmiðið var meðal annars tryggja efnahagslegt sjálfstæði 
landsins og því öryggi þjóðarinnar (bls. 76) en einnig hafi verið nauðsynlegt að setja á 
fót þjóðarhagkerfi og byggja innviði stofnanna (bls.80).  
Samanborið við önnur evrópsk ríki þróaðist íslenskt bankakerfi tiltölulega seint með 
danska verslunarmenn sem nokkurs konar fjármálastofnanir sem veittu lán þegar slíkt 
var nauðsynlegt fyrir viðskipti. Íslendingar fengu fjárforræði með stjórnarskránni árið 
1874, á þúsund ára afmæli landsfundar (Guðmundur Jónsson 2004). Landsbanki 
Íslands var stofnsettur af ríkisstjórninni árið 1885 og hóf starfsemi ári síðar. Nafnið 
endurspeglaði tilgang hans, að vera banki allra landsmanna í víðum skilningi, enda var 
um að ræða blöndu af hefðbundnum banka og seðlabanka sem, með leyfi 
ríkisstjórnarinnar, mátti prenta takmarkað magn peninga sem tryggðir voru af ríkinu. Í 
frumvarpinu um stofnun hans segir að tilgangurinn sé að „greiða fyrir 
peningaviðskipum í landinu og styðja að framförum atvinnuveganna“ (Austri 1885, 
61). Sparisjóðir komu til sögunnar á þessum tíma en voru smáir og sjaldan langlífir. 
Nöfn þeirra endurspegla það að hlutverk þeirra var fyrst og fremst að vera 
þjónustuaðilar fyrir sitt heimasvæði, en sem dæmi ná nefna að sá fyrsti var kallaður 
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Sparnaðarsjóður búlausra í Skútustaðahreppi.89 Upp úr 1870 náðu sparisjóðirnir 
sterkari fótfestu, aðallega með tilkomu Sparisjóðs Reykjavíkur. Árið 1904 stofnuðu 
danskir fjárfestar banka á Íslandi og þrátt fyrir að vera í eigu erlendra manna og vera 
fyrsti vísirinn að fjármálastarfsemi með alþjóðlegri tengingu kusu Danirnir að nefna 
hann Íslandsbanka (Ásgeir Jónsson 2009). Bankinn fékk leyfi til útgáfu löglegrar 
íslenskrar myntar, sem gerði hann óbeint að nokkurs konar seðlabanka Íslands. Ríkið 
hafði veitt atvinnugreinunum ýmsar fyrirgreiðslur með mismunandi leiðum sem leiddi 
til stofnunar Búnaðarbankans árið 1929 sem hóf svo starfssemi ári síðar (Guðmundur 
Jónsson 2004). Íslandsbanki varð gjaldþrota í upphafi kreppunnar miklu árið 1930 og 
tók ríkisstjórn Íslands yfir rekstur bankans og stofnaði nýjan banka, Útvegsbanka 
Íslands, sem varð að viðskiptabanka sjávarútvegsins (Sveinn Agnarsson 2004; Ásgeir 
Jónsson 2009). Þrátt fyrir að litið var svo á að hlutverk bankanna fælist í því að vera 
þjónustuaðilar ákveðinna hópa, var samhliða talið að bankar hefðu mikilvægu hlutverki 
að gegna fyrir nývæðingu landsins og þannig fyrir Ísland til að verða bæði nútímaleg 
og sjálfstæð þjóð. Gott dæmi um þetta er sérhefti Fálkans sem gefið var út árið 1938 í 
tilefni af 20 ára fullveldi Íslands en þar má sjá mjög markvissa kynningu á Íslandi sem 
landi á leið til nývæðingar. Blaðið er að mestu á norðurlandamálum og þar eru kynntar 
ýmsar stofnanir landsins og atvinnuvegir, ásamt listgreinum. Landsbankinn og 
Útvegsbankinn auglýsa þar starfsemi sína með heilsíðuauglýsingum sem hafa líklega 
það markmið að draga fram nývæðingu Íslands og þróun í samræmi við aðrar 
                                                          
89 Það sama má einnig segja um eignarform þeirra, sem var lögfest árið 1915, þar sem eigendur 
stofnfjárskirteina áttu ekki ótakmarkað tilkall til hagnaðar sparisjóðana heldur fór hann einnig í varsjóð 
æltaður til samfélalgslegra verkefna á heimasvæði þeirra.  
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Evrópuþjóðir (Vilhjálmur Finsen og Skúli Skúlason 1938).  Eins og Guðmundur 
Jónsson (1995) hefur bent á hafði þjóðernishyggja í tengslum við efnahagsstjórnin 
landsins ekki þau áhrif að Íslendingar vildu óbreytt efnahagsástand heldur þvert á móti 
var mikill áhugi á uppbyggingu og nývæðingu atvinnuháttta (bls. 86).  
Þessi sérhæfing banka út frá sérstökum hópum lánþega hélt áfram næstu áratugi á eftir. 
Bankar, sem lánuðu þeim sem vildu komast í ódýrt lánsfé, voru stofnaðir næstu áratugi. 
Nöfn þeirra endurspegla að þeir áttu að lána ákveðnum hópum frekar en einblína á 
sérhæfingu í tegundum útlána (Sigurður Jóhannesson 2004). Iðnaðarbankinn var 
stofnaður 1953, Verzlunarbanki Íslands árið 1963 og Alþýðubanki Íslands árið 1971 
(Ásgeir Jónsson 2009). Þessir bankar keyptu Útvegsbankann árið 1989 (Sveinn 
Agnarsson 2004) og fékk sameinaður banki nafnið Íslandsbanki.90 Sparisjóðir héldu 
áfram þeirri sérstöðu að auðkenna sig við sín bæjarfélög og héruð eða jafnvel iðngrein, 
eins og á við um Sparisjóð vélstjóra sem var stofnaður árið 1961, á svipuðum tíma og 
bankarnir sem tengdu sig við ákveðnar starfsstéttir. Næstu áratugi á eftir var einnig í 
slagorðum bankanna, þ.e. í markaðssetningu þeirra, hamrað á gagnkvæmum tengslum 
fjármálastofnana og viðskiptavina þeirra. Landsbanki Íslands vísaði til sjálfs sín sem 
„banka allra landsmanna“. Á 100 ára starfsafmæli bankans árið 1986 var auglýst að 
hann hefði verið banki allra landsmanna í 100 ár og svipað stef mátti heyra næstu 
áratugi á eftir, jafnvel árið 2006 þegar áhersla bankans var á erlendan vöxt. Auglýsingar 
Búnaðarbanka Íslands vísuðu til þess að hann væri „traustur banki“. Slagorðið sótti 
trúverðugleika sinn til þess að bankinn hafði verið stofnaður til að þjónusta landbúnað, 
                                                          
90 Hér eru um að ræða sama nafn á óskyldri stofnun og þeirri sem stofnuð var árið 1904. 
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sem var þá grunnundirstaða þess að hér gæti land og þjóð þrifist. Slagorðið hafði 
gífurleg áhrif, eins og endurspeglast í því að fólk vísaði stundum til þess þegar það átti 
viðskipti við bankann91. Sparisjóðir lögðu áherslu á sameiginlega hagsmuni 
sparisjóðanna og þeirra hópa sem þeir þjónustuðu með því að vísa í sameiginlegum 
auglýsingum þeirra að þeir væru „fyrir þig og þína“ og vöktu þannig tilfinningu fyrir 
nánu nærsamfélagi og byggðu að ákveðnu leyti á þeirri sýn að Ísland væri lítið land þar 
sem allir þekktu alla.  
Á níunda áratugnum mjakaðist bankakerfi Íslands hægt og bítandi úr höftum eldri 
reglugerða (Seðlabanki Íslands 2006, 31). Afnám hafta hvað varðar fjárflæði átti sér 
stað í byrjun 10. áratugarins og voru höftin numin að fullu árið 1995, ári eftir að Ísland 
varð aðili að Evrópska efnahagssvæðinu (EES), sem einnig ruddi til hliðar afnámi um 
höft á erlendum fjárfestingum (Seðlabanki Íslands 2006, 31). Aðild Íslands að EES 
markaði tvenn tímamót í senn þar sem stórt skref í átt að alþjóðavæðingu var stigið 
samhliða því sem frelsi í bankarekstri komst í svipaðan farveg og var fyrir fall 
Íslandsbanka árið 1930 (Seðlabanki Íslands 2006). Íslenska bankakerfið var upp úr 
aldamótum farið að starfa að mestu eins og alþjóðalegt nútímalegt bankakerfi en þar 
skorti reynslu, bæði hjá starfsmönnum banka og Fjármálaeftirlitinu (FME) sem var í 
óða önn að aðlaga sig að breyttum aðstæðum. Einföld tilmæli eins og að aðskilja 
starfsemi eigin viðskipti frá viðskiptum fyrir hönd viðskiptavina þess komust til að 
mynda ekki á koppinn fyrr en árið 2002 (Fjármálaeftirlitið 2002). Árið 2000 
                                                          
91 Persónuleg reynsla starfsmanns Búnaðarbanka Verðbréfa. Þetta átti sér oft stað þegar að eldra fólk 
var að fjárfesta í verðbréfasjóðum bankans.  
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sameinaðist bankinn Fjárfestingarbanka atvinnulífsins (FBA) sem hafði einungis 
tveimur árum áður verið stofnaður á grunni Fiskveiðasjóðs Íslands, Iðnlánasjóðs, 
Iðnþróunarsjóðs og Útflutningssjóðs. Íslandsbanki hafði á þeim tíma náð sér á strik 
eftir erfiða tíma í upphafi 10. áratugarins og var orðinn öflugur banki.  
Ferli einkavæðingar hófst árið 1998 og var lokið árið 2002 þegar ríkið seldi afganginn 
af sínum hlut í tveimur af þremur helstu bönkum landsins. Upphaflega hugmyndin var 
sú að selja ráðandi hlut í Landsbankannum og Búnaðarbankanum til erlendra banka og 
ná þannig með auðveldum hætti í sterk alþjóðleg tengsl og þekkingu. Niðurstaðan var 
hins vegar sú að selja hlutinn til innlendra aðila.92 Erlendis hafa fræðimenn sýnt fram 
að nýfrjálshyggjustefnur, þar sem ríkisfyrirtæki, meðal annars bankar, hafa oft verið 
losuð úr viðjum stjórnmálaafla á yfirborðinu en seld til, samhliða valdatilfærslu, til 
einstakra aðila sem tengdust ráðandi öflum innan stjórnmála (Steger og Roy 2010; 
Duménil og Lévy 2011). Engin ástæða er að ætla að slíkt hafi ekki átt við um Ísland 
þegar ríkisfyrirtæki voru einkavædd. Innlendu aðilarnir voru í eðli sínu frekar 
fjárfestingabankamenn en bankamenn í þeim skilningi sem almenn bankastarfssemi er 
tengd við. Takmark þeirra var alla jafna að stækka efnahagsreikning sinn afar hratt og 
verða stórir þátttakendur á alþjóðlegum mörkuðum. Fljótlega líktist starfsemi bankanna 
meira alþjóðlegum fjárfestingabanka en hefðundinni íslenskri viðskiptabankastarfsemi 
(Ólafur G. Halldórsson og Gylfi Zoega 2010).  
                                                          
92 Aldrei hefur fengist opinber skýring á því af hverju ákveðið var að selja ekki erlendum aðilum. 
Leiða má að því líkum að verið væri að tryggja völd þáverandi valdhafa sem gátu valið þá sem þeir 
kusu í stjórnir einkavæddu bankanna. 
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Innganga Íslands í EES var augljóslega stórt skref í átt að alþjóðavæðingu landsins og 
hafði mikil áhrif á fjármálakerfi landsins, sem mátti nú vera með starfsemi innan 
svæðisins og að því leyti til eðlilegt að regluverk íslenska fjármálakerfisins væri 
aðlagað á þann hátt að það tæki mið af evrópska svæðinu og reglugerðum þess. Þetta 
var þó aðeins byrjunin því frá ársbyrjun 2003 til ársloka 2007 fóru íslenskir bankar að 
fjármagna sig á svæðinu af fullum krafti, opna útibú víðs vegar um Evrópu og kaupa 
fjármálafyrirtæki í miklum mæli (Þröstur Olaf Sigurjónsson 2010). Það er 
kaldhæðnislegt að þetta innflæði fjármagns kom að mestu frá fjármálastofnunum í 
Evrópu sem veittu íslenskum fjármálastofnunum lán. Íslensku aðilarnir töldu sig finna 
fáa vænlega fjárfestingakosti innanlands93 og fóru að nota fjármagnið til að fjárfesta í 
evrópskum fyrirtækjum (Aliber 2010). Þýskir bankar lánuðu til dæmis mikið til 
íslenskra fjármálafyrirtækja sem fjárfestu í verkefnum sem Þjóðverjar sjálfir töldu vart 
vera skynsamar fjárfestingar. Tapið varð hins vegar þeirra þegar íslensku bankarnir 
urðu gjaldþrota þannig að samanlagt tap þeirra varð meira en árleg verg landsframleiða 
Íslands (Lewis 2011). Ofurtrú á skilvirkni markaða, sem náði hámarki fram að hruninu 
haustið 2008, hafði einnig mikil áhrif á fjármögnunargetu íslensku bankanna. Dæmi 
eru um að erlendir bankar hafi lánað íslenskum bönkum mörg hundruð milljónir evra 
án haldbærra veða (skammtímalán) eftir nánast enga greiningarvinnu nema athugun á 
                                                          
93 Kindleberger og Aliber (2011) fjalla um flæði fjármagns á milli landa og áhrif þess á efnahag þjóðar 
þegar að skyndilegt innflæði á sér stað í hagkerfið. Slíkt veldur almennt eignabólu og gerðist einnig á 
Íslandi. Fjárflæðið var aftur á móti það mikið að þrátt fyrir mikla skuldasöfnun Íslendinga, aukningu í 
neyslu og eignabólu þá þurfti fjármagn samt í stórum stíl að leita út fyrir landsteinanna. 
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lánshæfismati fyrirtækja eins og Moody‘s og Standard og Poor‘s (Héraðsdómur 
Reykjavíkur, 2010, 2012).  
Vöxtur í gegnum slík bankaviðskipti varð miklu meiri en hefðbundin lánastarfsemi til 
heimila, sem undirstrikar umsnúning á meintu hlutverki íslenskra banka. Þetta kemur 
skýrt fram á mynd 1 sem sýnir aukningu útlána til eignarhaldsfélaga samanborið við 
lán til íslenskra heimila frá apríl 2005. Þessi mynd segir þó ekki alla söguna því slík 
lán voru stundum veitt í þeim tilgangi einum að kaupa hlutabréf í öðrum félögum 
(Jannari 2009) eða jafnvel hlutabréf í sömu bönkum og veittu lánin (Rannsóknarnefnd 
Alþingi 2010, 12. kafli).  
 
Mynd 1. Samanburður á aukningu útlána til íslenskra eignarhaldsfélaga 
samanborið við heimili. 
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Heimild: Seðlabanki Íslands (2009). 
Á mynd 1 sést hvað íslensku bankarnir lánuðu mikið til eignarhaldsfélaga sem fóru í 
útrás. Samanburðurinn er jafnvel ekki alveg raunhæfur því lán til heimila voru mikil á 
þessu tímabili þar sem íslenskir bankar höfðu þá nýverið hafið lánastarfsemi í vegna 
húsnæðislána. Oft lögðu eigendur eignarhaldsfélaga lítið eigið fé fram í kaupin sem 
þýddi að þau voru afar voguð94.  
Þrátt fyrir áherslu á að vera alþjóðlegir með möguleikum á fjárfestingum út um allan 
heim ásældust íslenskir bankar furðu svipaðar eignir, margar hverjar þekktar af 
Íslendingum fyrir útrás. Verslunarkeðjur á Oxford-stræti í London og miðbæ 
Kaupmannahafnar eru dæmi um félög sem íslenskir athafnamenn keyptu og 
fjármögnuðu að stórum hluta með erlendu fjármagni en hvort tveggja voru staðir þar 
sem Íslendingar höfðu undanfarin ár helst verslað í Evrópu. Meðal kaupa voru Arcadia 
í London sem átti verslunarkeðjur eins og Selfridges, Debenhams og House of Fraser 
og einnig fataverslunarakeðjur eins og Topman, Topshop, Wallis, Burton, Dorothy 
Perkins, Evans, Miss Selfridge og BHS, Illum og Magazine í Kaupmannahöfn. Gott 
dæmi um einsleitni íslensku bankanna í útrásinni voru kaup Kaupþings á danska FIH-
bankanum árið 2004, en eignir Kaupþings þrefölduðust því sem næst það árið og nam 
sú eignaryfirtaka 80% af heildareignaaukningunni (Rannsóknarnefnd Alþingis 2010, 
                                                          
94 Voguð kaup eru þegar að lánsfé er uppspretta stórs hluta fjárfestinga. Þegar að vel gengur magnast 
hagnaðurinn því að lítil hækkun á fjárfestingu myndar mikla hækkun á það fé sem lagt er í fjárfestingu. 
Sé til dæmis fjárfest fyrir 100 krónur og 90 krónur fengnar að láni til þess, sem þýðir að 
eiginfjárframlag er aðeins 10 krónur, þá myndar 10 króna hagnaður 100% arðsemi eigin fjár. Ef 
fjárfestingin lækkar hins vegar örlítið, til dæmis 10 krónur, þurrkast eiginfjárframlagið út. Því getur 
velgengni í ákveðin tíma virst vera gríðarleg án þess að áhætta henni tengd sé sjáanleg flestum. 
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7. kafli). Helstu keppinautar Kaupþings í þessum kaupum voru hinir Landsbankinn og 
Glitnir banki.  
Í ljósi þess að ráðamenn höfðu lítinn áhuga á að tengjast alþjóðlegu fjármálaumhverfi 
á þann hátt að erlendum aðilum væri boðið að eiga ráðandi hlut í bönkum á Íslandi má 
segja að önnur tegund af alþjóðavæðingu íslenskra banka hafi hafist með þessum auknu 
umsvifum íslenskra fjárfesta, sem voru annaðhvort bankarnir sjálfir eða félög studd 
dyggilega af þeim. Forstjóri Kaupþings sagði til dæmis á lokuðum fundi að fyrirtækið 
stefndi að því að verða eins og fjárfestingarbankinn Merrill Lynch,95 sem Kaupþing 
hafði nýverið heimsótt, og sumir starfsmenn bankans sögðu í gríni að þeir væru að 
verða eins og Goldman Sachs á Íslandi (Ásgeir Jónsson 2009). Líkt og nánar er fjallað 
um í næsta hluta greinarinnar mátti fljótlega sjá í fjölmiðlum og ræðum ráðamanna 
hugtakið „útrásarvíkingar“ í tengslum við þessi kaup Íslendinga erlendis, en eignarhald 
fjölmiðla var í sífellt auknum mæli að færast í hendur stærstu viðskiptavina og eigendur 
bankanna (Alda Guðrún Áskelsdóttir 2009). Í stað þess að vísa til íslensks bankakerfis 
sem staðbundins kerfis sem var að færast í átt að aukinni samtengingu alþjóðlegra 
fjármála markaða var myndað hugtak sem var samofið hugmyndum um óljósa 
víkingaarfleifð Íslands (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2009). 
Alþjóðavæðing og þjóðernishyggja  
Leggja má áherslu á að þegar einkvæðingarferli bankanna var lokið var þessi vöxtur 
banka og verðbréfamarkaða Íslands sögulega óþekktur í veröldinni. Íslenska 
                                                          
95 Þetta kom fram í viðtali við bankastarfsmann sem vann náið með Kaupþingi á þessum árum. 
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hlutabréfavísitalan hækkaði um 56% árið 2003, 59% árið 2004 og 64% árið 2005 sem 
samsvarar fjórfaldri hækkun vísitölunnar (Gylfi Magnússon 2006).96 Jafnvel 
samanborið við aðra hlutabréfamarkaði, sem hækkuðu líka mikið á sama tímabili, var 
hækkun íslenskra hlutabréfa áberandi mest. Mynd 2 sýnir vel hversu hratt íslenska 
hlutabréfavísitalan hækkaði miðað við önnur Norðurlönd frá upphafi ársins 1999. Þessi 
velgengni hélst hönd í hönd við þá sýn að velgengnin væri á einhvern hátt afleiðing af 
„eðli“ Íslendinganna sjálfra sem birtist einna helst í því hversu víða í samfélaginu var 
farið að vísa til viðskipta erlendis sem þátt í íslenskri útrás og það tengt við 
þjóðareinkenni Íslendinga. 
 
 
  
                                                          
96 Til samanburðar var mesta sögulega hækkun hlutabréfa í Bandaríkjunum árið 1933 þegar að 
hlutabréfavísitalan hækkaði um 54% (Fridson, 1998) - en sú hækkun kom í kjölfar tæplega 90% 
lækkunar á gengi hlutabréfa í skugga kreppunnar miklu. Hér er verið að vísa í hækkun á almannaksári 
frá 1. janúar til 31. desembers, S&P 500 hlutabréfavísitalan í Bandaríkjunum hækkaði til dæmis um 
rúmlega 66% frá mars 2009 til mars 2010. 
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Mynd 2. Samanburður á gengi hlutabréfavísitalna Norðurlanda, fimm lönd. 
 
Heimild: Eurostat (2012). 
Aukin áhersla á þjóðernishyggju endurspeglaðist í bönkunum sjálfum eins og sjá má í 
nöfnum og umbreytingu á slagorðum bankanna. Landsbanki Íslands hélt bæði nafni 
sínu og slagorði sem vísar augljóslega ekki til neinna sérstaka starfsgreina eða hópa. 
Það féll því vel að ímynd „okkar“ Íslendinga sem (útrásar)víkingar, sem tengist banka 
allra landsmanna nema hvað nú var hugtakið „landsmenn“ líklega ekki í hugum 
almennings tengt við hlutverk banka í umsýslu daglegs lífs  heldur víkinga sem numu 
ný mið. Auglýsingar þess tíma fara einnig í vaxandi mæli að nýta sér tilvísun til lands 
og þjóðar með myndum af íslensku landslagi eða sameiningartáknum íslensku 
þjóðarinnar, svo sem listaverkum eða listamönnum. Í eldri auglýsingum má sjá ríkari 
áherslu á gæði þjónustu við viðskiptavini sem lykil áhersluatriði bankanna og tilvísun 
til ákveðna starfsgreina eða þjóðfélagshópaNafni Búnaðarbankans var í fyrstu breytt í 
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skammstöfun þess og Kaupþings, sem varð hið hlutlausa og staðlausa heiti KB-banki. 
Því var síðan breytt aftur í nafn Kaupþings sem var íslenskt en hafði þó orðið þekkt 
erlendis. Bankinn hætti með slagorðið „traustur banki“ sem beðið hafði hnekki um 
aldamótin enda var þá frekar lögð áhersla á vöxt frekar en traust. Íslandsbanki breytti 
nafni sínu í Glitnir banki árið 2006 til að veita bankanum alþjóðlegan blæ (þrátt fyrir 
það áttu margir útlendingar í erfiðleikum með að bera það fram) en héldu á sama tíma 
tengingu við Ísland. Hérlendis var lögð töluverð áhersla á tenginguna við norræna 
goðafræði en lítið fór þó fyrir nánari útskýringu á hugtakinu. Glitnir var bústaður ássins 
Forseta sem sagður var vera þakinn silfri og borinn af súlum, veggjum og bitum úr 
gulli.97 Jafnvel sparisjóðir fóru í auknum mæli að nota skammstafanir í 
auglýsingaherferðum sínum, svo sem SPH í stað Sparisjóðs Hafnarfjarðar og SPV í 
stað Sparisjóðs vélstjóra, sem gerðu tengsl þeirra við ákveðnar starfstéttir eða 
bæjarfélög óljósari og jafnvel ósýnileg. Þegar ofangreindir sparisjóðir sameinuðust árið 
2006 var nýtt nafn sameinaðs sparisjóðs Byr sparisjóður og þannig voru ekki lengur að 
finna nein staðbundin tengsl í nafninu. Sameiginleg kynningarstarfsemi sparisjóða hélt 
þó áfram að einblína á þjónustu „fyrir þig og þína“ en þeir þóttu vera orðnir eftirbátar 
bankanna árin áður en fjármálakerfi Íslands hrundi. Nafni Sparisjóðabanka Íslands var 
árið 2006 breytt í Icebank, nafn sem notað hafði verið gagnvart erlendum 
viðskiptavinum þess frá stofnun bankans árið 1986 (Icebank 2006). Með því var nafn 
bankans ekki lengur íslenskt en vísaði engu að síður til Íslands. Því var aftur breytt í 
sitt upprunalega nafn nokkrum dögum eftir hrun íslenska bankakerfisins haustið 2008, 
                                                          
97 http://visindavefur.is/svar.php?id=22727 
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þegar ljóst þótti að útrásin hefði misheppnast og hugsanlegt framhaldslíf bankans yrði 
einungis byggt á sínu gamla hlutverki að þjónusta innlenda sparisjóði. 
Endurskilgreiningin á bönkum sem stofnanir ótengdar ákveðnum starfsgreinum eða 
hópum í samfélaginu passaði vel við samfélagslegu umræðu og áherslur helstu 
framamanna þjóðarinnar á nýju hlutverki þeirra samhliða áherslu á þjóðerni Íslendinga 
sem áhrifaþátt í velgengni banka og íslenskra fjárfesta. Það er sérlega áhugavert hvernig 
umræða fjölmiðla á þessum tíma, þá bæði í orðum blaðamanna sjálfra og viðtölum við 
forkólfa viðskiptalífs og banka, má sjá sí endurtekna tilvísun til „okkar“ Íslendinga; 
velgengnin erlendis verður þannig hluti af „okkar“ velgengi, ásamt því að vera sprottin 
frá sérstökum þjóðareinkennum „okkar“. Tilvísun í landnámsarfleifð Íslands og 
víkinga var sérlega mikilvæg þegar vísað var í vöruhús minningana, en þó benda má á 
að í íslenskum námsbókum frá byrjun 20 aldar er frekar vísað til landnámsmanna en 
víkinga (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2009, 121). Ræða forseta Íslands, Ólafs Ragnars 
Grímssonar hjá Sagnfræðingafélagi Íslands árið 2006, endurspeglar skýrt hvernig 
árangur íslenskra fjárfesta erlendis var tengdur við landnámsarfleifð Íslendinga en 
þessir fjárfestar voru í flestum tilfellum annaðhvort bankarnir sjálfir eða félög studd af 
þeim. Að sögn forseta var landnámsöldin á ákveðinn hátt „upphafið að þessu öllu 
saman“ og „fólk sem hingað kom var hluti af menningarheild sem sótti nýjan efnivið á 
framandi lendur, hélt í langferðir í leit að betri tækifærum, bar í brjósti svipaðan 
útrásaranda og mótað hefur árangur okkar að undanförnu“ (Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson 
2006). Það voru því ekki aðeins dagblöð sem á þessum tíma skírskotuðu til 
landnámsarfleifðar Íslands heldur voru þessar vísanir einnig að finna í opinberum 
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gögnum, þar á meðal skýrslu Viðskiptaráðs þar sem notuð eru hugtök eins og 
„víkingar“ og „strandhögg“ (Þór Sigfússon og Halldór Benjamín Þorbersson 2005, 21 
og 33). Skýrsla nefndar um ímynd Íslands sem forsætisráðherra skipaði árið 2007 
endurspeglar svipaðar hugmyndir með áherslu á landnámsarfleifð Íslands 
(Forsætisráðuneytið 2008). Í umfjöllun Markaðarins um viðtal við Björgólf Thor 
Björgólfsson fengið af Bloomberg-viðskiptafréttaveitunni kemur fram að Björgólfur 
tali um það að hlutverk sitt sé að vera „könnuður“ (Markaðurinn 2006a, 8). 
Blaðamennirnir sjálfir nota stundum skírskotun í víkinga sem millifyrirsagnir eða sem 
útskýringu á velgengni einstaklinga sem endurspeglar vel hversu eðlileg slík tilvísun 
var á þeim tíma (sjá til dæmis Markaðurinn 2006b). Þessi áhersla á landnámsarfleifð 
Íslendinga skaraðist á við þá útskýringu að velgengni útrásarinnar byggðist á sérstökum 
einkennum Íslendinga. Skýrsla Viðskiptaráðs um ímynd Íslands sem fyrr var nefnd 
endurspeglar slíkar áherslur en þar segir að „íslenskt viðskiptalíf [einkennist] öðru 
fremur af miklum sveiganleika og skjótri ákvarðanatöku“, sem og að Íslendingar séu 
fljótir að „tileinka sér nýjungar“ og skeri sig þannig til dæmis frá Bretum (Þór 
Sigfússon og Halldór Benjamín Þorgeirsson, 2005, 26). Á svipaðan hátt er talað um 
Íslendinga hjá blaðamanni Markaðarins sem frumkvöðla sem „séu tilbúnir að taka 
mikla áhættu“ (Markaðurinn 2007a, 14) og í viðtali við starfandi stjórnarformann Auði 
Capital kemur fram að sumir telji „okkur jafnvel ‘léttgeggjaða‘ þjóð, því við látum 
okkur detta í hug að framkvæma það sem aðrir telja ómögulegt“ (Markaðurinn 2007b, 
16). Einnig má sjá hvernig ríkisvaldið og hagsmunahópar studdu við þessa ímynd. 
Skýrt dæmi um þetta er Viðskiptaþing árið 2007 þar sem yfirskriftin var „Ísland best í 
heimi? Alþjóðlegt orðspor og ímynd“ þar sem sjá mátti forsetisráðherra og 
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menntamálaráðherra sem eina af lykilþáttakendum í bland við ýmsa forkólfa 
viðskiptalífsins. Á þessu þingi var jafnframt fengin ímyndasérfræðingur, Simon 
Arnholt, til að kynna íslenskum stjórnvöldum tillögur hvað varðar 
langtímastefnumótun varðandi mótun ímyndar Íslands (sjá Viðskiptablaðið 2007, 6). 
Samkæmt samanburðarrannsókn Arnholt voru Íslendingar í 19. sæti í samanburði hans 
á styrkleika ímyndar landsins. Geir Haarde sagði í tilefni þess, samkvæmt 
Viðskiptablaðinu, að hann væri ósáttur við þetta enda „vitum við betur og við þurfum 
að miðla því betur að við erum í fremsta flokki“ (Viðskiptablaðið 2007, 6). Orð Geirs 
snúa áherslunni frá ímyndinni sem slíkri yfir í hvað Ísland er í „raun og veru“. 
Samkvæmt orðum hans erum „við“ í fremsta flokki í einhverju óljósu flokkunarkerfi 
þjóða og markmiðið er að koma öðrum í skilning um réttmæta stöðu okkar. Þessa 
sameiginlegu umræðu stjórnvalda og viðskiptalífsins á málþinginu má tengja við 
umræðu Guðmundar Hálfdanarsonar og Ólafs Rastick sem minnst var á fyrr, sem 
bendir á mikilvægi stjórnvalda í því að taka upp ákveðna þjóðernislega umræðu og gefa 
henni aukið vægi. 
Þó ber ekki að skilja þetta sem svo að fullkomin sátt hafi verið um þessa ímynd 
Íslendinga sem svo frjálslega var brugðið upp í fjölmiðlum. Sumir settu spurningamerki 
við þá sýn að eitthvað væri séríslenskt við útrásina, jafnvel hjá þeim sem tengdust 
svokölluðum útrásarverkefnum. Þetta kemur lítillega fram í skýrslu Útflutningsráðs 
Íslands um íslensk fyrirtæki á Norðurlöndum þar sem fram kemur að það fari 
„greinilega fyrir brjóstið á ýmsum íslenskum stjórnendum þegar erlendur árangur er 
rakinn til einhverra lítt skilgreindra íslenskra yfirburða“ (Þorgeir Pálsson, Hákon 
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Gunnarsson og Sveinbjörn Hannesson 2006, 15), þótt ekki sé fjallað um þetta á 
nákvæman hátt. Einnig er að finna stutt viðtal við forstjóra Össurar í Markaðnum þar 
sem hann leggur áherslu á að „við Íslendingar erum ekkert endilega betri en aðrir þótt 
við séu alveg örugglega jafn góðir“ (Markaðurinn 2006c, 10). Það að viðkomandi telji 
nauðsynlegt að staðhæfa slíkt gefur þó vísbendingu um hversu viðteknar slíkar 
hugmyndir voru. Þó er einnig ljóst að þjóðernisleg umræða á Íslandi speglaði sig einnig 
í erlendri umræðu um Ísland og var í gagnkvæmu samspili við hana. Einn kafli í skýrslu 
Viðskiptaráðs Íslands fjallar um mat Breta á íslensku viðskiptaumhverfi og þar má sjá 
þrástef sem eru kunnuleg úr íslenskum fjölmiðlum, svo sem áherslu á sveigjanleika 
Íslendinga og skjótar ákvörðunartökur (Þór Sigfússon og Halldór Benjamín 
Þorbergsson 2005, 28-29). Breskir fjölmiðlar fluttu einnig fréttir þar sem talað var um 
„íslenska víkinga“ og í Markaðnum og Viðskiptablaðinu var lögð áhersla á að flytja 
fréttir þar sem hól erlendra blaða um Ísland og útrásina voru útlistuð nákvæmlega. 
Markaðurinn birti til dæmis fréttir af umræðu The Guardian í Bretlandi þar sem sagt 
er að „íslensku útrásarvíkingarnir“ séu „ungir, graðir og hungraðir“ (Markaðurinn 
2007d, 12). Minna má á að samhliða, eins og endurspeglast í Markaðnum á tímabilinu 
2006–2007, er fjallað um fréttir af gagnrýni á íslensku útrásina og áhyggjur erlendra 
matsfyrirtæka af skuldsetningu íslensku bankanna sem eitthvað sem runnið væri af 
rótum annarlegra sjónarmiða. Þetta endurspeglast til dæmis í fyrirsögn leiðara 
Markaðarins nóvember 2006: „Danir eru í árásarham og engra varna að vænta þar í 
landi: Verðum að verjast lyginni sjálf“ (Hafliði Helgason 2006, 12). Í fyrirsögninni er 
lögð áhersla á „okkur“ Íslendinga sem einn samhentan hóp eins og fyrr var talað um 
þar sem Íslendinga eru kallaðir til varnar.  
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Umræða  
Lehman Brothers féllu í október 2008 og þá þegar mátti sjá hvernig hnattræn ferli eru 
samtengd staðbundnum aðstæðum (Moore 2004; Haugerud 2003) sem og þá 
samþjöppun tíma og rýmis sem oft er nefnd sem megineinkenni hnattvædds heims 
(Appadurai, 1996). Einstaklingar víðs vegar í heiminum, þar á meðal Íslandi, fylgdust 
náið með, vitandi að fall bankans myndi hafa mikil áhrif á afkomu og framtíð þeirra 
sjálfra, þrátt fyrir að gera sér engan veginn grein fyrir að hversu miklu leyti. Hrun 
íslenska fjármálakerfisins setti á svipaðan hátt sitt mark á alþjóðlegar aðstæður annars 
staðar.  
Íslendingar voru virkir í að túlka það alþjóðlega umhverfi sem íslenskt bankakerfi sigldi 
inn á tíunda áratug síðustu aldar, og þá ekki sem hluta af aukinni stöðlun íslenska 
kerfisins eða aukinni einsleitni heldur á mjög þjóðernislegan hátt. Kristín Loftsdóttir 
hefur talað um að þátttaka íslensku þjóðarinnar í hnattvæddum ferlum hafi verið 
„samofin orðræðum um sjálfsmyndir og þjóðarímynd“ þar sem hið „þjóðlega og 
alþjóðlega eru ekki andstæður, heldur hvort fyrir sig mikilvægt í sjálfsmynd 
þjóðarinnar (2007, 160)“. Þannig geta tákn íslenskrar þjóðernishyggju öðlast nýja 
merkingu í síbreytilegu samhengi, þar sem þau verða þáttur í markaðssetningu Íslands 
fyrir Íslendinga sjálfa (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2007, 164 og 169). Til þess að ákveðnar 
hugmyndir eða hugmyndafræði fái slíkt forræði í samfélaginu þarf að vera samhljómur 
milli þeirra og reynslu einstaklinga, sem og vera í samspili við þrár og væntingar þeirra 
(Eagleton 1991, 14–15). Velgengni Íslendinga erlendis og hugmyndin um útrásina var 
ekki aðskilin frá reynslu einstaklinga heldur þvert á móti, útrásin var „almenn þekking, 
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lifuð og snert og margsönnuð á síðum fjölmiðla“ (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2011, 5).98 Í 
stanslausri umræðu um hrifningu útlendinga á Íslendingum og með slíkri sjálfshyllingu 
má líta sem svo á að útrásin hafi hlotið sterkt forræði innan íslensks samfélags. Þetta er 
í samræmi við lýsingu Reinhart og Rogoff (2011) sem halda því fram að 
almenningsálitið á slíkum uppgangstímum feli í sér þá trú að „[v]ið [séum] klárari og 
við höfum lært frá fyrri mistökum… byggt á traustum grunni, umbættum stoðum, 
tæknilegri nýsköpun og góða stjórnarstefnu“ (þýðing okkar, bls. 1681). Á Íslandi var 
uppgangurinn fjármagnaður með fé útlendinga sem er merkilegt í ljósi þeirra sterku 
þjóðernisumræðu sem einkenndi hann.  
Ef litið er á sögu bankakerfis á Íslandi eins og við höfum gert hér er forvitnilegt að sú 
umræða sem átti sér stað um íslenska fjárfesta og bankamenn innan ramma útrásarinnar 
hafði engin sýnileg tengsl við sögulega þróun fjármálakerfis á Íslandi eða bankana. 
Áherslan var þess í stað lögð á óljóst víkingaeðli sem var úr takti við fjármálalegasögu 
landsins sem að ákveðnu leyti, eins og einn alþjóðlegur bankastarfsmaður benti á, var 
einfaldlega ekki til staðar á Íslandi (viðtal tekið 2012). Innan sögu banka og 
fjármálastofnana má sjá litla áherslu á „skjóta ákvörðunartöku“, „sjálfstæði“ eða 
„sveigjanleika“ sem mikilvæga þætti einstaklinga. Að sumu leyti á hugtak Hobsbawm 
„tilbúnar hefðir“ (invented traditions) við (1983) þar sem í nútímanum er sótt í smiðju 
hugmyndarinnar um landnámsmanninn eða víkingsins og þannig vísað óbeint til 
sjálfstæðisbaráttunnar í upphafi 20. aldar (Kristín Loftsdóttir 2009). Hobsbawm (1983) 
                                                          
98 Sú ásýnd var að stórum hluta tilkomin vegna auðvelds aðgengis að fjármagni frá útlöndum, sem til 
skemmri tíma veldur sögulega aukna þjóðarframleiðslu og velmegun. Sú ásýnd reynist oft vera 
yfirborðskennd og oft undanfari fjármálakreppa og mikils samdráttar í efnahagslífinu. 
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bendir einmitt á mikilvægi slíks á tímum mikilla þjóðfélagsbreytinga, þegar vinna þarf 
ákveðnum hugmyndum forræði, auka samstöðu ákveðins hóps og réttlæta tilkomu 
lagskiptingar í samfélaginu. Á Íslandi mátti sjá aukna stéttskiptingu í íslensku 
samfélagi, samhliða mikilli umræðu í fjölmiðlum um lífsstíl þeirra sem voru í forsvari 
fyrir bankana og hina svokölluðu útrásarvíkinga sem skapaði umhverfi eftirvæntingar 
og trausts (Már Wolfgang Mixa 2010).  
Sú sterka samstaða sem var um útrásina endurspeglast vel í þeim viðbrögðum sem fram 
komu á síðum viðskiptablaðanna þegar erlend matsfyrirtæki settu spurningarmerki við 
starfsemi íslensku bankanna. Þar kemur skýrt í ljós hvernig gagnrýni á útrás bankanna 
var gagnrýni á „okkur“ og því sjálfkrafa hluti af annarlegum sjónarmiðum eins og 
fyrrnefndar tilvísanir endurspegla. Þessi áhersla á „okkur“ hefur gert gagnrýni 
sérstaklega erfiða eins og sjá má á orðum eins sérfræðings hjá SPV (áður Sparisjóður 
vélstjóra) þegar hann fjallar um gagnrýni erlendis á útrásina í kjölfar neikvæðrar 
umræðu matsaðila á þenslu bankanna og bætir við: „Dapurlegra er þó að aðilar hér á 
landi hafa kosið að enduróma illa ígrundaðar yfirlýsingar og órökstudda gagnrýni 
erlendra samkeppnisaðila (Markaðurinn 2006d, 16).“ Þessu svipar til umræðunnar fyrir 
kreppuna miklu í Bandaríkjunum þegar Paul Warburg, einn af helstu 
hugmyndasmiðum við stofnun seðlabanka Bandaríkjanna árið 1913, lýsti yfir 
áhyggjum af ofþenslu í fjármálakerfinu í upphafi árs 1929; þá var hann gagnrýndur 
harðlega af löndum sínum að gera lítið úr velgengni landsins (e. Sandbagging 
American Prosperity) (Sobel 1968, 126).  
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Lokaorð 
Íslenskt bankakerfi breyttist á tiltölulega stuttum tíma úr lokuðu kerfi, sem byggði á 
pólitískri stefnumörkun og fyrirgreiðslu, í einkavædda banka sem áttu að stuðla að 
meiri hagræðingu í rekstri og minnka pólitísk afskipti. Sú leið alþjóðavæðingar sem 
valin var fól þó ekki í sér aðkomu erlendra aðila heldur fyrst og fremst stuðning við 
íslenska einstaklinga við að auka umsvif sín erlendis. Áherslur bankanna breyttust í 
kjölfarið: Áður var höfðað til sérstakra hópa íslenskra lánþega en nú beindu bankarnir 
sjónum sínum aðallega að fjárfestingatækifærum með það að markmiði að verða 
mikilvægir þátttakendur á alþjóðlegum mörkuðum. Þessi áherslubreyting náði 
varanlegri fótfestu eftir einkavæðingu bankanna. Sú gífurlega þensla sem hér varð 
áratuginn fyrir hrun bar augljós merki sem sjá má í undanfara annarra stórra 
efnahagshruna í gegnum söguna, þá bæði út frá efnahagslegu og samfélagslegu tilliti 
(Reinhart og Rogoff 2008, Shiller 2001). Viðvörunarraddir voru farnar að heyrast í 
upphafi nýrrar aldar varðandi aukningu í útlánum, meðal annars tengdum erlendum 
myntum (Morgunblaðið 2003; Seðlabanki Íslands 2004). Þessari gagnrýni var þá oft 
svarað með tilvísun til þess að höft á lánum hefðu haldið aftur af íslenskum heimilum 
til lántöku og að afnám haftanna væri þannig þáttur í að aðlaga sig að vestrænum heimi, 
svipað og sagt var á Norðurlöndunum í aðdraganda bankakreppunnar þar fyrir 20 árum 
síðan (Jonung 2008). Þegar sótt var í vöruhús minninganna var lögð sérstök áhersla á 
landnámsarleifð og einstakt atgervi Íslendinga sem talið var mótast af þessari arfleifð 
og veru í harðbýlu landi og beindi sjónum frá þáttum eins og hversu margt var líkt á 
Íslandi á þessum tíma og í undanfara fjármálabóla annars staðar sögulega – hvernig 
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keyrt var áfram á rauðu ljósi eins Már W. Mixa og Þröstur Olaf Sigurjónsson (2010) 
hafa orðað það. Hér höfum við lagt til að hluti af útskýringunni á því af hverju 
viðvörunarmerki voru hundsuð megi finna í því hvernig alþjóðavæðingin var túlkuð á 
þjóðernislegan hátt á Íslandi, sem undirstrikar að oft er erfitt að aðskilja greiningu á 
menningu og fjármálum.  
Sterk samstaða myndaðist innan íslensks samfélags um hina svokölluðu útrás sem 
byggði meðal annars á því hvernig hún var skilgreind sem verkefni „okkar“ Íslendinga 
og gagnrýni á einstaka þætti hennar var þannig auðveldlega túlkuð sem gagnrýni á 
„okkur“. Það er nokkuð erfitt að staðhæfa um hvort forsvarsmenn í hópi útrásarvíkinga 
hafi meðvitað nýtt sér þjóðernisleg stef, en þeir virðast þó að einhverju leyti hafa reynt 
að ýkja þessi tengsl eins og þegar Jón Ásgeir nefndi snekkjuna sína „Viking“ og hafði 
þriggja metra háa styttu af Leif heppna í móttökunni á höfuðstöðvum sínum í London 
(Guðni Elíasson 2009). Það er kaldhæðnislegt að þessi þjóðernislega útrás var að 
stórum hluta til fjármögnuð af erlendum aðilum, jafnvel Dönum, sem voru á sama tíma 
gagnrýndir harðlega í íslenskum fjölmiðlum. Á endanum voru það einnig 
útlendingarnir sem tóku skellinn og þurftu að fjármagna að mestu það gífurlega tap sem 
ævintýrið ól af sér. Ímynduð sérstaða íslenskrar bankastarfsemi þjónaði vel tilgangi 
eigenda og helstu hagsmunaaðila sem tengdust bönkunum. Sú mynd af hlutverki þeirra 
og einkennum var hins vegar í engu samræmi við sögulegar staðreyndir um hugmyndir 
varðandi hlutverk bankanna. 
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